This tool is beta test, If You got some problem please contact us
# | Start | End | Original | Translated |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 00:00:10,478 | 00:00:13,561 | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ |
2 | 00:00:16,228 | 00:00:18,937 | Newscaster 1: New and frightening warning from the FBI | Newscaster 1: New and frightening warning from the FBI |
3 | 00:00:19,019 | 00:00:21,103 | on hackers using malicious software | on hackers using malicious software |
4 | 00:00:21,186 | 00:00:23,895 | to launch a cyber attack against US businesses. | to launch a cyber attack against US businesses. |
5 | 00:00:23,978 | 00:00:26,770 | Newscaster 2: In some ways, it's a whole new way of making warfare, | Newscaster 2: In some ways, it's a whole new way of making warfare, |
6 | 00:00:26,853 | 00:00:28,895 | and I don't think that that overstates it one bit. | and I don't think that that overstates it one bit. |
7 | 00:00:28,978 | 00:00:31,186 | Mohammad javad zarif: There is a cyber war going on. | Mohammad javad zarif: There is a cyber war going on. |
8 | 00:00:31,269 | 00:00:33,853 | The United States started that cyber war. | The United States started that cyber war. |
9 | 00:00:33,937 | 00:00:35,353 | Newscaster 3: The first cyber weapon | Newscaster 3: The first cyber weapon |
10 | 00:00:35,436 | 00:00:38,019 | to threaten to damage targets in the real world. | to threaten to damage targets in the real world. |
11 | 00:00:38,103 | 00:00:41,728 | Newscaster 4: Hackers in places like China, North Korea, Iran, elsewhere, | Newscaster 4: Hackers in places like China, North Korea, Iran, elsewhere, |
12 | 00:00:41,812 | 00:00:45,978 | are exhibiting the capability to hit the power grid. | are exhibiting the capability to hit the power grid. |
13 | 00:00:46,061 | 00:00:48,019 | Newscaster 5: Chinese state-backed hackers | Newscaster 5: Chinese state-backed hackers |
14 | 00:00:48,103 | 00:00:50,770 | have been mobilized with one target in mind: | have been mobilized with one target in mind: |
15 | 00:00:50,853 | 00:00:54,812 | Anything to do with covid-19 related research. | Anything to do with covid-19 related research. |
16 | 00:00:54,895 | 00:00:58,436 | Mark Warner: Many of the threats in the 21st century will be in cyber: | Mark Warner: Many of the threats in the 21st century will be in cyber: |
17 | 00:00:58,520 | 00:01:00,019 | Misinformation, disinformation. | Misinformation, disinformation. |
18 | 00:01:00,103 | 00:01:01,978 | Newscaster 6: YouTube, Facebook, Twitter. | Newscaster 6: YouTube, Facebook, Twitter. |
19 | 00:01:02,061 | 00:01:03,603 | Whatsapp? Instagram? | Whatsapp? Instagram? |
20 | 00:01:03,687 | 00:01:06,770 | We are human species. We can be hacked. | We are human species. We can be hacked. |
21 | 00:01:06,853 | 00:01:09,395 | Newscaster 7: Russian government hackers | Newscaster 7: Russian government hackers |
22 | 00:01:09,478 | 00:01:11,561 | have breached the network of the dnc. | have breached the network of the dnc. |
23 | 00:01:11,645 | 00:01:13,228 | I don't think anybody knows it was Russia. | I don't think anybody knows it was Russia. |
24 | 00:01:13,311 | 00:01:14,853 | Newscaster 8: Russia, China, and other countries | Newscaster 8: Russia, China, and other countries |
25 | 00:01:14,937 | 00:01:17,061 | are collecting stolen information from hackers. | are collecting stolen information from hackers. |
26 | 00:01:17,144 | 00:01:18,395 | Michael Rogers: Today we face threats | Michael Rogers: Today we face threats |
27 | 00:01:18,478 | 00:01:20,144 | that have increased in sophistication, | that have increased in sophistication, |
28 | 00:01:20,228 | 00:01:23,228 | magnitude, intensity, volume, and velocity. | magnitude, intensity, volume, and velocity. |
29 | 00:01:23,311 | 00:01:25,395 | What about the confidence in the vote? | What about the confidence in the vote? |
30 | 00:01:25,478 | 00:01:27,395 | Andrea Mitchell: Especially against the backdrop | Andrea Mitchell: Especially against the backdrop |
31 | 00:01:27,478 | 00:01:29,687 | of the Russian interference in 2016. | of the Russian interference in 2016. |
32 | 00:01:29,770 | 00:01:32,061 | Joe biden: They're involved going after me on Facebook. | Joe biden: They're involved going after me on Facebook. |
33 | 00:01:32,144 | 00:01:33,436 | Because putin knows me, | Because putin knows me, |
34 | 00:01:33,520 | 00:01:35,311 | and I know him, and he doesn't want me to be president. | and I know him, and he doesn't want me to be president. |
35 | 00:01:35,395 | 00:01:37,311 | Newscaster 9: President Trump claimed without evidence, | Newscaster 9: President Trump claimed without evidence, |
36 | 00:01:37,395 | 00:01:41,019 | quote, "rigged 2020 election will be the scandal of our times." | quote, "rigged 2020 election will be the scandal of our times." |
37 | 00:01:41,103 | 00:01:44,103 | Are you suggesting that you might not accept the results of the election? | Are you suggesting that you might not accept the results of the election? |
38 | 00:01:44,186 | 00:01:45,353 | I have to see. | I have to see. |
39 | 00:02:02,895 | 00:02:04,353 | Announcer: Madam speaker, | Announcer: Madam speaker, |
40 | 00:02:04,436 | 00:02:07,228 | the president of the United States. | the president of the United States. |
41 | 00:02:07,311 | 00:02:10,353 | (Cheering and applause) | (Cheering and applause) |
42 | 00:02:17,019 | 00:02:19,436 | David sanger: At the end of the bush administration, | David sanger: At the end of the bush administration, |
43 | 00:02:19,520 | 00:02:22,311 | president bush decided he had to stop | president bush decided he had to stop |
44 | 00:02:22,395 | 00:02:24,103 | the Iranian nuclear program. | the Iranian nuclear program. |
45 | 00:02:24,186 | 00:02:26,937 | The United Nations has imposed sanctions on Iran, | The United Nations has imposed sanctions on Iran, |
46 | 00:02:27,019 | 00:02:30,478 | and made it clear that the world will not allow the regime in Tehran | and made it clear that the world will not allow the regime in Tehran |
47 | 00:02:30,561 | 00:02:32,144 | to acquire nuclear weapons. | to acquire nuclear weapons. |
48 | 00:02:32,228 | 00:02:34,144 | (Applause) | (Applause) |
49 | 00:02:34,228 | 00:02:35,853 | But he had a problem. | But he had a problem. |
50 | 00:02:37,353 | 00:02:39,436 | Colin Powell: My second purpose today is to share with you | Colin Powell: My second purpose today is to share with you |
51 | 00:02:39,520 | 00:02:43,853 | what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction... | what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction... |
52 | 00:02:43,937 | 00:02:45,812 | We had just gone to a war in Iraq | We had just gone to a war in Iraq |
53 | 00:02:45,895 | 00:02:49,019 | on the false pretense that Iraq had a nuclear weapon. | on the false pretense that Iraq had a nuclear weapon. |
54 | 00:02:50,395 | 00:02:52,186 | So there was no way he was going to be able to | So there was no way he was going to be able to |
55 | 00:02:52,269 | 00:02:54,019 | publicly convince the world | publicly convince the world |
56 | 00:02:54,103 | 00:02:58,978 | to get into a conflict with Iran over its nuclear program. | to get into a conflict with Iran over its nuclear program. |
57 | 00:02:59,061 | 00:03:02,645 | One day, a group of intelligence officials | One day, a group of intelligence officials |
58 | 00:03:02,728 | 00:03:04,895 | and military officers | and military officers |
59 | 00:03:04,978 | 00:03:08,228 | came to the president and said, "sir, we have another way." | came to the president and said, "sir, we have another way." |
60 | 00:03:09,937 | 00:03:14,478 | They told bush that a joint Israeli-American cyber team | They told bush that a joint Israeli-American cyber team |
61 | 00:03:14,561 | 00:03:16,228 | had designed some code | had designed some code |
62 | 00:03:16,311 | 00:03:21,061 | that could get into the Iranian nuclear control system. | that could get into the Iranian nuclear control system. |
63 | 00:03:21,144 | 00:03:26,687 | Until then, countries were using cyber to steal data. | Until then, countries were using cyber to steal data. |
64 | 00:03:26,770 | 00:03:28,895 | To spy on each other. | To spy on each other. |
65 | 00:03:30,186 | 00:03:34,645 | But almost no one had used cyber as an offensive weapon. | But almost no one had used cyber as an offensive weapon. |
66 | 00:03:37,228 | 00:03:41,269 | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ |
67 | 00:03:44,311 | 00:03:45,812 | John hultquist: The plan was | John hultquist: The plan was |
68 | 00:03:45,895 | 00:03:48,186 | a piece of malware would be delivered | a piece of malware would be delivered |
69 | 00:03:48,269 | 00:03:50,728 | into the industrial control systems | into the industrial control systems |
70 | 00:03:50,812 | 00:03:53,603 | running the Iranian nuclear program. | running the Iranian nuclear program. |
71 | 00:03:55,228 | 00:03:57,061 | Michael Riley: This network was air gapped. | Michael Riley: This network was air gapped. |
72 | 00:03:57,144 | 00:03:59,561 | In other words, it's not connected to the Internet. | In other words, it's not connected to the Internet. |
73 | 00:03:59,645 | 00:04:03,812 | So you had to have ways in which the code could jump onto those computers. | So you had to have ways in which the code could jump onto those computers. |
74 | 00:04:09,103 | 00:04:13,520 | Sanger: There's still some mystery about exactly how this code | Sanger: There's still some mystery about exactly how this code |
75 | 00:04:13,603 | 00:04:16,728 | made it from the NSA and the Israeli cyber unit | made it from the NSA and the Israeli cyber unit |
76 | 00:04:16,812 | 00:04:18,978 | into the natanz plant. | into the natanz plant. |
77 | 00:04:21,103 | 00:04:22,561 | There are many ways, | There are many ways, |
78 | 00:04:22,645 | 00:04:25,436 | including slipping in a USB key. | including slipping in a USB key. |
79 | 00:04:26,937 | 00:04:28,436 | But we also now know | But we also now know |
80 | 00:04:28,520 | 00:04:32,019 | that the NSA had designed a brilliant small system, | that the NSA had designed a brilliant small system, |
81 | 00:04:32,103 | 00:04:34,103 | about the size of a briefcase, | about the size of a briefcase, |
82 | 00:04:34,186 | 00:04:37,061 | that could work from six or seven miles away, | that could work from six or seven miles away, |
83 | 00:04:37,144 | 00:04:40,061 | beaming computer code into a computer | beaming computer code into a computer |
84 | 00:04:40,144 | 00:04:43,353 | that had been set up with a receiver chip. | that had been set up with a receiver chip. |
85 | 00:04:43,436 | 00:04:47,269 | And that device could be used | And that device could be used |
86 | 00:04:47,353 | 00:04:49,103 | not only to put code in, | not only to put code in, |
87 | 00:04:49,186 | 00:04:51,687 | but later to replace it and update it. | but later to replace it and update it. |
88 | 00:04:53,353 | 00:04:55,228 | Hultquist: Once they got in, | Hultquist: Once they got in, |
89 | 00:04:55,311 | 00:04:58,269 | the code started unlocking itself, | the code started unlocking itself, |
90 | 00:04:58,353 | 00:05:01,520 | and it started two major tasks. | and it started two major tasks. |
91 | 00:05:01,603 | 00:05:04,311 | The first one was to record | The first one was to record |
92 | 00:05:04,395 | 00:05:07,353 | everything that the operator would be saying, | everything that the operator would be saying, |
93 | 00:05:07,436 | 00:05:09,436 | and essentially, put that on a loop. | and essentially, put that on a loop. |
94 | 00:05:09,520 | 00:05:12,436 | So that every day, when the operator came in to work, | So that every day, when the operator came in to work, |
95 | 00:05:12,520 | 00:05:15,061 | everything would look just fine. | everything would look just fine. |
96 | 00:05:16,770 | 00:05:18,895 | It's sort of like a classic heist movie | It's sort of like a classic heist movie |
97 | 00:05:18,978 | 00:05:21,269 | where the surveillance video is run on a loop, | where the surveillance video is run on a loop, |
98 | 00:05:21,353 | 00:05:23,478 | and the guard never knows what's actually going on. | and the guard never knows what's actually going on. |
99 | 00:05:23,561 | 00:05:27,520 | While at the same time, somebody's breaking in and stealing something. | While at the same time, somebody's breaking in and stealing something. |
100 | 00:05:30,728 | 00:05:32,645 | The Iranians were thinking the whole time | The Iranians were thinking the whole time |
101 | 00:05:32,728 | 00:05:34,019 | that they're making progress. | that they're making progress. |
102 | 00:05:34,103 | 00:05:36,103 | That they're moving towards their goal, | That they're moving towards their goal, |
103 | 00:05:36,186 | 00:05:39,728 | when in fact, these systems are deadlined. | when in fact, these systems are deadlined. |
104 | 00:05:39,812 | 00:05:42,103 | Because the second task for the code | Because the second task for the code |
105 | 00:05:42,186 | 00:05:45,561 | was to take the centrifuges and break them. | was to take the centrifuges and break them. |
106 | 00:05:47,019 | 00:05:48,520 | This code was so ingenious | This code was so ingenious |
107 | 00:05:48,603 | 00:05:50,812 | that not only did it have this sort of fake video, | that not only did it have this sort of fake video, |
108 | 00:05:50,895 | 00:05:52,645 | pay no attention to what's going on here, | pay no attention to what's going on here, |
109 | 00:05:52,728 | 00:05:54,395 | it would lie in wait. | it would lie in wait. |
110 | 00:05:54,478 | 00:05:56,061 | And so days would go by, | And so days would go by, |
111 | 00:05:56,144 | 00:05:59,269 | where the centrifuges were spinning exactly as they were supposed to. | where the centrifuges were spinning exactly as they were supposed to. |
112 | 00:05:59,353 | 00:06:01,853 | And then all of a sudden, they'd speed up really fast. | And then all of a sudden, they'd speed up really fast. |
113 | 00:06:01,937 | 00:06:03,269 | And then when you'd turn to look, | And then when you'd turn to look, |
114 | 00:06:03,353 | 00:06:05,186 | they would slow down to the regular speed. | they would slow down to the regular speed. |
115 | 00:06:05,269 | 00:06:06,770 | And eventually what happens when you do this | And eventually what happens when you do this |
116 | 00:06:06,853 | 00:06:08,269 | to these finely tuned machines, | to these finely tuned machines, |
117 | 00:06:08,353 | 00:06:10,144 | is that they break themselves apart. | is that they break themselves apart. |
118 | 00:06:15,353 | 00:06:18,520 | Sanger: When President Obama had that traditional meeting | Sanger: When President Obama had that traditional meeting |
119 | 00:06:18,603 | 00:06:21,395 | with his predecessor, George Bush, | with his predecessor, George Bush, |
120 | 00:06:21,478 | 00:06:24,019 | bush told him that there were two programs | bush told him that there were two programs |
121 | 00:06:24,103 | 00:06:27,228 | he had to make sure that he preserved. | he had to make sure that he preserved. |
122 | 00:06:27,311 | 00:06:28,937 | One of them was the drone program. | One of them was the drone program. |
123 | 00:06:30,269 | 00:06:33,019 | The second program was "olympic games," | The second program was "olympic games," |
124 | 00:06:33,103 | 00:06:36,687 | the code name for the program against Iran. | the code name for the program against Iran. |
125 | 00:06:36,770 | 00:06:40,144 | Suddenly, in his first months in office, | Suddenly, in his first months in office, |
126 | 00:06:40,228 | 00:06:43,144 | President Obama finds himself in the situation room, | President Obama finds himself in the situation room, |
127 | 00:06:43,228 | 00:06:46,144 | picking out centrifuges to attack. | picking out centrifuges to attack. |
128 | 00:06:48,812 | 00:06:52,520 | For a while, the Iranians had no idea what was going on. | For a while, the Iranians had no idea what was going on. |
129 | 00:06:52,603 | 00:06:55,728 | They didn't know if they had made engineering errors, | They didn't know if they had made engineering errors, |
130 | 00:06:55,812 | 00:06:57,561 | whether they had bad parts. | whether they had bad parts. |
131 | 00:06:57,645 | 00:07:00,395 | They suspected sabotage, but couldn't prove it. | They suspected sabotage, but couldn't prove it. |
132 | 00:07:00,478 | 00:07:03,937 | Until one day, when the code got out. | Until one day, when the code got out. |
133 | 00:07:04,019 | 00:07:07,103 | Riley: This code is only supposed to go into one facility, | Riley: This code is only supposed to go into one facility, |
134 | 00:07:07,186 | 00:07:10,061 | and it was never supposed to be known to the rest of the world. | and it was never supposed to be known to the rest of the world. |
135 | 00:07:10,144 | 00:07:12,103 | Instead, it escapes the box. | Instead, it escapes the box. |
136 | 00:07:12,186 | 00:07:15,269 | It gets out of that facility and begins to spread around the world. | It gets out of that facility and begins to spread around the world. |
137 | 00:07:15,353 | 00:07:17,144 | Newscaster 1: These are the letters and numbers | Newscaster 1: These are the letters and numbers |
138 | 00:07:17,228 | 00:07:19,061 | behind the so-called stuxnet virus. | behind the so-called stuxnet virus. |
139 | 00:07:19,144 | 00:07:21,436 | Newscaster 2: It begins with a simple USB key. | Newscaster 2: It begins with a simple USB key. |
140 | 00:07:21,520 | 00:07:23,103 | Then with surgical precision, | Then with surgical precision, |
141 | 00:07:23,186 | 00:07:26,603 | penetrates some of the world's most advanced computer security. | penetrates some of the world's most advanced computer security. |
142 | 00:07:26,687 | 00:07:29,019 | Newscaster 3: Its creators hid their tracks so well, | Newscaster 3: Its creators hid their tracks so well, |
143 | 00:07:29,103 | 00:07:33,061 | experts say we will likely never know who created it. | experts say we will likely never know who created it. |
144 | 00:07:33,144 | 00:07:35,061 | Sanger: As we began to hear about | Sanger: As we began to hear about |
145 | 00:07:35,144 | 00:07:38,395 | this incredibly sophisticated piece of code | this incredibly sophisticated piece of code |
146 | 00:07:38,478 | 00:07:40,937 | that the industry was calling stuxnet, | that the industry was calling stuxnet, |
147 | 00:07:41,019 | 00:07:43,770 | I began to reconstruct the story | I began to reconstruct the story |
148 | 00:07:43,853 | 00:07:47,395 | of who authorized this code to be written. | of who authorized this code to be written. |
149 | 00:07:54,144 | 00:07:55,645 | Riley: Neither Israel nor the US | Riley: Neither Israel nor the US |
150 | 00:07:55,728 | 00:07:58,478 | had publicly admitted that this was designed by them. | had publicly admitted that this was designed by them. |
151 | 00:07:58,561 | 00:08:01,561 | John maggio: You did that without at all mentioning stuxnet or olympic games. | John maggio: You did that without at all mentioning stuxnet or olympic games. |
152 | 00:08:01,645 | 00:08:02,978 | That was, that was impressive. | That was, that was impressive. |
153 | 00:08:03,061 | 00:08:04,812 | I never heard of those. | I never heard of those. |
154 | 00:08:04,895 | 00:08:06,478 | Chris durrance: Can you talk about stuxnet? | Chris durrance: Can you talk about stuxnet? |
155 | 00:08:06,561 | 00:08:09,478 | -No: -Durrance: It's years ago. That-- one thing that-- | -No: -Durrance: It's years ago. That-- one thing that-- |
156 | 00:08:09,561 | 00:08:11,687 | I don't want to talk about it, okay? | I don't want to talk about it, okay? |
157 | 00:08:11,770 | 00:08:13,269 | Durrance: It's just that, it's a mystery. | Durrance: It's just that, it's a mystery. |
158 | 00:08:13,353 | 00:08:15,478 | I don't want to talk about it. | I don't want to talk about it. |
159 | 00:08:15,561 | 00:08:18,728 | Let me know if I'm not-- if I'm being too subtle, okay? | Let me know if I'm not-- if I'm being too subtle, okay? |
160 | 00:08:21,353 | 00:08:26,144 | Newscaster: This is the first worm designed to damage the physical world. | Newscaster: This is the first worm designed to damage the physical world. |
161 | 00:08:26,228 | 00:08:29,311 | Newscaster 2: It's a new dimension in sabotage and warfare. | Newscaster 2: It's a new dimension in sabotage and warfare. |
162 | 00:08:29,395 | 00:08:31,978 | The implications and the possible consequences | The implications and the possible consequences |
163 | 00:08:32,061 | 00:08:34,937 | are only now coming to light. | are only now coming to light. |
164 | 00:08:35,019 | 00:08:37,812 | Amy zegart: The stuxnet attack on Iran | Amy zegart: The stuxnet attack on Iran |
165 | 00:08:37,895 | 00:08:41,019 | was the first time a major state | was the first time a major state |
166 | 00:08:41,103 | 00:08:43,561 | used a powerful cyber weapon | used a powerful cyber weapon |
167 | 00:08:43,645 | 00:08:45,478 | in a very aggressive way. | in a very aggressive way. |
168 | 00:08:46,812 | 00:08:48,853 | Riley: People knew that the US government | Riley: People knew that the US government |
169 | 00:08:48,937 | 00:08:50,311 | had been developing tools | had been developing tools |
170 | 00:08:50,395 | 00:08:52,687 | that can manipulate computer systems | that can manipulate computer systems |
171 | 00:08:52,770 | 00:08:56,019 | to create effects in the real world. | to create effects in the real world. |
172 | 00:08:56,103 | 00:08:59,937 | Stuxnet was the first big example of that happening. | Stuxnet was the first big example of that happening. |
173 | 00:09:00,019 | 00:09:02,103 | Here's what it looks like, here's how sophisticated it is, | Here's what it looks like, here's how sophisticated it is, |
174 | 00:09:02,186 | 00:09:03,436 | and here's what it can do. | and here's what it can do. |
175 | 00:09:05,269 | 00:09:06,520 | You take that same principle, | You take that same principle, |
176 | 00:09:06,603 | 00:09:08,687 | you could shut down an airport with a similar tool. | you could shut down an airport with a similar tool. |
177 | 00:09:08,770 | 00:09:11,144 | You could shut down an electrical grid with a similar tool. | You could shut down an electrical grid with a similar tool. |
178 | 00:09:11,228 | 00:09:14,353 | You could shut down a gas pipeline with a similar tool. | You could shut down a gas pipeline with a similar tool. |
179 | 00:09:14,436 | 00:09:16,978 | So these things that were speculative | So these things that were speculative |
180 | 00:09:17,061 | 00:09:18,353 | suddenly become real. | suddenly become real. |
181 | 00:09:18,436 | 00:09:21,269 | The question is, if you're the first mover there, | The question is, if you're the first mover there, |
182 | 00:09:21,353 | 00:09:24,061 | have you now said, "that's fair game for everybody." | have you now said, "that's fair game for everybody." |
183 | 00:09:24,144 | 00:09:25,561 | They've crossed the rubicon. | They've crossed the rubicon. |
184 | 00:09:25,645 | 00:09:29,269 | The United States had basically legitimized | The United States had basically legitimized |
185 | 00:09:29,353 | 00:09:30,687 | the use of cyber | the use of cyber |
186 | 00:09:30,770 | 00:09:33,061 | as a weapon against another country | as a weapon against another country |
187 | 00:09:33,144 | 00:09:35,728 | against whom you had not declared war. | against whom you had not declared war. |
188 | 00:09:35,812 | 00:09:39,353 | It pushed the world into an entirely new territory. | It pushed the world into an entirely new territory. |
189 | 00:09:39,436 | 00:09:42,436 | (President ahmadinejad speaking) | (President ahmadinejad speaking) |
190 | 00:09:49,395 | 00:09:51,436 | Jason healey: Once the Iranians took the punch, | Jason healey: Once the Iranians took the punch, |
191 | 00:09:51,520 | 00:09:54,770 | Iran said, "oh, that's the way the game is played. | Iran said, "oh, that's the way the game is played. |
192 | 00:09:54,853 | 00:09:56,353 | All right, I get this now." | All right, I get this now." |
193 | 00:09:56,436 | 00:09:58,395 | And then they started to unleash | And then they started to unleash |
194 | 00:09:58,478 | 00:09:59,812 | against the United States. | against the United States. |
195 | 00:09:59,895 | 00:10:02,687 | ("Viva Las Vegas" by Elvis Presley playing) | ("Viva Las Vegas" by Elvis Presley playing) |
196 | 00:10:02,770 | 00:10:05,937 | ♪ Gonna set my soul on fire ♪ | ♪ Gonna set my soul on fire ♪ |
197 | 00:10:06,019 | 00:10:09,269 | ♪ got a whole lot of money that's ready to burn ♪ | ♪ got a whole lot of money that's ready to burn ♪ |
198 | 00:10:09,353 | 00:10:12,645 | ♪ so get those stakes up higher ♪ | ♪ so get those stakes up higher ♪ |
199 | 00:10:13,269 | 00:10:15,728 | ♪ viva Las Vegas ♪ | ♪ viva Las Vegas ♪ |
200 | 00:10:16,645 | 00:10:19,228 | ♪ viva Las Vegas ♪ | ♪ viva Las Vegas ♪ |
201 | 00:10:20,687 | 00:10:24,228 | Riley: In 2013, it's clear that Iran is still working towards | Riley: In 2013, it's clear that Iran is still working towards |
202 | 00:10:24,311 | 00:10:26,395 | a nuclear weapon. | a nuclear weapon. |
203 | 00:10:26,478 | 00:10:28,353 | And the Obama administration in the US | And the Obama administration in the US |
204 | 00:10:28,436 | 00:10:30,269 | is trying to start negotiations | is trying to start negotiations |
205 | 00:10:30,353 | 00:10:32,687 | to sort of coax them away from that. | to sort of coax them away from that. |
206 | 00:10:34,186 | 00:10:37,061 | In October of 2013, there's a panel. | In October of 2013, there's a panel. |
207 | 00:10:37,144 | 00:10:38,103 | There are several people on it, | There are several people on it, |
208 | 00:10:38,186 | 00:10:39,770 | but the really interesting person | but the really interesting person |
209 | 00:10:39,853 | 00:10:43,853 | that comes to talk on the panel is Sheldon adelson. | that comes to talk on the panel is Sheldon adelson. |
210 | 00:10:43,937 | 00:10:46,853 | Sheldon adelson is one of the richest men in the world. | Sheldon adelson is one of the richest men in the world. |
211 | 00:10:46,937 | 00:10:48,853 | He's a casino magnate. | He's a casino magnate. |
212 | 00:10:48,937 | 00:10:51,770 | He's got casinos off China, | He's got casinos off China, |
213 | 00:10:51,853 | 00:10:54,311 | he's got a major casino in Singapore. | he's got a major casino in Singapore. |
214 | 00:10:54,395 | 00:10:56,478 | He's got two major casinos in Las Vegas, | He's got two major casinos in Las Vegas, |
215 | 00:10:56,561 | 00:10:58,144 | and that's really where he made his money. | and that's really where he made his money. |
216 | 00:10:58,228 | 00:10:59,978 | Newscaster: The billionaire businessman | Newscaster: The billionaire businessman |
217 | 00:11:00,061 | 00:11:01,478 | who made a fortune with casinos | who made a fortune with casinos |
218 | 00:11:01,561 | 00:11:03,645 | gave more than $92 million | gave more than $92 million |
219 | 00:11:03,728 | 00:11:06,478 | to conservative candidates in the 2012 race. | to conservative candidates in the 2012 race. |
220 | 00:11:06,561 | 00:11:07,895 | Riley: One of his most famous things is | Riley: One of his most famous things is |
221 | 00:11:07,978 | 00:11:09,812 | an effort to spend a hundred million dollars | an effort to spend a hundred million dollars |
222 | 00:11:09,895 | 00:11:12,228 | to make sure that Obama doesn't get elected to a second term. | to make sure that Obama doesn't get elected to a second term. |
223 | 00:11:12,311 | 00:11:14,520 | You've got to really dislike me... | You've got to really dislike me... |
224 | 00:11:14,603 | 00:11:16,269 | (Crowd laughing) | (Crowd laughing) |
225 | 00:11:16,353 | 00:11:17,978 | ...to spend that kind of money. | ...to spend that kind of money. |
226 | 00:11:18,061 | 00:11:20,103 | And he's very clear, and, | And he's very clear, and, |
227 | 00:11:20,186 | 00:11:21,812 | and full-throated about his opinions. | and full-throated about his opinions. |
228 | 00:11:21,895 | 00:11:23,853 | How are you able to be so outspoken? | How are you able to be so outspoken? |
229 | 00:11:23,937 | 00:11:27,520 | I flunked diplomacy 101. | I flunked diplomacy 101. |
230 | 00:11:27,603 | 00:11:29,561 | Riley: Especially when it comes to Iran, | Riley: Especially when it comes to Iran, |
231 | 00:11:29,645 | 00:11:32,103 | and when it comes to these negotiations in particular. | and when it comes to these negotiations in particular. |
232 | 00:11:32,186 | 00:11:33,687 | Wait, so you would support | Wait, so you would support |
233 | 00:11:33,770 | 00:11:35,728 | negotiations with Iran currently, | negotiations with Iran currently, |
234 | 00:11:35,812 | 00:11:39,853 | so long as they first seized all enrichment of uranium? | so long as they first seized all enrichment of uranium? |
235 | 00:11:39,937 | 00:11:42,812 | No. What do you mean support nego-- | No. What do you mean support nego-- |
236 | 00:11:42,895 | 00:11:44,687 | what are we going to negotiate about? | what are we going to negotiate about? |
237 | 00:11:44,770 | 00:11:47,770 | What I would say is... listen. | What I would say is... listen. |
238 | 00:11:47,853 | 00:11:50,103 | You see that desert out there? | You see that desert out there? |
239 | 00:11:50,186 | 00:11:52,103 | I want to show you something. | I want to show you something. |
240 | 00:11:52,186 | 00:11:54,311 | You pick up your cell phone, | You pick up your cell phone, |
241 | 00:11:54,395 | 00:11:56,353 | and you call somewhere in Nebraska, | and you call somewhere in Nebraska, |
242 | 00:11:56,436 | 00:11:58,269 | and you say, "okay, let it go." | and you say, "okay, let it go." |
243 | 00:11:58,353 | 00:12:01,812 | So there's an atomic weapon goes over ballistic missiles | So there's an atomic weapon goes over ballistic missiles |
244 | 00:12:01,895 | 00:12:05,978 | in the middle of the desert that doesn't hurt a soul. | in the middle of the desert that doesn't hurt a soul. |
245 | 00:12:06,061 | 00:12:09,561 | Maybe a couple of rattlesnakes and scorpions or whatever. | Maybe a couple of rattlesnakes and scorpions or whatever. |
246 | 00:12:09,645 | 00:12:11,937 | And then, and then you say, "see? | And then, and then you say, "see? |
247 | 00:12:12,019 | 00:12:14,478 | The next one is in the middle of Tehran." | The next one is in the middle of Tehran." |
248 | 00:12:15,436 | 00:12:17,687 | So, we mean business. | So, we mean business. |
249 | 00:12:17,770 | 00:12:20,061 | And that was not taken well in Iran. | And that was not taken well in Iran. |
250 | 00:12:20,144 | 00:12:22,937 | See? The next one is in the middle of Tehran. | See? The next one is in the middle of Tehran. |
251 | 00:12:23,019 | 00:12:25,228 | Riley: Somebody gets a YouTube clip of this. | Riley: Somebody gets a YouTube clip of this. |
252 | 00:12:25,311 | 00:12:26,228 | It goes up. | It goes up. |
253 | 00:12:26,311 | 00:12:28,478 | Doesn't take long before Iran notices it. | Doesn't take long before Iran notices it. |
254 | 00:12:28,561 | 00:12:31,019 | (Speaking foreign language) | (Speaking foreign language) |
255 | 00:12:43,436 | 00:12:45,645 | (Cheering) | (Cheering) |
256 | 00:12:48,478 | 00:12:51,311 | Riley: It's clear that Iran wants to punish adelson. | Riley: It's clear that Iran wants to punish adelson. |
257 | 00:12:51,395 | 00:12:53,019 | And they want to make it hurt. | And they want to make it hurt. |
258 | 00:12:56,728 | 00:12:59,269 | Casinos are basically big banks, right? | Casinos are basically big banks, right? |
259 | 00:12:59,353 | 00:13:02,561 | The amount of money that goes in and out of a casino in a day | The amount of money that goes in and out of a casino in a day |
260 | 00:13:02,645 | 00:13:05,103 | is millions and millions of dollars. | is millions and millions of dollars. |
261 | 00:13:05,186 | 00:13:08,561 | And so, casinos spend an enormous amount of money on physical security. | And so, casinos spend an enormous amount of money on physical security. |
262 | 00:13:08,645 | 00:13:11,561 | On cameras, on security guards, on vaults. | On cameras, on security guards, on vaults. |
263 | 00:13:11,645 | 00:13:13,520 | Like, the things that you would do to protect | Like, the things that you would do to protect |
264 | 00:13:13,603 | 00:13:15,311 | chips and cash. | chips and cash. |
265 | 00:13:15,395 | 00:13:17,603 | But as far as their it infrastructure, | But as far as their it infrastructure, |
266 | 00:13:17,687 | 00:13:19,478 | what does that look like? | what does that look like? |
267 | 00:13:24,645 | 00:13:27,061 | So, around December 2013, | So, around December 2013, |
268 | 00:13:27,144 | 00:13:30,103 | hackers in Iran start looking for a weak link | hackers in Iran start looking for a weak link |
269 | 00:13:30,186 | 00:13:32,436 | into sands corp's network. | into sands corp's network. |
270 | 00:13:32,520 | 00:13:35,186 | And the hackers just ultimately get lucky. | And the hackers just ultimately get lucky. |
271 | 00:13:36,895 | 00:13:39,645 | A senior software engineer had come from Las Vegas, | A senior software engineer had come from Las Vegas, |
272 | 00:13:39,728 | 00:13:42,770 | was working at a small casino in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, | was working at a small casino in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, |
273 | 00:13:42,853 | 00:13:45,061 | that's part of the sands corp empire, | that's part of the sands corp empire, |
274 | 00:13:45,144 | 00:13:47,103 | and had used his credentials | and had used his credentials |
275 | 00:13:47,186 | 00:13:48,937 | to get onto one of the machines in Bethlehem, | to get onto one of the machines in Bethlehem, |
276 | 00:13:49,019 | 00:13:50,687 | and the hackers found him. | and the hackers found him. |
277 | 00:13:50,770 | 00:13:54,186 | Those credentials allowed them to get into the Bethlehem network. | Those credentials allowed them to get into the Bethlehem network. |
278 | 00:13:55,103 | 00:13:57,061 | And then, from Bethlehem, | And then, from Bethlehem, |
279 | 00:13:57,144 | 00:14:00,228 | to Las Vegas, which is really where they wanted to be. | to Las Vegas, which is really where they wanted to be. |
280 | 00:14:04,019 | 00:14:05,978 | They'd start kind of slowly, | They'd start kind of slowly, |
281 | 00:14:06,061 | 00:14:07,687 | but by early February, | but by early February, |
282 | 00:14:07,770 | 00:14:10,645 | they release a few hundred lines of code, | they release a few hundred lines of code, |
283 | 00:14:10,728 | 00:14:14,728 | which is designed to, not to steal information, | which is designed to, not to steal information, |
284 | 00:14:14,812 | 00:14:16,436 | but to destroy computers. | but to destroy computers. |
285 | 00:14:16,520 | 00:14:20,770 | To, to override information. To really create chaos | To, to override information. To really create chaos |
286 | 00:14:20,853 | 00:14:22,603 | within sands corp's network. | within sands corp's network. |
287 | 00:14:26,478 | 00:14:28,520 | Former sands employee 1: I received a phone call | Former sands employee 1: I received a phone call |
288 | 00:14:28,603 | 00:14:30,478 | from a support desk manager | from a support desk manager |
289 | 00:14:30,561 | 00:14:33,436 | at about 4:00 A.M. | at about 4:00 A.M. |
290 | 00:14:33,520 | 00:14:36,144 | The support desk manager had been receiving calls | The support desk manager had been receiving calls |
291 | 00:14:36,228 | 00:14:41,687 | telling her that people's emails were getting locked up. | telling her that people's emails were getting locked up. |
292 | 00:14:41,770 | 00:14:44,353 | Some of the engineers tried to look into | Some of the engineers tried to look into |
293 | 00:14:44,436 | 00:14:46,144 | what might be the cause of it, | what might be the cause of it, |
294 | 00:14:46,228 | 00:14:48,603 | and they couldn't get in. | and they couldn't get in. |
295 | 00:14:49,603 | 00:14:51,770 | I wouldn't say that they were panicked. | I wouldn't say that they were panicked. |
296 | 00:14:51,853 | 00:14:53,436 | I would say that there was, um, | I would say that there was, um, |
297 | 00:14:53,520 | 00:14:57,269 | an extreme sense of urgency. | an extreme sense of urgency. |
298 | 00:14:57,353 | 00:15:00,687 | Former sands employee 2: In the morning, sometimes I check my email. | Former sands employee 2: In the morning, sometimes I check my email. |
299 | 00:15:00,770 | 00:15:02,812 | And I couldn't get to anything. | And I couldn't get to anything. |
300 | 00:15:02,895 | 00:15:07,353 | First thing I thought is, someone's gonna call me and yell at me, | First thing I thought is, someone's gonna call me and yell at me, |
301 | 00:15:07,436 | 00:15:10,228 | because probably the software is down. | because probably the software is down. |
302 | 00:15:10,311 | 00:15:12,228 | Minutes of a software outage | Minutes of a software outage |
303 | 00:15:12,311 | 00:15:15,812 | can amount to a loss of a serious amount of money. | can amount to a loss of a serious amount of money. |
304 | 00:15:17,895 | 00:15:19,645 | We were getting reports left and right | We were getting reports left and right |
305 | 00:15:19,728 | 00:15:22,520 | of people not being able to access their computers. | of people not being able to access their computers. |
306 | 00:15:22,603 | 00:15:26,853 | Our internal systems, our email, our way to communicate. | Our internal systems, our email, our way to communicate. |
307 | 00:15:26,937 | 00:15:28,478 | Accounting, was, like, paralyzed, | Accounting, was, like, paralyzed, |
308 | 00:15:28,561 | 00:15:30,186 | and that place is all accountants. | and that place is all accountants. |
309 | 00:15:30,269 | 00:15:32,978 | I mean, everybody in the back that isn't it | I mean, everybody in the back that isn't it |
310 | 00:15:33,061 | 00:15:34,895 | is in some kind of finance team. | is in some kind of finance team. |
311 | 00:15:34,978 | 00:15:38,061 | As the guys kept digging into it more and more, | As the guys kept digging into it more and more, |
312 | 00:15:38,144 | 00:15:41,937 | a sense of, like, "holy shit, this is huge. | a sense of, like, "holy shit, this is huge. |
313 | 00:15:42,019 | 00:15:44,478 | Like, the damage is massive." | Like, the damage is massive." |
314 | 00:15:48,144 | 00:15:50,853 | Former sands employee 1: At some point in time, we made a decision | Former sands employee 1: At some point in time, we made a decision |
315 | 00:15:50,937 | 00:15:54,228 | that everybody needs to turn off their computers. | that everybody needs to turn off their computers. |
316 | 00:15:54,311 | 00:15:58,937 | We basically had teams go out and unplug desktop machines. | We basically had teams go out and unplug desktop machines. |
317 | 00:15:59,019 | 00:16:01,436 | Former sands employee 2: We were going to pcs on the casino floor | Former sands employee 2: We were going to pcs on the casino floor |
318 | 00:16:01,520 | 00:16:03,853 | in the pits, and at the player's club, | in the pits, and at the player's club, |
319 | 00:16:03,937 | 00:16:05,228 | and in the cage, | and in the cage, |
320 | 00:16:05,311 | 00:16:07,436 | and taking them offline one at a time. | and taking them offline one at a time. |
321 | 00:16:07,520 | 00:16:09,353 | Scanning 'em, cleaning 'em. | Scanning 'em, cleaning 'em. |
322 | 00:16:11,770 | 00:16:15,853 | Former sands employee 1: We knew at that time this was a possible hack. | Former sands employee 1: We knew at that time this was a possible hack. |
323 | 00:16:15,937 | 00:16:18,937 | But I still thought it was a singular event. | But I still thought it was a singular event. |
324 | 00:16:19,019 | 00:16:22,311 | That we were basically doing damage control. | That we were basically doing damage control. |
325 | 00:16:22,395 | 00:16:24,645 | But there were things that popped up | But there were things that popped up |
326 | 00:16:24,728 | 00:16:26,978 | that indicated that it wasn't somebody hacking | that indicated that it wasn't somebody hacking |
327 | 00:16:27,061 | 00:16:28,728 | just for the sake of hacking. | just for the sake of hacking. |
328 | 00:16:28,812 | 00:16:30,603 | It was a political statement. | It was a political statement. |
329 | 00:16:32,520 | 00:16:35,561 | Former sands employee 2: The Las Vegas sands website had been defaced, | Former sands employee 2: The Las Vegas sands website had been defaced, |
330 | 00:16:35,645 | 00:16:37,978 | to show an image of the globe | to show an image of the globe |
331 | 00:16:38,061 | 00:16:41,395 | with various locations of the world on fire. | with various locations of the world on fire. |
332 | 00:16:42,436 | 00:16:44,478 | Former sands employee 1: I remember flames, | Former sands employee 1: I remember flames, |
333 | 00:16:44,561 | 00:16:49,019 | and something about adelson and cutting off his tongue. | and something about adelson and cutting off his tongue. |
334 | 00:16:49,103 | 00:16:51,561 | Former sands employee 2: We were all curious as to who did it, | Former sands employee 2: We were all curious as to who did it, |
335 | 00:16:51,645 | 00:16:54,186 | and then when we saw what had happened to the website, | and then when we saw what had happened to the website, |
336 | 00:16:54,269 | 00:16:55,687 | it was like, "oh. | it was like, "oh. |
337 | 00:16:55,770 | 00:16:59,395 | Well, this is a reaction to what Mr. Adelson had said." | Well, this is a reaction to what Mr. Adelson had said." |
338 | 00:16:59,478 | 00:17:02,478 | Former sands employee 1: You know, my stomach sank. It was like, | Former sands employee 1: You know, my stomach sank. It was like, |
339 | 00:17:02,561 | 00:17:05,603 | excuse my language, like, "holy shit." | excuse my language, like, "holy shit." |
340 | 00:17:06,687 | 00:17:08,228 | This is real. | This is real. |
341 | 00:17:11,061 | 00:17:14,186 | Newscaster: A cascading attack. Servers shut down. | Newscaster: A cascading attack. Servers shut down. |
342 | 00:17:14,269 | 00:17:17,436 | Screens go blank. A rush to unplug computers. | Screens go blank. A rush to unplug computers. |
343 | 00:17:17,520 | 00:17:20,561 | This attack hit the world's largest casino operation | This attack hit the world's largest casino operation |
344 | 00:17:20,645 | 00:17:21,853 | ten months ago. | ten months ago. |
345 | 00:17:21,937 | 00:17:23,978 | Sands corp was able to keep it secret for months, | Sands corp was able to keep it secret for months, |
346 | 00:17:24,061 | 00:17:27,478 | and to keep the scale, especially, of the attacks, secret for months. | and to keep the scale, especially, of the attacks, secret for months. |
347 | 00:17:27,561 | 00:17:30,561 | Newscaster: CNN has learned on February 10th of this year, | Newscaster: CNN has learned on February 10th of this year, |
348 | 00:17:30,645 | 00:17:33,812 | thousands of employees at sands casinos in Las Vegas | thousands of employees at sands casinos in Las Vegas |
349 | 00:17:33,895 | 00:17:36,895 | and Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, had their computers hit. | and Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, had their computers hit. |
350 | 00:17:38,186 | 00:17:41,186 | Former sands employee 1: They didn't want to get this out. | Former sands employee 1: They didn't want to get this out. |
351 | 00:17:41,269 | 00:17:43,895 | They wanted controlled communications, | They wanted controlled communications, |
352 | 00:17:43,978 | 00:17:45,770 | is what I will say. | is what I will say. |
353 | 00:17:48,770 | 00:17:51,853 | Riley: That comment that adelson made on that stage | Riley: That comment that adelson made on that stage |
354 | 00:17:51,937 | 00:17:53,687 | was a very expensive comment to make. | was a very expensive comment to make. |
355 | 00:17:55,103 | 00:17:58,353 | The cost of the attack and recovering from the attack | The cost of the attack and recovering from the attack |
356 | 00:17:58,436 | 00:18:00,395 | was about $40 million. | was about $40 million. |
357 | 00:18:00,478 | 00:18:02,728 | It cost the Iranians far less than $40 million. | It cost the Iranians far less than $40 million. |
358 | 00:18:02,812 | 00:18:05,186 | I mean, that's the thing about the asymmetry of these attacks | I mean, that's the thing about the asymmetry of these attacks |
359 | 00:18:05,269 | 00:18:08,687 | is hackers working in a team for a few days, | is hackers working in a team for a few days, |
360 | 00:18:08,770 | 00:18:11,311 | you know, they started probing in December. | you know, they started probing in December. |
361 | 00:18:11,395 | 00:18:15,186 | You know, a couple of teams got really active for a few days in January, | You know, a couple of teams got really active for a few days in January, |
362 | 00:18:15,269 | 00:18:17,853 | and in February, they unleashed the attack. | and in February, they unleashed the attack. |
363 | 00:18:17,937 | 00:18:21,353 | You know, that's a very low-cost attack from a nation-state point of view. | You know, that's a very low-cost attack from a nation-state point of view. |
364 | 00:18:26,520 | 00:18:29,353 | Sanger: The sands casino attack was a warning shot. | Sanger: The sands casino attack was a warning shot. |
365 | 00:18:29,436 | 00:18:32,269 | It was a reinforcement of the thought | It was a reinforcement of the thought |
366 | 00:18:32,353 | 00:18:34,812 | that a middling power like Iran | that a middling power like Iran |
367 | 00:18:34,895 | 00:18:38,770 | could shut down a big economic enterprise | could shut down a big economic enterprise |
368 | 00:18:38,853 | 00:18:40,687 | in the United States. | in the United States. |
369 | 00:18:40,770 | 00:18:44,186 | And that if the sands casino could be brought down, | And that if the sands casino could be brought down, |
370 | 00:18:44,269 | 00:18:46,144 | so could the rest of Vegas. | so could the rest of Vegas. |
371 | 00:18:46,228 | 00:18:50,144 | And what happened in Vegas wouldn't stay in Vegas. | And what happened in Vegas wouldn't stay in Vegas. |
372 | 00:18:50,228 | 00:18:54,978 | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ |
373 | 00:18:58,687 | 00:19:01,895 | Zegart: The evolution of cyber has happened very quickly, | Zegart: The evolution of cyber has happened very quickly, |
374 | 00:19:01,978 | 00:19:04,311 | in terms of its importance to the United States, | in terms of its importance to the United States, |
375 | 00:19:04,395 | 00:19:08,395 | and the organizational dimension of it in the US government. | and the organizational dimension of it in the US government. |
376 | 00:19:09,520 | 00:19:12,186 | In 2007, the director of national intelligence | In 2007, the director of national intelligence |
377 | 00:19:12,269 | 00:19:15,228 | issues a threat assessment of all the threats against the country. | issues a threat assessment of all the threats against the country. |
378 | 00:19:15,311 | 00:19:18,853 | The word "cyber" isn't in it a single time. | The word "cyber" isn't in it a single time. |
379 | 00:19:20,853 | 00:19:22,937 | Fast forward just a couple of years, | Fast forward just a couple of years, |
380 | 00:19:23,019 | 00:19:25,019 | you had the creation of cyber command. | you had the creation of cyber command. |
381 | 00:19:26,186 | 00:19:29,436 | Fast forward a couple more years, it's 2012. | Fast forward a couple more years, it's 2012. |
382 | 00:19:29,520 | 00:19:32,645 | Suddenly cyber has gone from not being mentioned at all | Suddenly cyber has gone from not being mentioned at all |
383 | 00:19:32,728 | 00:19:33,978 | in those threat assessments, | in those threat assessments, |
384 | 00:19:34,061 | 00:19:35,978 | to being one of the top three threats | to being one of the top three threats |
385 | 00:19:36,061 | 00:19:38,061 | facing the United States. | facing the United States. |
386 | 00:19:42,895 | 00:19:44,645 | Secretary of defense panetta | Secretary of defense panetta |
387 | 00:19:44,728 | 00:19:48,228 | goes on board the intrepid, which is an aircraft carrier museum-- | goes on board the intrepid, which is an aircraft carrier museum-- |
388 | 00:19:48,311 | 00:19:50,520 | I think the background is not a coincidence-- | I think the background is not a coincidence-- |
389 | 00:19:50,603 | 00:19:53,144 | and talks about a cyber Pearl harbor. | and talks about a cyber Pearl harbor. |
390 | 00:19:53,228 | 00:19:56,937 | We know that foreign cyber actors | We know that foreign cyber actors |
391 | 00:19:57,019 | 00:20:01,895 | are probing america's critical infrastructure networks. | are probing america's critical infrastructure networks. |
392 | 00:20:01,978 | 00:20:05,561 | They are targeting the computer control systems | They are targeting the computer control systems |
393 | 00:20:05,645 | 00:20:10,228 | that operate chemical, electricity, and water plants, | that operate chemical, electricity, and water plants, |
394 | 00:20:10,311 | 00:20:13,311 | and those that guide transportation | and those that guide transportation |
395 | 00:20:13,395 | 00:20:16,228 | throughout this country. | throughout this country. |
396 | 00:20:16,311 | 00:20:20,478 | The collective result of these kinds of attacks | The collective result of these kinds of attacks |
397 | 00:20:20,561 | 00:20:23,353 | could be a cyber Pearl harbor. | could be a cyber Pearl harbor. |
398 | 00:20:23,436 | 00:20:26,311 | Riley: And as people were warned about this notion of the cyber Pearl harbor, | Riley: And as people were warned about this notion of the cyber Pearl harbor, |
399 | 00:20:26,395 | 00:20:28,353 | what they seem to miss was, in fact, | what they seem to miss was, in fact, |
400 | 00:20:28,436 | 00:20:31,061 | that the US had set up a regime where, | that the US had set up a regime where, |
401 | 00:20:31,144 | 00:20:34,061 | if they, if Russia took down the electrical grid | if they, if Russia took down the electrical grid |
402 | 00:20:34,144 | 00:20:36,061 | or if China took down a, a gas pipeline, | or if China took down a, a gas pipeline, |
403 | 00:20:36,144 | 00:20:38,978 | they should expect a military response. | they should expect a military response. |
404 | 00:20:39,061 | 00:20:42,228 | The government had plans for a massive, kind of, | The government had plans for a massive, kind of, |
405 | 00:20:42,311 | 00:20:44,061 | major attack against the electrical grid. | major attack against the electrical grid. |
406 | 00:20:44,144 | 00:20:46,770 | What they didn't really have plans for was | What they didn't really have plans for was |
407 | 00:20:46,853 | 00:20:49,978 | this kind of, like, incremental, hit a company, | this kind of, like, incremental, hit a company, |
408 | 00:20:50,061 | 00:20:51,895 | you know, destroy its brand. | you know, destroy its brand. |
409 | 00:20:51,978 | 00:20:54,186 | Destroy its capacity to do business. | Destroy its capacity to do business. |
410 | 00:20:54,269 | 00:20:56,395 | How are we gonna respond, as the US government, | How are we gonna respond, as the US government, |
411 | 00:20:56,478 | 00:20:58,645 | to those kinds of attacks? | to those kinds of attacks? |
412 | 00:21:07,770 | 00:21:10,770 | (Singing in korean) | (Singing in korean) |
413 | 00:21:23,687 | 00:21:26,937 | Seth Rogen: I started with just a huge fascination | Seth Rogen: I started with just a huge fascination |
414 | 00:21:27,019 | 00:21:28,812 | with North Korea. | with North Korea. |
415 | 00:21:33,520 | 00:21:37,186 | Me and my writing partner Evan would read articles and books | Me and my writing partner Evan would read articles and books |
416 | 00:21:37,269 | 00:21:39,019 | and watch documentaries, and it was just, like, | and watch documentaries, and it was just, like, |
417 | 00:21:39,103 | 00:21:41,103 | endlessly fascinating to US. | endlessly fascinating to US. |
418 | 00:21:41,186 | 00:21:42,395 | Uh, who is it? | Uh, who is it? |
419 | 00:21:42,478 | 00:21:44,311 | Man: It is, uh, Kim jong-UN. | Man: It is, uh, Kim jong-UN. |
420 | 00:21:44,395 | 00:21:45,770 | What? | What? |
421 | 00:21:45,853 | 00:21:48,436 | Rogen: And then when Kim jong-UN took over | Rogen: And then when Kim jong-UN took over |
422 | 00:21:48,520 | 00:21:51,311 | is when the idea really expanded in our heads, | is when the idea really expanded in our heads, |
423 | 00:21:51,395 | 00:21:54,478 | because we realized he was around our age, | because we realized he was around our age, |
424 | 00:21:54,561 | 00:21:56,645 | um, and we read more about his life, | um, and we read more about his life, |
425 | 00:21:56,728 | 00:21:59,812 | and he weirdly was like a very sympathetic character | and he weirdly was like a very sympathetic character |
426 | 00:21:59,895 | 00:22:01,561 | in, in some ways. | in, in some ways. |
427 | 00:22:05,186 | 00:22:09,520 | We came up with this story about a guy who hosts | We came up with this story about a guy who hosts |
428 | 00:22:09,603 | 00:22:13,269 | a very exploitative late night talk show. | a very exploitative late night talk show. |
429 | 00:22:15,144 | 00:22:19,228 | Kim jong-UN is a big fan of his TV show. | Kim jong-UN is a big fan of his TV show. |
430 | 00:22:22,561 | 00:22:24,478 | So we get an interview with him. | So we get an interview with him. |
431 | 00:22:24,561 | 00:22:26,311 | And then the CIA says, | And then the CIA says, |
432 | 00:22:26,395 | 00:22:28,228 | because we are gonna be the first Americans, | because we are gonna be the first Americans, |
433 | 00:22:28,311 | 00:22:30,186 | you know, face-to-face with him in a long time, | you know, face-to-face with him in a long time, |
434 | 00:22:30,269 | 00:22:31,895 | uh, we could kill him. | uh, we could kill him. |
435 | 00:22:35,853 | 00:22:38,186 | We pitched the idea to Sony, | We pitched the idea to Sony, |
436 | 00:22:38,269 | 00:22:40,395 | and they basically said, like, | and they basically said, like, |
437 | 00:22:40,478 | 00:22:42,061 | "if you get James Franco in this, | "if you get James Franco in this, |
438 | 00:22:42,144 | 00:22:44,019 | we'll make this movie right away." | we'll make this movie right away." |
439 | 00:22:44,103 | 00:22:45,853 | And we were like, "okay." | And we were like, "okay." |
440 | 00:22:45,937 | 00:22:50,103 | (Guitar music playing) | (Guitar music playing) |
441 | 00:22:51,144 | 00:22:52,770 | If I recall correctly, | If I recall correctly, |
442 | 00:22:52,853 | 00:22:56,853 | it was them who suggested that we make it actually | it was them who suggested that we make it actually |
443 | 00:22:56,937 | 00:22:58,228 | Kim jong-UN. | Kim jong-UN. |
444 | 00:23:01,103 | 00:23:03,353 | It was something that, like, we were maybe, we were like, | It was something that, like, we were maybe, we were like, |
445 | 00:23:03,436 | 00:23:04,645 | "should we make up a guy? | "should we make up a guy? |
446 | 00:23:04,728 | 00:23:07,311 | Is that too much?" Um, and, | Is that too much?" Um, and, |
447 | 00:23:07,395 | 00:23:09,645 | Sony suggested, like, "well, just call him Kim jong-UN. | Sony suggested, like, "well, just call him Kim jong-UN. |
448 | 00:23:09,728 | 00:23:12,019 | It's probably funnier that way." Okay. | It's probably funnier that way." Okay. |
449 | 00:23:12,103 | 00:23:14,103 | (Action music playing) | (Action music playing) |
450 | 00:23:14,186 | 00:23:16,019 | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ |
451 | 00:23:16,103 | 00:23:18,186 | So, when the trailer comes out, | So, when the trailer comes out, |
452 | 00:23:18,269 | 00:23:21,103 | North Korea releases a statement through the UN | North Korea releases a statement through the UN |
453 | 00:23:21,186 | 00:23:22,645 | condemning the movie. | condemning the movie. |
454 | 00:23:22,728 | 00:23:24,978 | Newscaster: North Korea is accusing the United States | Newscaster: North Korea is accusing the United States |
455 | 00:23:25,061 | 00:23:28,061 | of "provocative insanity." An "act of war." | of "provocative insanity." An "act of war." |
456 | 00:23:28,144 | 00:23:31,353 | And promising "a decisive and merciless countermeasure" | And promising "a decisive and merciless countermeasure" |
457 | 00:23:31,436 | 00:23:34,311 | if the US supports the release of the film. | if the US supports the release of the film. |
458 | 00:23:38,269 | 00:23:41,395 | Michael lynton: We were trying to understand how seriously to take this | Michael lynton: We were trying to understand how seriously to take this |
459 | 00:23:41,478 | 00:23:44,478 | and whether there was something that we should be concerned about. | and whether there was something that we should be concerned about. |
460 | 00:23:44,561 | 00:23:46,687 | I called a friend of mine at the state department | I called a friend of mine at the state department |
461 | 00:23:46,770 | 00:23:50,478 | who directed me to the person who knew about the subject. | who directed me to the person who knew about the subject. |
462 | 00:23:52,478 | 00:23:55,144 | They said the North Korean government | They said the North Korean government |
463 | 00:23:55,228 | 00:23:57,895 | tends to be prone to make a lot of threats. | tends to be prone to make a lot of threats. |
464 | 00:23:58,019 | 00:24:01,395 | But almost never carried out on those threats. | But almost never carried out on those threats. |
465 | 00:24:01,478 | 00:24:03,311 | And they would certainly never | And they would certainly never |
466 | 00:24:03,395 | 00:24:06,603 | be able to carry out on a threat on US soil. | be able to carry out on a threat on US soil. |
467 | 00:24:06,687 | 00:24:09,520 | There was no mention whatsoever of cyber. | There was no mention whatsoever of cyber. |
468 | 00:24:11,186 | 00:24:14,603 | Rogen: Around then, conversations started to come up, | Rogen: Around then, conversations started to come up, |
469 | 00:24:14,687 | 00:24:17,853 | of like, "should we tone it down a bit?" | of like, "should we tone it down a bit?" |
470 | 00:24:19,186 | 00:24:21,478 | The idea that maybe, uh, | The idea that maybe, uh, |
471 | 00:24:21,561 | 00:24:26,019 | killing Kim jong-UN so graphically was maybe, um, | killing Kim jong-UN so graphically was maybe, um, |
472 | 00:24:26,103 | 00:24:27,603 | extra antagonistic. | extra antagonistic. |
473 | 00:24:27,687 | 00:24:32,687 | ♪ As you leave 'em falling down, down, down ♪ | ♪ As you leave 'em falling down, down, down ♪ |
474 | 00:24:36,853 | 00:24:41,061 | Lynton: Seth Rogen and his group were very resistant. | Lynton: Seth Rogen and his group were very resistant. |
475 | 00:24:41,144 | 00:24:44,937 | They felt that it added to the satire. | They felt that it added to the satire. |
476 | 00:24:45,019 | 00:24:49,269 | It was a lot of back and forth and there was a little bit of argument about it. | It was a lot of back and forth and there was a little bit of argument about it. |
477 | 00:24:49,353 | 00:24:52,728 | But we ultimately came to a compromise, I think. | But we ultimately came to a compromise, I think. |
478 | 00:24:54,311 | 00:24:58,061 | At that point, we felt that we had taken all the necessary precautions. | At that point, we felt that we had taken all the necessary precautions. |
479 | 00:24:58,144 | 00:25:00,645 | We made the changes to the picture that, | We made the changes to the picture that, |
480 | 00:25:00,728 | 00:25:04,061 | you know, Sony felt, or that my, my employer felt was, | you know, Sony felt, or that my, my employer felt was, |
481 | 00:25:04,144 | 00:25:06,144 | was necessary and, you know, | was necessary and, you know, |
482 | 00:25:06,228 | 00:25:08,228 | the rest was about getting the movie out. | the rest was about getting the movie out. |
483 | 00:25:08,311 | 00:25:11,978 | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ |
484 | 00:25:12,061 | 00:25:13,687 | Sanger: In North Korea, | Sanger: In North Korea, |
485 | 00:25:13,770 | 00:25:15,812 | the reconnaissance general bureau, | the reconnaissance general bureau, |
486 | 00:25:15,895 | 00:25:19,019 | which is the North Korean equivalent of the CIA, | which is the North Korean equivalent of the CIA, |
487 | 00:25:19,103 | 00:25:21,645 | dispatched a young hacker | dispatched a young hacker |
488 | 00:25:21,728 | 00:25:24,853 | to go to China and Southeast Asia | to go to China and Southeast Asia |
489 | 00:25:24,937 | 00:25:29,561 | and put together a team that would break into Sony's systems. | and put together a team that would break into Sony's systems. |
490 | 00:25:30,853 | 00:25:32,687 | Jim clapper went to North Korea | Jim clapper went to North Korea |
491 | 00:25:32,770 | 00:25:34,603 | during the middle of the Sony hack, | during the middle of the Sony hack, |
492 | 00:25:34,687 | 00:25:37,353 | and met the head of the reconnaissance general bureau. | and met the head of the reconnaissance general bureau. |
493 | 00:25:37,436 | 00:25:40,019 | He was trying to get the release of two Americans there | He was trying to get the release of two Americans there |
494 | 00:25:40,103 | 00:25:41,978 | while the hack was underway. | while the hack was underway. |
495 | 00:25:42,061 | 00:25:45,728 | And he never raised it because he never knew it was happening. | And he never raised it because he never knew it was happening. |
496 | 00:25:45,812 | 00:25:49,103 | The north Koreans went about this patiently, | The north Koreans went about this patiently, |
497 | 00:25:49,186 | 00:25:50,770 | and somewhat brilliantly. | and somewhat brilliantly. |
498 | 00:25:52,603 | 00:25:57,228 | In September of 2014, they broke into the Sony systems. | In September of 2014, they broke into the Sony systems. |
499 | 00:26:00,186 | 00:26:02,978 | But they didn't then just turn around and attack. | But they didn't then just turn around and attack. |
500 | 00:26:03,061 | 00:26:05,728 | They spent weeks examining | They spent weeks examining |
501 | 00:26:05,812 | 00:26:09,812 | how each element of Sony's operations | how each element of Sony's operations |
502 | 00:26:09,895 | 00:26:11,770 | were tied into the computer system. | were tied into the computer system. |
503 | 00:26:11,853 | 00:26:14,269 | They lurked in the system long enough | They lurked in the system long enough |
504 | 00:26:14,353 | 00:26:17,645 | to figure out how they could do maximum damage. | to figure out how they could do maximum damage. |
505 | 00:26:17,728 | 00:26:21,395 | And it wasn't until just around Thanksgiving, | And it wasn't until just around Thanksgiving, |
506 | 00:26:21,478 | 00:26:24,353 | two months later, that they struck. | two months later, that they struck. |
507 | 00:26:27,978 | 00:26:30,853 | Lynton: I was driving to work. My phone rang in the car. | Lynton: I was driving to work. My phone rang in the car. |
508 | 00:26:30,937 | 00:26:34,311 | The chief financial officer of the company rang me up | The chief financial officer of the company rang me up |
509 | 00:26:34,395 | 00:26:36,520 | and he said, "we have a real problem at work. | and he said, "we have a real problem at work. |
510 | 00:26:36,603 | 00:26:39,269 | All the email has gone down." | All the email has gone down." |
511 | 00:26:39,353 | 00:26:41,812 | Nobody was able to retrieve any data. | Nobody was able to retrieve any data. |
512 | 00:26:41,895 | 00:26:44,311 | And as the day progressed, it became quickly evident | And as the day progressed, it became quickly evident |
513 | 00:26:44,395 | 00:26:47,436 | that it was way beyond that. That in fact, we had... | that it was way beyond that. That in fact, we had... |
514 | 00:26:47,520 | 00:26:51,061 | Pretty much 70 percent of our computers had been knocked out of action. | Pretty much 70 percent of our computers had been knocked out of action. |
515 | 00:26:51,144 | 00:26:52,687 | Had been ruined, frankly. | Had been ruined, frankly. |
516 | 00:26:52,770 | 00:26:55,687 | Newscaster: Serious breach at Sony pictures last week. | Newscaster: Serious breach at Sony pictures last week. |
517 | 00:26:55,770 | 00:26:58,603 | A skeleton appeared on the Sony picture computers | A skeleton appeared on the Sony picture computers |
518 | 00:26:58,687 | 00:27:01,353 | with a small message that claimed they'd been hacked by a group | with a small message that claimed they'd been hacked by a group |
519 | 00:27:01,436 | 00:27:03,103 | calling itself "guardians of peace." | calling itself "guardians of peace." |
520 | 00:27:03,186 | 00:27:04,937 | Newscaster 2: Whoever they are, the guardians of peace | Newscaster 2: Whoever they are, the guardians of peace |
521 | 00:27:05,019 | 00:27:06,770 | have already done real damage. | have already done real damage. |
522 | 00:27:06,853 | 00:27:09,687 | Newscaster 3: Employees communicated with a phone tree, | Newscaster 3: Employees communicated with a phone tree, |
523 | 00:27:09,770 | 00:27:14,103 | and paid people with paper checks cut by a machine pulled from storage. | and paid people with paper checks cut by a machine pulled from storage. |
524 | 00:27:14,186 | 00:27:15,687 | Newscaster 4: Sony, by the time this is done, | Newscaster 4: Sony, by the time this is done, |
525 | 00:27:15,770 | 00:27:17,687 | is gonna lose tens of millions of dollars | is gonna lose tens of millions of dollars |
526 | 00:27:17,770 | 00:27:19,728 | just recovering from this attack. | just recovering from this attack. |
527 | 00:27:19,812 | 00:27:23,311 | It's a huge cost, just in terms of the impact of the it infrastructure. | It's a huge cost, just in terms of the impact of the it infrastructure. |
528 | 00:27:23,395 | 00:27:26,395 | But more importantly, it's a huge cost to the brand, | But more importantly, it's a huge cost to the brand, |
529 | 00:27:26,478 | 00:27:28,436 | because they steal a lot of data in this attack, | because they steal a lot of data in this attack, |
530 | 00:27:28,520 | 00:27:30,186 | and then they start releasing it publicly. | and then they start releasing it publicly. |
531 | 00:27:30,269 | 00:27:31,937 | Reporter 1: Tinseltown's dirty laundry | Reporter 1: Tinseltown's dirty laundry |
532 | 00:27:32,019 | 00:27:33,895 | is laid out in plain view. | is laid out in plain view. |
533 | 00:27:33,978 | 00:27:35,353 | And it is not pretty. | And it is not pretty. |
534 | 00:27:35,436 | 00:27:36,728 | Reporter 2: The studio's co-chairman | Reporter 2: The studio's co-chairman |
535 | 00:27:36,812 | 00:27:38,228 | and a powerful Hollywood producer | and a powerful Hollywood producer |
536 | 00:27:38,311 | 00:27:40,687 | used racial jokes to mock President Obama. | used racial jokes to mock President Obama. |
537 | 00:27:40,770 | 00:27:42,645 | Reporter 3: A top producer criticizing | Reporter 3: A top producer criticizing |
538 | 00:27:42,728 | 00:27:45,311 | Angelina Jolie's talent and ego. | Angelina Jolie's talent and ego. |
539 | 00:27:45,395 | 00:27:46,978 | These are juicy. | These are juicy. |
540 | 00:27:47,061 | 00:27:50,061 | Dmitri alperovitch: We had seen criminal hackers and hacktivists | Dmitri alperovitch: We had seen criminal hackers and hacktivists |
541 | 00:27:50,144 | 00:27:52,144 | use this hack and dump technique | use this hack and dump technique |
542 | 00:27:52,228 | 00:27:55,311 | to intimidate victims on a small scale. | to intimidate victims on a small scale. |
543 | 00:27:55,395 | 00:27:57,478 | That was the first time we had seen a nation-state | That was the first time we had seen a nation-state |
544 | 00:27:57,561 | 00:27:59,019 | do it very effectively. | do it very effectively. |
545 | 00:27:59,103 | 00:28:00,645 | The first thing that the north Koreans did | The first thing that the north Koreans did |
546 | 00:28:00,728 | 00:28:02,228 | was give it to reporters. | was give it to reporters. |
547 | 00:28:02,311 | 00:28:04,937 | And then, when they've exhausted that channel, | And then, when they've exhausted that channel, |
548 | 00:28:05,019 | 00:28:06,728 | they gave it to wikileaks. | they gave it to wikileaks. |
549 | 00:28:09,687 | 00:28:12,520 | Zegart: This was all very valuable information to the company. | Zegart: This was all very valuable information to the company. |
550 | 00:28:12,603 | 00:28:15,812 | Trade secrets, like scripts before movies were released, | Trade secrets, like scripts before movies were released, |
551 | 00:28:15,895 | 00:28:19,228 | detailed contract information about what had been paid to whom. | detailed contract information about what had been paid to whom. |
552 | 00:28:19,311 | 00:28:22,019 | By the way, Seth Rogen made two million dollars more | By the way, Seth Rogen made two million dollars more |
553 | 00:28:22,103 | 00:28:25,353 | -than co-star James Franco. -Mm... | -than co-star James Franco. -Mm... |
554 | 00:28:25,436 | 00:28:27,687 | You wouldn't assume someone's stolen property | You wouldn't assume someone's stolen property |
555 | 00:28:27,770 | 00:28:30,311 | was instantly going to be made | was instantly going to be made |
556 | 00:28:30,395 | 00:28:32,520 | available for public consumption | available for public consumption |
557 | 00:28:32,603 | 00:28:34,269 | by the media. | by the media. |
558 | 00:28:34,353 | 00:28:37,019 | Sony were the victims of a crime. | Sony were the victims of a crime. |
559 | 00:28:37,103 | 00:28:39,395 | And then the media took the victims of a crime | And then the media took the victims of a crime |
560 | 00:28:39,478 | 00:28:41,144 | and made it a hundred million times worse. | and made it a hundred million times worse. |
561 | 00:28:41,228 | 00:28:44,728 | You want US to assassinate the leader of North Korea? | You want US to assassinate the leader of North Korea? |
562 | 00:28:44,812 | 00:28:46,687 | -Yes. -What? | -Yes. -What? |
563 | 00:28:46,770 | 00:28:48,478 | James Franco, Seth Rogen here right now. | James Franco, Seth Rogen here right now. |
564 | 00:28:48,561 | 00:28:51,728 | And that's what the whole world is doing right now, saying, "what?" | And that's what the whole world is doing right now, saying, "what?" |
565 | 00:28:51,812 | 00:28:53,103 | (Laughing) | (Laughing) |
566 | 00:28:53,186 | 00:28:55,103 | Rogen: I go to New York | Rogen: I go to New York |
567 | 00:28:55,186 | 00:28:58,561 | to, like, do the final week of promotion for the film. | to, like, do the final week of promotion for the film. |
568 | 00:28:58,645 | 00:29:00,144 | It's a very weird thing to do. | It's a very weird thing to do. |
569 | 00:29:00,228 | 00:29:03,395 | To promote a thing that is causing the world | To promote a thing that is causing the world |
570 | 00:29:03,478 | 00:29:05,228 | distress at that moment. | distress at that moment. |
571 | 00:29:05,311 | 00:29:10,228 | And that's when, like, it really ratcheted up a notch. | And that's when, like, it really ratcheted up a notch. |
572 | 00:29:10,311 | 00:29:14,978 | The hackers made a threat against anyone who goes to see Sony's new film. | The hackers made a threat against anyone who goes to see Sony's new film. |
573 | 00:29:15,061 | 00:29:18,770 | Newscaster: This message warns movie-goers to stay away from theaters. | Newscaster: This message warns movie-goers to stay away from theaters. |
574 | 00:29:18,853 | 00:29:21,728 | The group is threatening to deliver what it calls its "Christmas gift." | The group is threatening to deliver what it calls its "Christmas gift." |
575 | 00:29:21,812 | 00:29:24,728 | I literally got on a plane and left New York in the middle of my press tour. | I literally got on a plane and left New York in the middle of my press tour. |
576 | 00:29:24,812 | 00:29:26,645 | I think I was, like, on the way to do "Jimmy Fallon," | I think I was, like, on the way to do "Jimmy Fallon," |
577 | 00:29:26,728 | 00:29:28,978 | and I was like, "let's go to the airport. Like... | and I was like, "let's go to the airport. Like... |
578 | 00:29:29,061 | 00:29:31,269 | I don't think this movie's coming out, guys." | I don't think this movie's coming out, guys." |
579 | 00:29:33,520 | 00:29:36,269 | And I went back to la, and went to Sony, | And I went back to la, and went to Sony, |
580 | 00:29:36,353 | 00:29:38,895 | and was like, "what's the plan? Like, is it gonna be pulled from theaters? | and was like, "what's the plan? Like, is it gonna be pulled from theaters? |
581 | 00:29:38,978 | 00:29:41,978 | It seems like people don't want to play the movie anymore." | It seems like people don't want to play the movie anymore." |
582 | 00:29:45,103 | 00:29:48,603 | Lynton: When the email came out that involved physical threats, | Lynton: When the email came out that involved physical threats, |
583 | 00:29:48,687 | 00:29:52,103 | there was a lot of conversations with the theaters that happened | there was a lot of conversations with the theaters that happened |
584 | 00:29:52,186 | 00:29:55,269 | where they were asking to delay the release of the picture. | where they were asking to delay the release of the picture. |
585 | 00:29:55,353 | 00:30:00,019 | I think Michael lynton didn't want to leave the theater owners, | I think Michael lynton didn't want to leave the theater owners, |
586 | 00:30:00,103 | 00:30:02,103 | you know, looking like the bad guy. | you know, looking like the bad guy. |
587 | 00:30:02,186 | 00:30:04,395 | So, he then was like, "I'm gonna pull the movie. | So, he then was like, "I'm gonna pull the movie. |
588 | 00:30:04,478 | 00:30:08,186 | "I'm just gonna say... It's... it's, it's pulled. | "I'm just gonna say... It's... it's, it's pulled. |
589 | 00:30:08,269 | 00:30:10,645 | "And we all need to come as like a united front, | "And we all need to come as like a united front, |
590 | 00:30:10,728 | 00:30:12,395 | and say that that's what we want." | and say that that's what we want." |
591 | 00:30:12,478 | 00:30:14,561 | And we were like, "absolutely not." | And we were like, "absolutely not." |
592 | 00:30:14,645 | 00:30:18,311 | Newscaster: Today, Sony cancelled the Christmas day release | Newscaster: Today, Sony cancelled the Christmas day release |
593 | 00:30:18,395 | 00:30:19,436 | of "the interview." | of "the interview." |
594 | 00:30:19,520 | 00:30:20,728 | Newscaster 2: The hackers win. | Newscaster 2: The hackers win. |
595 | 00:30:20,812 | 00:30:22,061 | I don't know how else to frame it | I don't know how else to frame it |
596 | 00:30:22,144 | 00:30:23,478 | now that Sony has cancelled | now that Sony has cancelled |
597 | 00:30:23,561 | 00:30:24,770 | the release of "the interview," | the release of "the interview," |
598 | 00:30:24,853 | 00:30:25,978 | that spoof about North Korea | that spoof about North Korea |
599 | 00:30:26,061 | 00:30:27,895 | starring James Franco and Seth Rogen. | starring James Franco and Seth Rogen. |
600 | 00:30:29,728 | 00:30:31,603 | Rogen: A couple days later, | Rogen: A couple days later, |
601 | 00:30:31,687 | 00:30:35,436 | we were all gathered in our bungalow on the Sony lot. | we were all gathered in our bungalow on the Sony lot. |
602 | 00:30:35,520 | 00:30:37,812 | And they were like, "there's a press conference coming, | And they were like, "there's a press conference coming, |
603 | 00:30:37,895 | 00:30:39,687 | and Obama's gonna talk about it, I think." | and Obama's gonna talk about it, I think." |
604 | 00:30:39,770 | 00:30:42,186 | And we, we were like, "he's not gonna talk about it." | And we, we were like, "he's not gonna talk about it." |
605 | 00:30:42,269 | 00:30:43,645 | Like, and it was like the first question. | Like, and it was like the first question. |
606 | 00:30:43,728 | 00:30:45,311 | Reporter: Thank you, Mr. President. Uh, | Reporter: Thank you, Mr. President. Uh, |
607 | 00:30:45,395 | 00:30:47,186 | let's start on North Korea, 'cause that seems to be | let's start on North Korea, 'cause that seems to be |
608 | 00:30:47,269 | 00:30:48,812 | the, uh, biggest topic today. | the, uh, biggest topic today. |
609 | 00:30:48,895 | 00:30:53,144 | Uh, what does a proportional response look like, | Uh, what does a proportional response look like, |
610 | 00:30:53,228 | 00:30:55,353 | uh, to the Sony hack? | uh, to the Sony hack? |
611 | 00:30:55,436 | 00:30:58,853 | The question at that time was, well, how serious a deal is this? | The question at that time was, well, how serious a deal is this? |
612 | 00:30:58,937 | 00:31:03,019 | And before you knew it, it was an international security incident | And before you knew it, it was an international security incident |
613 | 00:31:03,103 | 00:31:05,603 | that involved the president of the United States. | that involved the president of the United States. |
614 | 00:31:07,561 | 00:31:11,478 | Hurd: If North Korea launched a missile | Hurd: If North Korea launched a missile |
615 | 00:31:11,561 | 00:31:14,019 | into San Francisco, | into San Francisco, |
616 | 00:31:14,103 | 00:31:18,228 | everybody knows what the United States of America, our response would be. | everybody knows what the United States of America, our response would be. |
617 | 00:31:18,311 | 00:31:21,186 | Right? That's a physical-on-physical attack. | Right? That's a physical-on-physical attack. |
618 | 00:31:21,269 | 00:31:24,311 | But what is a digital-on-digital attack, | But what is a digital-on-digital attack, |
619 | 00:31:24,395 | 00:31:26,186 | and what is the appropriate response? | and what is the appropriate response? |
620 | 00:31:26,269 | 00:31:29,269 | John mccain at the time said, "this is an act of war." | John mccain at the time said, "this is an act of war." |
621 | 00:31:29,353 | 00:31:32,395 | It's a new form of warfare that we're involved in, | It's a new form of warfare that we're involved in, |
622 | 00:31:32,478 | 00:31:35,269 | and we need to react, and react vigorously. | and we need to react, and react vigorously. |
623 | 00:31:35,353 | 00:31:37,311 | President Obama didn't want to go there. | President Obama didn't want to go there. |
624 | 00:31:38,520 | 00:31:40,561 | Eric rosenbach: When we were in those conversations | Eric rosenbach: When we were in those conversations |
625 | 00:31:40,645 | 00:31:42,019 | both in the department of defense | both in the department of defense |
626 | 00:31:42,103 | 00:31:43,395 | and in the white house, | and in the white house, |
627 | 00:31:43,478 | 00:31:45,645 | you fear that if you go too hard | you fear that if you go too hard |
628 | 00:31:45,728 | 00:31:46,728 | against the north Koreans, | against the north Koreans, |
629 | 00:31:46,812 | 00:31:48,603 | it becomes a real military conflict. | it becomes a real military conflict. |
630 | 00:31:48,687 | 00:31:50,561 | The last thing you want | The last thing you want |
631 | 00:31:50,645 | 00:31:52,812 | is to do something that escalates it, | is to do something that escalates it, |
632 | 00:31:52,895 | 00:31:54,895 | and the north Koreans then hit the US back | and the north Koreans then hit the US back |
633 | 00:31:54,978 | 00:31:56,353 | in our critical infrastructure, right? | in our critical infrastructure, right? |
634 | 00:31:56,436 | 00:31:58,895 | We didn't know whether they were in the grid | We didn't know whether they were in the grid |
635 | 00:31:58,978 | 00:32:00,228 | and could take something down. | and could take something down. |
636 | 00:32:00,311 | 00:32:04,019 | We will respond. Uh, we will respond proportionally, | We will respond. Uh, we will respond proportionally, |
637 | 00:32:04,103 | 00:32:07,186 | and we'll respond, uh, in a place and time, | and we'll respond, uh, in a place and time, |
638 | 00:32:07,269 | 00:32:09,353 | uh, and manner, that we choose. | uh, and manner, that we choose. |
639 | 00:32:09,436 | 00:32:11,395 | It's not something that I will announce, | It's not something that I will announce, |
640 | 00:32:11,478 | 00:32:13,061 | uh, here today at a press conference. | uh, here today at a press conference. |
641 | 00:32:13,144 | 00:32:15,853 | No one really knows what the US government did to North Korea. | No one really knows what the US government did to North Korea. |
642 | 00:32:15,937 | 00:32:18,895 | There are press reports that suggest that | There are press reports that suggest that |
643 | 00:32:19,019 | 00:32:20,478 | not long after the Sony hack, | not long after the Sony hack, |
644 | 00:32:20,561 | 00:32:22,812 | suddenly, uh, North Korea's Internet went down. | suddenly, uh, North Korea's Internet went down. |
645 | 00:32:22,895 | 00:32:25,186 | Even if it were the United States government | Even if it were the United States government |
646 | 00:32:25,269 | 00:32:27,103 | that shut down the Internet of North Korea, | that shut down the Internet of North Korea, |
647 | 00:32:27,186 | 00:32:29,937 | at the time, North Korea had 28 websites. | at the time, North Korea had 28 websites. |
648 | 00:32:30,019 | 00:32:32,269 | So the United States is far more vulnerable | So the United States is far more vulnerable |
649 | 00:32:32,353 | 00:32:36,520 | to cyber attacks than many of the countries that are trying to attack US. | to cyber attacks than many of the countries that are trying to attack US. |
650 | 00:32:38,186 | 00:32:40,395 | Lynton: The president didn't necessarily | Lynton: The president didn't necessarily |
651 | 00:32:40,478 | 00:32:42,436 | have a response to that, to them, | have a response to that, to them, |
652 | 00:32:42,520 | 00:32:45,937 | and so, he chose to talk about Sony. | and so, he chose to talk about Sony. |
653 | 00:32:46,019 | 00:32:48,061 | We cannot have a society | We cannot have a society |
654 | 00:32:48,144 | 00:32:51,103 | in which some dictator someplace | in which some dictator someplace |
655 | 00:32:51,186 | 00:32:55,436 | can start imposing censorship here in the United States. | can start imposing censorship here in the United States. |
656 | 00:32:55,520 | 00:32:57,353 | He was like, "yeah, theaters should play it." | He was like, "yeah, theaters should play it." |
657 | 00:32:57,436 | 00:33:00,353 | Um, "we shouldn't succumb to these threats." | Um, "we shouldn't succumb to these threats." |
658 | 00:33:00,436 | 00:33:02,937 | And we were all like, "great!" | And we were all like, "great!" |
659 | 00:33:03,019 | 00:33:05,895 | But everyone just bailed. (Laughs) | But everyone just bailed. (Laughs) |
660 | 00:33:06,853 | 00:33:08,311 | Lynton: There was certainly disappointment | Lynton: There was certainly disappointment |
661 | 00:33:08,395 | 00:33:09,687 | on the part of the filmmakers | on the part of the filmmakers |
662 | 00:33:09,770 | 00:33:11,853 | that they weren't gonna see the movie in, you know, | that they weren't gonna see the movie in, you know, |
663 | 00:33:11,937 | 00:33:13,645 | in theaters all across the country. | in theaters all across the country. |
664 | 00:33:13,728 | 00:33:16,645 | We reassured them that we intended to put the movie out. | We reassured them that we intended to put the movie out. |
665 | 00:33:16,728 | 00:33:18,520 | I called Eric schmidt at Google. | I called Eric schmidt at Google. |
666 | 00:33:18,603 | 00:33:20,978 | He and the folks at Google felt that it was important | He and the folks at Google felt that it was important |
667 | 00:33:21,061 | 00:33:25,436 | that the picture get out, and they offered to put it out on their platform. | that the picture get out, and they offered to put it out on their platform. |
668 | 00:33:31,353 | 00:33:33,103 | Rogen: Ultimately, | Rogen: Ultimately, |
669 | 00:33:33,186 | 00:33:35,019 | they let the theaters who wanted to play it play it. | they let the theaters who wanted to play it play it. |
670 | 00:33:35,103 | 00:33:37,770 | It was in, like, 20 theaters or something like that. | It was in, like, 20 theaters or something like that. |
671 | 00:33:37,853 | 00:33:40,353 | Um, I think it is still Google play's | Um, I think it is still Google play's |
672 | 00:33:40,436 | 00:33:42,853 | number one ever downloaded movie. | number one ever downloaded movie. |
673 | 00:33:42,937 | 00:33:47,186 | ♪ As you leave 'em falling down, down, down ♪ | ♪ As you leave 'em falling down, down, down ♪ |
674 | 00:33:47,269 | 00:33:50,603 | Rogen: And also, the scene is released. | Rogen: And also, the scene is released. |
675 | 00:33:50,687 | 00:33:52,645 | "The verge" or something like that | "The verge" or something like that |
676 | 00:33:52,728 | 00:33:54,687 | goes through the hacked footage, | goes through the hacked footage, |
677 | 00:33:54,770 | 00:33:56,978 | finds the shot of Kim jong-UN's head exploding, | finds the shot of Kim jong-UN's head exploding, |
678 | 00:33:57,061 | 00:34:01,103 | and releases just that online for everyone to just see. | and releases just that online for everyone to just see. |
679 | 00:34:01,937 | 00:34:05,269 | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ |
680 | 00:34:06,603 | 00:34:08,978 | Zegart: This was a big deal. | Zegart: This was a big deal. |
681 | 00:34:09,061 | 00:34:11,478 | That a country that is so poor, | That a country that is so poor, |
682 | 00:34:11,561 | 00:34:14,645 | and has only ten percent of its population with cell phones, | and has only ten percent of its population with cell phones, |
683 | 00:34:14,728 | 00:34:16,937 | could actually wage a cyber attack | could actually wage a cyber attack |
684 | 00:34:17,019 | 00:34:19,478 | against one of our most powerful movie studios | against one of our most powerful movie studios |
685 | 00:34:19,561 | 00:34:23,436 | and a major corporation, and create an international crisis. | and a major corporation, and create an international crisis. |
686 | 00:34:28,019 | 00:34:31,645 | Hurd: The Sony attack changed the public's perception | Hurd: The Sony attack changed the public's perception |
687 | 00:34:31,728 | 00:34:33,687 | of what a cyber attack was. | of what a cyber attack was. |
688 | 00:34:33,770 | 00:34:35,853 | Prior to Sony, people believed, | Prior to Sony, people believed, |
689 | 00:34:35,937 | 00:34:39,353 | "oh, somebody's trying to steal my credit card information." | "oh, somebody's trying to steal my credit card information." |
690 | 00:34:39,436 | 00:34:43,853 | "They're trying to steal my social security in order to commit fraud." | "They're trying to steal my social security in order to commit fraud." |
691 | 00:34:43,937 | 00:34:47,728 | Sony was purely an attack to destroy. | Sony was purely an attack to destroy. |
692 | 00:34:47,812 | 00:34:52,186 | ♪ | ♪ |
693 | 00:35:01,269 | 00:35:04,103 | James clapper: 2014 saw, for the first time, | James clapper: 2014 saw, for the first time, |
694 | 00:35:04,186 | 00:35:07,353 | destructive cyber attacks carried out on US soil | destructive cyber attacks carried out on US soil |
695 | 00:35:07,436 | 00:35:09,186 | by nation-state entities. | by nation-state entities. |
696 | 00:35:09,269 | 00:35:11,395 | Marked first by the Iranian attack | Marked first by the Iranian attack |
697 | 00:35:11,478 | 00:35:13,812 | against the Las Vegas sands casino corporation | against the Las Vegas sands casino corporation |
698 | 00:35:13,895 | 00:35:15,353 | a year ago this month, | a year ago this month, |
699 | 00:35:15,436 | 00:35:19,186 | and the North Korean attack against Sony in November. | and the North Korean attack against Sony in November. |
700 | 00:35:19,269 | 00:35:22,436 | While the both of these nations have lesser technical capabilities | While the both of these nations have lesser technical capabilities |
701 | 00:35:22,520 | 00:35:24,853 | in comparison to Russia and China, | in comparison to Russia and China, |
702 | 00:35:24,937 | 00:35:27,436 | these destructive attacks demonstrate that | these destructive attacks demonstrate that |
703 | 00:35:27,520 | 00:35:32,436 | Iran and North Korea are motivated and unpredictable cyber actors. | Iran and North Korea are motivated and unpredictable cyber actors. |
704 | 00:35:32,520 | 00:35:34,520 | Russia and China continue to develop | Russia and China continue to develop |
705 | 00:35:34,603 | 00:35:37,103 | very sophisticated cyber programs. | very sophisticated cyber programs. |
706 | 00:35:37,186 | 00:35:39,144 | And while I can't go into detail here, | And while I can't go into detail here, |
707 | 00:35:39,228 | 00:35:41,269 | the Russian cyber threat is more severe | the Russian cyber threat is more severe |
708 | 00:35:41,353 | 00:35:43,645 | than we had previously assessed. | than we had previously assessed. |
709 | 00:35:54,728 | 00:35:57,895 | Alperovitch: These days, one must always get hired by the lawyers, | Alperovitch: These days, one must always get hired by the lawyers, |
710 | 00:35:57,978 | 00:36:00,603 | because the lawyers are the first call of a company that gets hacked. | because the lawyers are the first call of a company that gets hacked. |
711 | 00:36:00,687 | 00:36:02,937 | Because there might be lawsuits that would follow | Because there might be lawsuits that would follow |
712 | 00:36:03,019 | 00:36:04,770 | from, uh, from the announcement over the breach, | from, uh, from the announcement over the breach, |
713 | 00:36:04,853 | 00:36:07,853 | so, very, very typically we get a call from a law firm that says, | so, very, very typically we get a call from a law firm that says, |
714 | 00:36:07,937 | 00:36:10,770 | "one of our clients, uh, thinks they may have an issue. | "one of our clients, uh, thinks they may have an issue. |
715 | 00:36:10,853 | 00:36:11,978 | Can you come in and help them?" | Can you come in and help them?" |
716 | 00:36:12,061 | 00:36:13,853 | In this case, it was the dnc. | In this case, it was the dnc. |
717 | 00:36:16,937 | 00:36:18,395 | The call came on a Friday, | The call came on a Friday, |
718 | 00:36:18,478 | 00:36:20,812 | so it took US a few days for US to go into the network | so it took US a few days for US to go into the network |
719 | 00:36:20,895 | 00:36:24,311 | and find infected machines on the network. | and find infected machines on the network. |
720 | 00:36:24,395 | 00:36:25,978 | This wasn't just on one system. | This wasn't just on one system. |
721 | 00:36:26,061 | 00:36:29,144 | There were hundreds of systems that were being impacted. | There were hundreds of systems that were being impacted. |
722 | 00:36:30,353 | 00:36:32,269 | We start looking at the malware | We start looking at the malware |
723 | 00:36:32,353 | 00:36:35,561 | and immediately realized that this was malware we had seen many times before. | and immediately realized that this was malware we had seen many times before. |
724 | 00:36:35,645 | 00:36:39,395 | That we had high confidence attribution to the gru, | That we had high confidence attribution to the gru, |
725 | 00:36:39,478 | 00:36:41,645 | the Russian military intelligence. | the Russian military intelligence. |
726 | 00:36:45,937 | 00:36:48,520 | We're seeing them spread from system to system, | We're seeing them spread from system to system, |
727 | 00:36:48,603 | 00:36:51,478 | touch files, take those files out of the network, | touch files, take those files out of the network, |
728 | 00:36:51,561 | 00:36:53,770 | stealing data, monitoring everything. | stealing data, monitoring everything. |
729 | 00:36:53,853 | 00:36:55,395 | You can't just shut down one machine | You can't just shut down one machine |
730 | 00:36:55,478 | 00:36:56,937 | because they're everywhere. | because they're everywhere. |
731 | 00:36:57,019 | 00:36:59,186 | So you have to shut everything down, um, | So you have to shut everything down, um, |
732 | 00:36:59,269 | 00:37:02,103 | and spend several days rebuilding all the infrastructure. | and spend several days rebuilding all the infrastructure. |
733 | 00:37:02,186 | 00:37:05,937 | We told, um, the dnc, "when do you want US to do this remediation?" | We told, um, the dnc, "when do you want US to do this remediation?" |
734 | 00:37:06,019 | 00:37:07,520 | (Cheering) | (Cheering) |
735 | 00:37:07,603 | 00:37:10,687 | At the time, the primaries were in full swing. | At the time, the primaries were in full swing. |
736 | 00:37:10,770 | 00:37:13,395 | Hillary Clinton had not yet locked down her nomination, | Hillary Clinton had not yet locked down her nomination, |
737 | 00:37:13,478 | 00:37:16,978 | so they said, "let's plan for four or five weeks from now, | so they said, "let's plan for four or five weeks from now, |
738 | 00:37:17,061 | 00:37:20,228 | um, when the primaries are over and we're not under the gun." | um, when the primaries are over and we're not under the gun." |
739 | 00:37:20,311 | 00:37:22,978 | Waiting a few weeks did not seem outrageous. | Waiting a few weeks did not seem outrageous. |
740 | 00:37:23,061 | 00:37:24,395 | Of course over that period of time, | Of course over that period of time, |
741 | 00:37:24,478 | 00:37:25,978 | the Russians continued stealing documents, | the Russians continued stealing documents, |
742 | 00:37:26,061 | 00:37:28,645 | and we're sort of helplessly watching them. | and we're sort of helplessly watching them. |
743 | 00:37:30,603 | 00:37:34,395 | Hillary Clinton: I was really confused and disturbed | Hillary Clinton: I was really confused and disturbed |
744 | 00:37:34,478 | 00:37:36,812 | by what was happening. | by what was happening. |
745 | 00:37:36,895 | 00:37:41,186 | But initially, uh, the FBI didn't take it all that seriously, | But initially, uh, the FBI didn't take it all that seriously, |
746 | 00:37:41,269 | 00:37:44,770 | and so, it wasn't rising to the level of, | and so, it wasn't rising to the level of, |
747 | 00:37:44,853 | 00:37:49,061 | of urgent, you know, five-alarm fire, uh, drill. | of urgent, you know, five-alarm fire, uh, drill. |
748 | 00:37:49,144 | 00:37:51,269 | Barack Obama: I want to congratulate Hillary Clinton | Barack Obama: I want to congratulate Hillary Clinton |
749 | 00:37:51,353 | 00:37:55,144 | on making history as the presumptive Democratic nominee | on making history as the presumptive Democratic nominee |
750 | 00:37:55,228 | 00:37:58,103 | -for president of the United States. -(Cheering) | -for president of the United States. -(Cheering) |
751 | 00:37:58,186 | 00:38:00,603 | Alperovitch: Finally, in June of 2016, | Alperovitch: Finally, in June of 2016, |
752 | 00:38:00,687 | 00:38:03,019 | we kicked the Russians out of the dnc network. | we kicked the Russians out of the dnc network. |
753 | 00:38:03,103 | 00:38:04,520 | This just in to CNN. | This just in to CNN. |
754 | 00:38:04,603 | 00:38:06,937 | Russian hackers managed to infiltrate | Russian hackers managed to infiltrate |
755 | 00:38:07,019 | 00:38:09,603 | the computer network at the Democratic national committee. | the computer network at the Democratic national committee. |
756 | 00:38:09,687 | 00:38:13,103 | The researchers were roaming around the network for about a year, | The researchers were roaming around the network for about a year, |
757 | 00:38:13,186 | 00:38:15,269 | but were removed this weekend. | but were removed this weekend. |
758 | 00:38:15,353 | 00:38:16,687 | We've talked to dnc officials. | We've talked to dnc officials. |
759 | 00:38:16,770 | 00:38:19,520 | We've also talked to the outside firm that the dnc brought in | We've also talked to the outside firm that the dnc brought in |
760 | 00:38:19,603 | 00:38:21,520 | when they recognized that there was an issue here. | when they recognized that there was an issue here. |
761 | 00:38:21,603 | 00:38:22,978 | That firm called crowdstrike. | That firm called crowdstrike. |
762 | 00:38:23,061 | 00:38:26,186 | There was a small blip on the, on the, on the news cycle | There was a small blip on the, on the, on the news cycle |
763 | 00:38:26,269 | 00:38:29,144 | that day, of, "oh, Russia's hacking the dnc," | that day, of, "oh, Russia's hacking the dnc," |
764 | 00:38:29,228 | 00:38:31,645 | but national media moved on within hours, | but national media moved on within hours, |
765 | 00:38:31,728 | 00:38:34,520 | and, uh, I thought that was gonna be the end of the story. | and, uh, I thought that was gonna be the end of the story. |
766 | 00:38:37,186 | 00:38:41,395 | But then on the Eve of the Democratic national convention... | But then on the Eve of the Democratic national convention... |
767 | 00:38:43,520 | 00:38:46,395 | Wikileaks dumps the emails. | Wikileaks dumps the emails. |
768 | 00:38:49,061 | 00:38:51,978 | Lester holt: Good evening. Their party's chairman off the program, | Lester holt: Good evening. Their party's chairman off the program, |
769 | 00:38:52,061 | 00:38:53,978 | an apparent Russian email hack, | an apparent Russian email hack, |
770 | 00:38:54,061 | 00:38:56,478 | and now a revolt among Bernie Sanders supporters. | and now a revolt among Bernie Sanders supporters. |
771 | 00:38:56,561 | 00:39:00,019 | Welcome to day one of the Democratic national convention. | Welcome to day one of the Democratic national convention. |
772 | 00:39:02,228 | 00:39:05,353 | Riley: The information stolen from those servers in the dnc, | Riley: The information stolen from those servers in the dnc, |
773 | 00:39:05,436 | 00:39:07,728 | suddenly it begins to surface in this way | suddenly it begins to surface in this way |
774 | 00:39:07,812 | 00:39:09,770 | that was presaged by the Sony attack, | that was presaged by the Sony attack, |
775 | 00:39:09,853 | 00:39:11,019 | and the sands corp attack. | and the sands corp attack. |
776 | 00:39:11,103 | 00:39:12,812 | Newscaster: Emails released by wikileaks, | Newscaster: Emails released by wikileaks, |
777 | 00:39:12,895 | 00:39:16,228 | proving the dnc had favored Hillary Clinton over Sanders. | proving the dnc had favored Hillary Clinton over Sanders. |
778 | 00:39:16,311 | 00:39:19,186 | Comes out through wikileaks, which makes everything searchable so you'd be, | Comes out through wikileaks, which makes everything searchable so you'd be, |
779 | 00:39:19,269 | 00:39:21,520 | you know, there'll be a dump of 20,000 emails | you know, there'll be a dump of 20,000 emails |
780 | 00:39:21,603 | 00:39:23,603 | and you just type in some names if you're a reporter, | and you just type in some names if you're a reporter, |
781 | 00:39:23,687 | 00:39:25,061 | and suddenly you've got a story. | and suddenly you've got a story. |
782 | 00:39:25,144 | 00:39:26,853 | Newscaster: The thousands of hacked emails | Newscaster: The thousands of hacked emails |
783 | 00:39:26,937 | 00:39:28,103 | leaked to wikileaks | leaked to wikileaks |
784 | 00:39:28,186 | 00:39:30,353 | rocked the Democratic national committee. | rocked the Democratic national committee. |
785 | 00:39:30,436 | 00:39:31,770 | (Man speaking) | (Man speaking) |
786 | 00:39:31,853 | 00:39:33,061 | I'm so proud-- | I'm so proud-- |
787 | 00:39:33,144 | 00:39:35,395 | (man speaking) | (man speaking) |
788 | 00:39:35,478 | 00:39:37,561 | John podesta: One of the things they were doing | John podesta: One of the things they were doing |
789 | 00:39:37,645 | 00:39:43,728 | was trying to stir up trouble between the Bernie delegates | was trying to stir up trouble between the Bernie delegates |
790 | 00:39:43,812 | 00:39:45,728 | and, and, and our forces. | and, and, and our forces. |
791 | 00:39:45,812 | 00:39:48,269 | Newscaster: Bernie Sanders supporters say the emails proved | Newscaster: Bernie Sanders supporters say the emails proved |
792 | 00:39:48,353 | 00:39:50,812 | the party favored Hillary Clinton all along. | the party favored Hillary Clinton all along. |
793 | 00:39:50,895 | 00:39:52,812 | It just validated everything we thought. | It just validated everything we thought. |
794 | 00:39:52,895 | 00:39:55,520 | That this was completely rigged right from the beginning. | That this was completely rigged right from the beginning. |
795 | 00:39:55,603 | 00:39:58,269 | Alex stamos: By using that stolen material, | Alex stamos: By using that stolen material, |
796 | 00:39:58,353 | 00:40:01,937 | the media injected the idea that the dnc had rigged the entire process | the media injected the idea that the dnc had rigged the entire process |
797 | 00:40:02,019 | 00:40:04,311 | against Bernie Sanders. And there's a kernel of truth. | against Bernie Sanders. And there's a kernel of truth. |
798 | 00:40:04,395 | 00:40:07,812 | Clearly there are people in the dnc who didn't like Bernie Sanders. | Clearly there are people in the dnc who didn't like Bernie Sanders. |
799 | 00:40:07,895 | 00:40:09,603 | But that doesn't mean the whole process is rigged. | But that doesn't mean the whole process is rigged. |
800 | 00:40:09,687 | 00:40:12,770 | And the media allowed them to go from the kernel of truth | And the media allowed them to go from the kernel of truth |
801 | 00:40:12,853 | 00:40:14,728 | to the conventional wisdom, | to the conventional wisdom, |
802 | 00:40:14,812 | 00:40:16,353 | because it sold papers, | because it sold papers, |
803 | 00:40:16,436 | 00:40:19,561 | and it got people to watch TV. | and it got people to watch TV. |
804 | 00:40:19,645 | 00:40:23,478 | But they were amplifying the messages that the Russians wanted amplified. | But they were amplifying the messages that the Russians wanted amplified. |
805 | 00:40:26,311 | 00:40:28,728 | Podesta: In that pile of information | Podesta: In that pile of information |
806 | 00:40:28,812 | 00:40:30,395 | that's come from the dnc, | that's come from the dnc, |
807 | 00:40:30,478 | 00:40:33,978 | there were some documents that were campaign finance documents | there were some documents that were campaign finance documents |
808 | 00:40:34,061 | 00:40:35,895 | from the campaign that would-- | from the campaign that would-- |
809 | 00:40:35,978 | 00:40:39,061 | had been unlikely to be at the dnc. | had been unlikely to be at the dnc. |
810 | 00:40:39,853 | 00:40:42,937 | So, the campaign began to look at | So, the campaign began to look at |
811 | 00:40:43,019 | 00:40:45,019 | where might those have originated. | where might those have originated. |
812 | 00:40:47,520 | 00:40:48,978 | Turned out, in the spring, | Turned out, in the spring, |
813 | 00:40:49,061 | 00:40:51,937 | one of my colleagues who had access to my email account | one of my colleagues who had access to my email account |
814 | 00:40:52,019 | 00:40:55,228 | had seen what was a fairly professional | had seen what was a fairly professional |
815 | 00:40:55,311 | 00:40:59,561 | phishing operation, looking to be from Google. | phishing operation, looking to be from Google. |
816 | 00:41:00,520 | 00:41:02,853 | She reported that to the people | She reported that to the people |
817 | 00:41:02,937 | 00:41:06,728 | in the tech security side of the campaign. | in the tech security side of the campaign. |
818 | 00:41:06,812 | 00:41:13,269 | He sent back an email to my assistant saying that it was real, | He sent back an email to my assistant saying that it was real, |
819 | 00:41:13,353 | 00:41:16,019 | and that I should change my credentials. | and that I should change my credentials. |
820 | 00:41:16,770 | 00:41:18,812 | She then clicked on the link, | She then clicked on the link, |
821 | 00:41:18,895 | 00:41:22,561 | and that's how I was hacked by the Russians. | and that's how I was hacked by the Russians. |
822 | 00:41:22,645 | 00:41:26,395 | But at that point, we weren't sure what the extent of the breach had been. | But at that point, we weren't sure what the extent of the breach had been. |
823 | 00:41:30,019 | 00:41:32,978 | Clapper: In the summer and fall of 2016, | Clapper: In the summer and fall of 2016, |
824 | 00:41:33,061 | 00:41:35,978 | there were many meetings about the Russians. | there were many meetings about the Russians. |
825 | 00:41:36,061 | 00:41:39,895 | There was a lot of back and forth about what to do. | There was a lot of back and forth about what to do. |
826 | 00:41:40,978 | 00:41:43,269 | Suzanne Spaulding: We began to get information | Suzanne Spaulding: We began to get information |
827 | 00:41:43,353 | 00:41:47,895 | about cyber activity that was focused on our voter registration databases. | about cyber activity that was focused on our voter registration databases. |
828 | 00:41:49,353 | 00:41:52,812 | And we realized that it was probably about disrupting | And we realized that it was probably about disrupting |
829 | 00:41:52,895 | 00:41:55,311 | the integrity of that data. | the integrity of that data. |
830 | 00:41:55,395 | 00:41:58,311 | The Russians could go into a voter registration database | The Russians could go into a voter registration database |
831 | 00:41:58,395 | 00:41:59,937 | and change that data, | and change that data, |
832 | 00:42:00,019 | 00:42:03,353 | so that on election day, when voters show up to vote, | so that on election day, when voters show up to vote, |
833 | 00:42:03,436 | 00:42:05,186 | they are turned away. | they are turned away. |
834 | 00:42:05,269 | 00:42:07,019 | There is chaos at the voting place, | There is chaos at the voting place, |
835 | 00:42:07,103 | 00:42:10,228 | because the name doesn't match the identification, | because the name doesn't match the identification, |
836 | 00:42:10,311 | 00:42:13,978 | and you could disrupt election day | and you could disrupt election day |
837 | 00:42:14,061 | 00:42:16,061 | to the degree that the American public | to the degree that the American public |
838 | 00:42:16,144 | 00:42:18,520 | would doubt the legitimacy of the process, | would doubt the legitimacy of the process, |
839 | 00:42:18,603 | 00:42:22,395 | and then potentially, the legitimacy of the outcome. | and then potentially, the legitimacy of the outcome. |
840 | 00:42:24,144 | 00:42:27,561 | Podesta: That's what Obama's focus was. | Podesta: That's what Obama's focus was. |
841 | 00:42:27,645 | 00:42:30,770 | When Obama saw putin in September, | When Obama saw putin in September, |
842 | 00:42:31,436 | 00:42:34,228 | he basically threatened him | he basically threatened him |
843 | 00:42:34,311 | 00:42:36,853 | that if they tried something like that, | that if they tried something like that, |
844 | 00:42:36,937 | 00:42:39,478 | there'd be severe consequences. | there'd be severe consequences. |
845 | 00:42:39,561 | 00:42:42,436 | What I think they underappreciated | What I think they underappreciated |
846 | 00:42:42,520 | 00:42:46,603 | was how much effect the Russians could have from the hacking, | was how much effect the Russians could have from the hacking, |
847 | 00:42:46,687 | 00:42:50,436 | and from their massive disinformation operation. | and from their massive disinformation operation. |
848 | 00:42:50,520 | 00:42:54,144 | ♪ | ♪ |
849 | 00:42:54,228 | 00:42:56,103 | Stamos: During the election, | Stamos: During the election, |
850 | 00:42:56,186 | 00:42:58,144 | we had a dedicated team at Facebook | we had a dedicated team at Facebook |
851 | 00:42:58,228 | 00:43:00,853 | whose job it was to look for Russian actors. | whose job it was to look for Russian actors. |
852 | 00:43:00,937 | 00:43:05,436 | And we had found gru activity. We had found dcleaks. | And we had found gru activity. We had found dcleaks. |
853 | 00:43:05,520 | 00:43:07,269 | We had found them pushing disinformation, | We had found them pushing disinformation, |
854 | 00:43:07,353 | 00:43:08,645 | but not really at scale. | but not really at scale. |
855 | 00:43:08,728 | 00:43:10,478 | And we didn't really understand | And we didn't really understand |
856 | 00:43:10,561 | 00:43:13,520 | what was behind the vast majority of this fake news. | what was behind the vast majority of this fake news. |
857 | 00:43:14,978 | 00:43:17,019 | But right after the election, | But right after the election, |
858 | 00:43:17,103 | 00:43:19,228 | we took all of the political ads that were run | we took all of the political ads that were run |
859 | 00:43:19,311 | 00:43:21,436 | in the United States in the year before the election. | in the United States in the year before the election. |
860 | 00:43:21,520 | 00:43:24,103 | And then we figured out all the accounts that were possibly tied to it. | And then we figured out all the accounts that were possibly tied to it. |
861 | 00:43:24,186 | 00:43:27,186 | So this is the people who ran the ad, but then also, | So this is the people who ran the ad, but then also, |
862 | 00:43:27,269 | 00:43:29,895 | people who used the same computer as the person who ran an ad. | people who used the same computer as the person who ran an ad. |
863 | 00:43:29,978 | 00:43:33,269 | Or people who have used the same phone as the person who ran the ad. | Or people who have used the same phone as the person who ran the ad. |
864 | 00:43:33,353 | 00:43:35,311 | And then for every single one of those accounts, | And then for every single one of those accounts, |
865 | 00:43:35,395 | 00:43:37,728 | we looked for possible links to Russia. | we looked for possible links to Russia. |
866 | 00:43:37,812 | 00:43:40,728 | We start pulling that thread, and then we eventually find this cluster | We start pulling that thread, and then we eventually find this cluster |
867 | 00:43:40,812 | 00:43:43,853 | that we can all link together, and that was the Internet research agency. | that we can all link together, and that was the Internet research agency. |
868 | 00:43:43,937 | 00:43:47,311 | ♪ | ♪ |
869 | 00:43:51,395 | 00:43:53,228 | The Internet research agency, llc | The Internet research agency, llc |
870 | 00:43:53,311 | 00:43:55,770 | is basically a building in St. Petersburg | is basically a building in St. Petersburg |
871 | 00:43:55,853 | 00:43:57,853 | with a bunch of trolls sitting there | with a bunch of trolls sitting there |
872 | 00:43:57,937 | 00:44:01,353 | trying to drive divisions in US society. | trying to drive divisions in US society. |
873 | 00:44:01,436 | 00:44:03,978 | It's existed for years and years at this point. | It's existed for years and years at this point. |
874 | 00:44:04,061 | 00:44:06,478 | And they've done propaganda work in Russia, | And they've done propaganda work in Russia, |
875 | 00:44:06,561 | 00:44:08,978 | and Ukraine, and the like. | and Ukraine, and the like. |
876 | 00:44:09,061 | 00:44:12,812 | The ira specifically sent people to the United States to study | The ira specifically sent people to the United States to study |
877 | 00:44:12,895 | 00:44:15,144 | the political sphere in the US | the political sphere in the US |
878 | 00:44:15,228 | 00:44:17,353 | and to understand what the pressure points were. | and to understand what the pressure points were. |
879 | 00:44:17,770 | 00:44:19,353 | So in 2016, | So in 2016, |
880 | 00:44:19,436 | 00:44:21,728 | they were creating these fake American personas, | they were creating these fake American personas, |
881 | 00:44:21,812 | 00:44:25,144 | and then running ads as political groups. | and then running ads as political groups. |
882 | 00:44:25,228 | 00:44:29,019 | ♪ | ♪ |
883 | 00:44:34,728 | 00:44:36,561 | The depth of the content was surprising. | The depth of the content was surprising. |
884 | 00:44:36,645 | 00:44:39,978 | Our assumption was that all of this content would be on one side, politically. | Our assumption was that all of this content would be on one side, politically. |
885 | 00:44:40,061 | 00:44:42,269 | But what they had done very effectively | But what they had done very effectively |
886 | 00:44:42,353 | 00:44:44,520 | was find a friction point | was find a friction point |
887 | 00:44:44,603 | 00:44:47,061 | and then try to manipulate people on both sides. | and then try to manipulate people on both sides. |
888 | 00:44:48,478 | 00:44:50,978 | The number-one topic was actually black lives matter. | The number-one topic was actually black lives matter. |
889 | 00:44:51,061 | 00:44:54,061 | They created a fake persona to pretend to be | They created a fake persona to pretend to be |
890 | 00:44:54,144 | 00:44:56,645 | a pro-black lives matter activist. | a pro-black lives matter activist. |
891 | 00:44:57,311 | 00:44:58,978 | And to push narratives | And to push narratives |
892 | 00:44:59,061 | 00:45:01,144 | that both would maybe radicalize | that both would maybe radicalize |
893 | 00:45:01,228 | 00:45:02,812 | people who were supportive of black lives matter, | people who were supportive of black lives matter, |
894 | 00:45:02,895 | 00:45:04,645 | but also look radical | but also look radical |
895 | 00:45:04,728 | 00:45:06,103 | to more moderate people | to more moderate people |
896 | 00:45:06,186 | 00:45:08,061 | who could say, like, "oh, look at these people. | who could say, like, "oh, look at these people. |
897 | 00:45:08,144 | 00:45:11,436 | Yeah, they're, they're they're really nuts." | Yeah, they're, they're they're really nuts." |
898 | 00:45:11,520 | 00:45:14,687 | They even, in a couple of cases, tried to create protests | They even, in a couple of cases, tried to create protests |
899 | 00:45:14,770 | 00:45:17,186 | where a pro-immigration group and an anti-immigration group | where a pro-immigration group and an anti-immigration group |
900 | 00:45:17,269 | 00:45:21,687 | protest one another by inviting people to events that were at the same time. | protest one another by inviting people to events that were at the same time. |
901 | 00:45:21,770 | 00:45:24,895 | Down with the racists! Down with the Nazis! | Down with the racists! Down with the Nazis! |
902 | 00:45:24,978 | 00:45:28,269 | (Yelling indistinctly) | (Yelling indistinctly) |
903 | 00:45:31,770 | 00:45:33,895 | Clinton: We were surprised that | Clinton: We were surprised that |
904 | 00:45:33,978 | 00:45:36,061 | putin would care so much | putin would care so much |
905 | 00:45:36,144 | 00:45:39,269 | about who the next president was. | about who the next president was. |
906 | 00:45:39,353 | 00:45:43,770 | That he was so intent upon damaging me, | That he was so intent upon damaging me, |
907 | 00:45:43,853 | 00:45:45,436 | damaging my campaign, | damaging my campaign, |
908 | 00:45:45,520 | 00:45:49,103 | preventing me, if he could, from becoming president. | preventing me, if he could, from becoming president. |
909 | 00:45:49,186 | 00:45:51,978 | And also how adept they were | And also how adept they were |
910 | 00:45:52,061 | 00:45:55,561 | in sowing disinformation, misinformation. | in sowing disinformation, misinformation. |
911 | 00:45:55,645 | 00:45:58,478 | It was unlike anything we'd ever seen. | It was unlike anything we'd ever seen. |
912 | 00:46:01,311 | 00:46:03,436 | Stamos: None of US kind of conceptualized this | Stamos: None of US kind of conceptualized this |
913 | 00:46:03,520 | 00:46:06,269 | as the kind of groups we should be looking for. | as the kind of groups we should be looking for. |
914 | 00:46:07,144 | 00:46:09,186 | Intelligence teams at the companies, | Intelligence teams at the companies, |
915 | 00:46:09,269 | 00:46:11,728 | and in places like NSA and the US government, | and in places like NSA and the US government, |
916 | 00:46:11,812 | 00:46:15,061 | were focused on very traditional threat actors. | were focused on very traditional threat actors. |
917 | 00:46:18,353 | 00:46:21,478 | Sanger: General clapper's this old cold warrior. | Sanger: General clapper's this old cold warrior. |
918 | 00:46:21,561 | 00:46:25,228 | Grew up as the son of an air force officer, | Grew up as the son of an air force officer, |
919 | 00:46:25,311 | 00:46:27,728 | becomes an air force intelligence officer. | becomes an air force intelligence officer. |
920 | 00:46:27,812 | 00:46:31,770 | And yet, the cyber conflicts | And yet, the cyber conflicts |
921 | 00:46:31,853 | 00:46:34,269 | that are springing up during his time | that are springing up during his time |
922 | 00:46:34,353 | 00:46:36,436 | as director of national intelligence | as director of national intelligence |
923 | 00:46:36,520 | 00:46:38,853 | are an entirely different kind of threat | are an entirely different kind of threat |
924 | 00:46:38,937 | 00:46:41,770 | that he's just trying to keep on top of. | that he's just trying to keep on top of. |
925 | 00:46:41,853 | 00:46:44,144 | And time and time again, | And time and time again, |
926 | 00:46:44,228 | 00:46:47,770 | he keeps getting caught by surprise. | he keeps getting caught by surprise. |
927 | 00:46:47,853 | 00:46:49,561 | It's not his fault. | It's not his fault. |
928 | 00:46:49,645 | 00:46:53,103 | We had never built an intelligence network | We had never built an intelligence network |
929 | 00:46:53,186 | 00:46:55,603 | designed to pick this stuff up. | designed to pick this stuff up. |
930 | 00:46:55,687 | 00:46:58,561 | But there he is in North Korea | But there he is in North Korea |
931 | 00:46:58,645 | 00:47:00,978 | while the north Koreans are inside Sony. | while the north Koreans are inside Sony. |
932 | 00:47:01,061 | 00:47:04,019 | And there he was, sitting on a system | And there he was, sitting on a system |
933 | 00:47:04,103 | 00:47:06,728 | that failed to raise a timely alarm | that failed to raise a timely alarm |
934 | 00:47:06,812 | 00:47:08,645 | to the president of the United States | to the president of the United States |
935 | 00:47:08,728 | 00:47:12,144 | that the Russians were inside the Democratic national committee. | that the Russians were inside the Democratic national committee. |
936 | 00:47:12,228 | 00:47:14,186 | Much less inside Facebook. | Much less inside Facebook. |
937 | 00:47:19,728 | 00:47:23,937 | Clapper: You know, 20/20 hindsight, it's all, it's perfect vision. | Clapper: You know, 20/20 hindsight, it's all, it's perfect vision. |
938 | 00:47:24,019 | 00:47:28,311 | At the time, there was concern about publicizing this, | At the time, there was concern about publicizing this, |
939 | 00:47:28,395 | 00:47:32,770 | because by doing so, we'd simply amplify its importance. | because by doing so, we'd simply amplify its importance. |
940 | 00:47:32,853 | 00:47:35,812 | And I think, as well, there was reluctance | And I think, as well, there was reluctance |
941 | 00:47:35,895 | 00:47:38,520 | to be seen by the last administration as | to be seen by the last administration as |
942 | 00:47:38,603 | 00:47:40,436 | putting its hand on the scale | putting its hand on the scale |
943 | 00:47:40,520 | 00:47:43,520 | in favor of one candidate, or appearing to do that, | in favor of one candidate, or appearing to do that, |
944 | 00:47:43,603 | 00:47:45,645 | to the disfavor of the other. | to the disfavor of the other. |
945 | 00:47:45,728 | 00:47:47,687 | The system, folks, is rigged. | The system, folks, is rigged. |
946 | 00:47:47,770 | 00:47:51,353 | It's a rigged, disgusting, dirty system. | It's a rigged, disgusting, dirty system. |
947 | 00:47:51,436 | 00:47:53,395 | It's a dirty system. | It's a dirty system. |
948 | 00:47:54,269 | 00:47:56,520 | Then candidate trump was alleging | Then candidate trump was alleging |
949 | 00:47:56,603 | 00:47:59,311 | that if he didn't win the election, it was rigged. | that if he didn't win the election, it was rigged. |
950 | 00:47:59,395 | 00:48:01,186 | So, there was reluctance to, | So, there was reluctance to, |
951 | 00:48:01,269 | 00:48:04,144 | you know, to play to that-- to play to that narrative. | you know, to play to that-- to play to that narrative. |
952 | 00:48:08,144 | 00:48:10,728 | But the magnitude of what the Russians were doing | But the magnitude of what the Russians were doing |
953 | 00:48:10,812 | 00:48:14,061 | grew both in expanse and clarity. | grew both in expanse and clarity. |
954 | 00:48:14,144 | 00:48:16,353 | And on the 7th of October, | And on the 7th of October, |
955 | 00:48:16,436 | 00:48:18,770 | we finally came out with a public statement, | we finally came out with a public statement, |
956 | 00:48:18,853 | 00:48:20,645 | which was a pretty forthcoming statement | which was a pretty forthcoming statement |
957 | 00:48:20,728 | 00:48:22,353 | about the Russian interference. | about the Russian interference. |
958 | 00:48:22,436 | 00:48:24,395 | Wolf blitzer: There's more breaking news we're following tonight. | Wolf blitzer: There's more breaking news we're following tonight. |
959 | 00:48:24,478 | 00:48:26,728 | The United States now openly saying | The United States now openly saying |
960 | 00:48:26,812 | 00:48:30,395 | that Russia is directly behind a series of cyber attacks | that Russia is directly behind a series of cyber attacks |
961 | 00:48:30,478 | 00:48:33,061 | targeting the upcoming presidential election. | targeting the upcoming presidential election. |
962 | 00:48:33,144 | 00:48:36,061 | Well, unfortunately our message was completely emasculated. | Well, unfortunately our message was completely emasculated. |
963 | 00:48:36,144 | 00:48:39,395 | A recording of Donald Trump made more than a decade ago... | A recording of Donald Trump made more than a decade ago... |
964 | 00:48:39,478 | 00:48:43,269 | Because that's the same day that the "access Hollywood" audio tape came out. | Because that's the same day that the "access Hollywood" audio tape came out. |
965 | 00:48:43,353 | 00:48:45,311 | You won't want young children to hear it. | You won't want young children to hear it. |
966 | 00:48:53,395 | 00:48:56,395 | The letter from the intelligence community comes out. | The letter from the intelligence community comes out. |
967 | 00:48:56,478 | 00:48:58,728 | The "access Hollywood" tape comes out | The "access Hollywood" tape comes out |
968 | 00:48:58,812 | 00:49:00,436 | all in one day. | all in one day. |
969 | 00:49:00,520 | 00:49:03,269 | And wikileaks starts dumping my emails | And wikileaks starts dumping my emails |
970 | 00:49:03,353 | 00:49:06,144 | an hour after the "access Hollywood" tape comes out. | an hour after the "access Hollywood" tape comes out. |
971 | 00:49:06,228 | 00:49:08,478 | You can judge whether that's a coincidence. | You can judge whether that's a coincidence. |
972 | 00:49:08,561 | 00:49:10,520 | Two thousand more emails have been posted online, | Two thousand more emails have been posted online, |
973 | 00:49:10,603 | 00:49:12,103 | apparently from the hacked account | apparently from the hacked account |
974 | 00:49:12,186 | 00:49:14,395 | of Hillary Clinton's campaign chairman John podesta. | of Hillary Clinton's campaign chairman John podesta. |
975 | 00:49:14,478 | 00:49:18,269 | Thousands of hacked emails from her campaign chairman, John podesta. | Thousands of hacked emails from her campaign chairman, John podesta. |
976 | 00:49:18,353 | 00:49:19,937 | Third installment of the hacked emails | Third installment of the hacked emails |
977 | 00:49:20,019 | 00:49:22,603 | from Hillary Clinton's campaign chairman John podesta, | from Hillary Clinton's campaign chairman John podesta, |
978 | 00:49:22,687 | 00:49:24,520 | and so far, the messages have provided a look | and so far, the messages have provided a look |
979 | 00:49:24,603 | 00:49:26,978 | into the inner workings of the Clinton camp. | into the inner workings of the Clinton camp. |
980 | 00:49:27,061 | 00:49:31,812 | Most of those ended up being of little import. | Most of those ended up being of little import. |
981 | 00:49:34,645 | 00:49:36,395 | I'm a boring sort of guy. | I'm a boring sort of guy. |
982 | 00:49:36,478 | 00:49:38,561 | Newscaster: One email reveals a disagreement | Newscaster: One email reveals a disagreement |
983 | 00:49:38,645 | 00:49:40,687 | between top Clinton aide huma abedin | between top Clinton aide huma abedin |
984 | 00:49:40,770 | 00:49:43,103 | and podesta over Clinton's press strategy. | and podesta over Clinton's press strategy. |
985 | 00:49:43,186 | 00:49:44,770 | A lot of this was gossip. | A lot of this was gossip. |
986 | 00:49:44,853 | 00:49:46,937 | Newscaster 2: In another email, a longtime Clinton aide | Newscaster 2: In another email, a longtime Clinton aide |
987 | 00:49:47,019 | 00:49:50,144 | refers to Chelsea Clinton as a, quote, "spoiled brat." | refers to Chelsea Clinton as a, quote, "spoiled brat." |
988 | 00:49:50,228 | 00:49:53,687 | But people thought, well, if it's secret, | But people thought, well, if it's secret, |
989 | 00:49:53,770 | 00:49:55,687 | or if it's stolen, | or if it's stolen, |
990 | 00:49:55,770 | 00:49:57,978 | it must be more sexy. | it must be more sexy. |
991 | 00:49:58,061 | 00:49:59,770 | It's kind of shadowy. | It's kind of shadowy. |
992 | 00:49:59,853 | 00:50:01,978 | "They didn't want you to know this much." | "They didn't want you to know this much." |
993 | 00:50:02,061 | 00:50:03,770 | Like any good peek behind the curtains, | Like any good peek behind the curtains, |
994 | 00:50:03,853 | 00:50:06,812 | they show things the campaign obviously would rather keep under wraps. | they show things the campaign obviously would rather keep under wraps. |
995 | 00:50:06,895 | 00:50:08,978 | The Clinton emails are fascinating | The Clinton emails are fascinating |
996 | 00:50:09,061 | 00:50:10,728 | and hilarious reading in some ways. | and hilarious reading in some ways. |
997 | 00:50:10,812 | 00:50:12,853 | So is it more like "veep" or is it more like "west wing"? | So is it more like "veep" or is it more like "west wing"? |
998 | 00:50:12,937 | 00:50:16,144 | We were very frustrated. | We were very frustrated. |
999 | 00:50:16,228 | 00:50:19,311 | The fact that this was a hostile foreign government | The fact that this was a hostile foreign government |
1000 | 00:50:19,395 | 00:50:21,103 | interfering in the election | interfering in the election |
1001 | 00:50:21,186 | 00:50:25,353 | was never really part of what the coverage was. | was never really part of what the coverage was. |
1002 | 00:50:25,436 | 00:50:28,103 | I would just add, you know, this should be of concern to everyone | I would just add, you know, this should be of concern to everyone |
1003 | 00:50:28,186 | 00:50:31,812 | that the Russians are trying to influence our election. | that the Russians are trying to influence our election. |
1004 | 00:50:31,895 | 00:50:34,561 | Clinton: You know, everybody was clearly informed | Clinton: You know, everybody was clearly informed |
1005 | 00:50:34,645 | 00:50:37,019 | about my email mistakes, but they didn't know | about my email mistakes, but they didn't know |
1006 | 00:50:37,103 | 00:50:40,436 | there was an active campaign against US by the Russians. | there was an active campaign against US by the Russians. |
1007 | 00:50:40,520 | 00:50:43,812 | They did not know that the trump campaign had personnel | They did not know that the trump campaign had personnel |
1008 | 00:50:43,895 | 00:50:47,103 | associated with it, who were also being investigated. | associated with it, who were also being investigated. |
1009 | 00:50:47,186 | 00:50:50,353 | If you look at trump's campaign the last month, | If you look at trump's campaign the last month, |
1010 | 00:50:50,436 | 00:50:53,687 | he mentioned wikileaks over 160 times. | he mentioned wikileaks over 160 times. |
1011 | 00:50:53,770 | 00:50:56,687 | And they used the most perverse | And they used the most perverse |
1012 | 00:50:56,770 | 00:50:59,853 | twisting of anything in John podesta's emails | twisting of anything in John podesta's emails |
1013 | 00:50:59,937 | 00:51:02,645 | to create controversy, | to create controversy, |
1014 | 00:51:02,728 | 00:51:05,186 | and, uh, sow distrust. | and, uh, sow distrust. |
1015 | 00:51:05,269 | 00:51:08,687 | A Russian news outlet just totally misrepresented one of these emails, | A Russian news outlet just totally misrepresented one of these emails, |
1016 | 00:51:08,770 | 00:51:10,061 | and then Donald Trump read it. | and then Donald Trump read it. |
1017 | 00:51:10,144 | 00:51:11,687 | She's now admitting that they could have | She's now admitting that they could have |
1018 | 00:51:11,770 | 00:51:13,228 | done something about Benghazi. | done something about Benghazi. |
1019 | 00:51:13,311 | 00:51:15,228 | This just came out a little while ago. | This just came out a little while ago. |
1020 | 00:51:15,311 | 00:51:17,269 | There was, like, an email story every day, | There was, like, an email story every day, |
1021 | 00:51:17,353 | 00:51:20,895 | and then comey drops this hand grenade on US. | and then comey drops this hand grenade on US. |
1022 | 00:51:20,978 | 00:51:22,895 | Newscaster: The October surprise came in the form | Newscaster: The October surprise came in the form |
1023 | 00:51:22,978 | 00:51:25,186 | of a three-paragraph letter to congress | of a three-paragraph letter to congress |
1024 | 00:51:25,269 | 00:51:27,103 | from FBI director James comey, | from FBI director James comey, |
1025 | 00:51:27,186 | 00:51:30,061 | who wrote that agents on an unrelated case | who wrote that agents on an unrelated case |
1026 | 00:51:30,144 | 00:51:32,061 | had learned of the existence of emails | had learned of the existence of emails |
1027 | 00:51:32,144 | 00:51:35,144 | that appear to be pertinent to the Clinton investigation. | that appear to be pertinent to the Clinton investigation. |
1028 | 00:51:35,228 | 00:51:37,353 | It's the wilderness of mirrors now, | It's the wilderness of mirrors now, |
1029 | 00:51:37,436 | 00:51:39,728 | in terms of investigation upon investigation. | in terms of investigation upon investigation. |
1030 | 00:51:39,812 | 00:51:42,812 | We have to investigate Hillary Clinton, | We have to investigate Hillary Clinton, |
1031 | 00:51:42,895 | 00:51:47,353 | and we have to investigate the investigation. | and we have to investigate the investigation. |
1032 | 00:51:47,436 | 00:51:49,895 | Podesta: This is out of a Russian playbook. | Podesta: This is out of a Russian playbook. |
1033 | 00:51:49,978 | 00:51:52,395 | "When nothing is real, everything is possible," | "When nothing is real, everything is possible," |
1034 | 00:51:52,478 | 00:51:53,895 | as one of putin's critics said. | as one of putin's critics said. |
1035 | 00:51:53,978 | 00:51:55,978 | I don't think anybody knows it was Russia | I don't think anybody knows it was Russia |
1036 | 00:51:56,061 | 00:51:58,812 | that broke into the dnc. She's saying Russia, Russia, Russia. | that broke into the dnc. She's saying Russia, Russia, Russia. |
1037 | 00:51:58,895 | 00:52:00,561 | But I don't-- maybe it was. | But I don't-- maybe it was. |
1038 | 00:52:00,645 | 00:52:02,603 | It also could be somebody sitting on their bed | It also could be somebody sitting on their bed |
1039 | 00:52:02,687 | 00:52:05,269 | that weighs 400 pounds, okay? | that weighs 400 pounds, okay? |
1040 | 00:52:05,353 | 00:52:07,687 | It begins to kind of | It begins to kind of |
1041 | 00:52:07,770 | 00:52:10,770 | destroy any trust that people have. | destroy any trust that people have. |
1042 | 00:52:10,853 | 00:52:12,228 | Do you make the same commitment | Do you make the same commitment |
1043 | 00:52:12,311 | 00:52:14,937 | that you will absolutely accept the result of this election? | that you will absolutely accept the result of this election? |
1044 | 00:52:15,019 | 00:52:16,812 | I will look at it at the time. | I will look at it at the time. |
1045 | 00:52:16,895 | 00:52:20,812 | And that really destroys the credibility of democracy. | And that really destroys the credibility of democracy. |
1046 | 00:52:20,895 | 00:52:22,978 | That's what putin wants. | That's what putin wants. |
1047 | 00:52:27,144 | 00:52:31,728 | Brian Williams: We look at our electronic superimposed map of the nation | Brian Williams: We look at our electronic superimposed map of the nation |
1048 | 00:52:31,812 | 00:52:34,603 | here out back 30 rockefeller Plaza | here out back 30 rockefeller Plaza |
1049 | 00:52:34,687 | 00:52:37,520 | in New York, where the sun will be rising, | in New York, where the sun will be rising, |
1050 | 00:52:37,603 | 00:52:40,770 | uh, on the president-elect Donald John trump | uh, on the president-elect Donald John trump |
1051 | 00:52:40,853 | 00:52:42,937 | of queens, New York. | of queens, New York. |
1052 | 00:52:43,019 | 00:52:46,103 | (Cheering) | (Cheering) |
1053 | 00:52:53,228 | 00:52:55,853 | I felt like, you know, my insides had fallen out. | I felt like, you know, my insides had fallen out. |
1054 | 00:52:55,937 | 00:53:00,103 | It's like, I mean... Devastating. | It's like, I mean... Devastating. |
1055 | 00:53:06,353 | 00:53:10,061 | Sanger: For months, the newly elected president is under fire | Sanger: For months, the newly elected president is under fire |
1056 | 00:53:10,144 | 00:53:12,520 | for how he's dealing with Russia. | for how he's dealing with Russia. |
1057 | 00:53:12,603 | 00:53:14,019 | I know a lot about hacking. | I know a lot about hacking. |
1058 | 00:53:14,103 | 00:53:16,061 | And hacking is a very hard thing to prove. | And hacking is a very hard thing to prove. |
1059 | 00:53:16,144 | 00:53:17,687 | So, it could be somebody else. | So, it could be somebody else. |
1060 | 00:53:17,770 | 00:53:21,269 | And I also know things that other people don't know, | And I also know things that other people don't know, |
1061 | 00:53:21,353 | 00:53:26,395 | and so, they cannot be sure of this situation. | and so, they cannot be sure of this situation. |
1062 | 00:53:26,478 | 00:53:31,353 | And everybody is awaiting his first meeting ever with Vladimir putin. | And everybody is awaiting his first meeting ever with Vladimir putin. |
1063 | 00:53:31,436 | 00:53:33,770 | Which took place in Hamburg, Germany. | Which took place in Hamburg, Germany. |
1064 | 00:53:35,269 | 00:53:37,019 | So we all fly into Hamburg. | So we all fly into Hamburg. |
1065 | 00:53:37,103 | 00:53:39,728 | Trump meets putin, first time. | Trump meets putin, first time. |
1066 | 00:53:39,812 | 00:53:41,520 | Has a long conversation with him. | Has a long conversation with him. |
1067 | 00:53:41,603 | 00:53:43,520 | Then at the dinner that night, | Then at the dinner that night, |
1068 | 00:53:43,603 | 00:53:46,353 | goes off and has a separate conversation with him | goes off and has a separate conversation with him |
1069 | 00:53:46,436 | 00:53:48,353 | that no one else has witnessed. | that no one else has witnessed. |
1070 | 00:53:48,436 | 00:53:52,770 | President putin and I have been discussing various things, | President putin and I have been discussing various things, |
1071 | 00:53:52,853 | 00:53:54,395 | and I think it's going very well. | and I think it's going very well. |
1072 | 00:53:54,478 | 00:53:57,061 | We've had some very, very good talks. | We've had some very, very good talks. |
1073 | 00:53:57,144 | 00:53:59,395 | I head back to my hotel room, | I head back to my hotel room, |
1074 | 00:53:59,478 | 00:54:03,228 | and as I'm checking out, my cell phone rings. | and as I'm checking out, my cell phone rings. |
1075 | 00:54:03,311 | 00:54:04,978 | It's the president. | It's the president. |
1076 | 00:54:05,061 | 00:54:09,061 | "David, I just had the most remarkable conversation | "David, I just had the most remarkable conversation |
1077 | 00:54:09,144 | 00:54:10,853 | "with Vladimir putin. | "with Vladimir putin. |
1078 | 00:54:10,937 | 00:54:13,186 | "And he tells me, | "And he tells me, |
1079 | 00:54:13,269 | 00:54:14,895 | "that if it had been the Russians | "that if it had been the Russians |
1080 | 00:54:14,978 | 00:54:17,561 | "who had meddled in the election, | "who had meddled in the election, |
1081 | 00:54:17,645 | 00:54:19,645 | "we never would have seen them. | "we never would have seen them. |
1082 | 00:54:19,728 | 00:54:21,395 | "And therefore, it couldn't have been them, | "And therefore, it couldn't have been them, |
1083 | 00:54:21,478 | 00:54:22,853 | "because they wouldn't have been this sloppy. | "because they wouldn't have been this sloppy. |
1084 | 00:54:22,937 | 00:54:25,978 | "You write about this stuff. You know about all of this. | "You write about this stuff. You know about all of this. |
1085 | 00:54:26,061 | 00:54:28,061 | He must be right." | He must be right." |
1086 | 00:54:28,144 | 00:54:31,395 | The president was actually looking for affirmation. | The president was actually looking for affirmation. |
1087 | 00:54:31,478 | 00:54:35,353 | He was looking for any way to deny | He was looking for any way to deny |
1088 | 00:54:35,436 | 00:54:37,812 | or cast doubt about the question of whether | or cast doubt about the question of whether |
1089 | 00:54:37,895 | 00:54:40,353 | the Russians were behind the hack. | the Russians were behind the hack. |
1090 | 00:54:40,436 | 00:54:42,478 | And at that moment you knew | And at that moment you knew |
1091 | 00:54:42,561 | 00:54:44,353 | that the United States government | that the United States government |
1092 | 00:54:44,436 | 00:54:46,728 | was not going to organize itself | was not going to organize itself |
1093 | 00:54:46,812 | 00:54:49,103 | to push back on the Russians. | to push back on the Russians. |
1094 | 00:54:49,186 | 00:54:53,311 | ♪ | ♪ |
1095 | 00:54:55,353 | 00:54:57,311 | Newscaster: Let's be clear from the outset. | Newscaster: Let's be clear from the outset. |
1096 | 00:54:57,395 | 00:55:01,103 | This is unlike any cyber attack that we have seen before. | This is unlike any cyber attack that we have seen before. |
1097 | 00:55:01,186 | 00:55:03,269 | Newscaster 2: We want to start on this Wednesday morning | Newscaster 2: We want to start on this Wednesday morning |
1098 | 00:55:03,353 | 00:55:04,603 | with that crippling cyber attack. | with that crippling cyber attack. |
1099 | 00:55:04,687 | 00:55:06,520 | It's a new form of ransomware... | It's a new form of ransomware... |
1100 | 00:55:06,603 | 00:55:08,645 | It is hitting companies around the world | It is hitting companies around the world |
1101 | 00:55:08,728 | 00:55:12,186 | holding their computer systems hostage for money. | holding their computer systems hostage for money. |
1102 | 00:55:12,269 | 00:55:16,395 | Spaulding: In 2017, shortly after trump came into office, | Spaulding: In 2017, shortly after trump came into office, |
1103 | 00:55:16,478 | 00:55:19,103 | we saw a dramatic escalation | we saw a dramatic escalation |
1104 | 00:55:19,186 | 00:55:23,978 | in the scale and the scope and the nature of cyber attacks. | in the scale and the scope and the nature of cyber attacks. |
1105 | 00:55:24,061 | 00:55:28,311 | There was a massive ransomware attack called "notpetya" | There was a massive ransomware attack called "notpetya" |
1106 | 00:55:28,395 | 00:55:31,186 | that started in Ukraine. | that started in Ukraine. |
1107 | 00:55:34,311 | 00:55:36,728 | Dmytro shymkiv: It was June 2017. | Dmytro shymkiv: It was June 2017. |
1108 | 00:55:36,812 | 00:55:40,478 | I'm deputy head of the presidential administration. | I'm deputy head of the presidential administration. |
1109 | 00:55:40,561 | 00:55:44,895 | Took a few days' vacation to drop my, uh, kids to the summer camp. | Took a few days' vacation to drop my, uh, kids to the summer camp. |
1110 | 00:55:44,978 | 00:55:48,061 | And in the morning, I start receiving text messages from my team. | And in the morning, I start receiving text messages from my team. |
1111 | 00:55:48,978 | 00:55:51,895 | "We think Ukraine is under attack." | "We think Ukraine is under attack." |
1112 | 00:55:51,978 | 00:55:54,395 | "Our infrastructure is registering attacks. | "Our infrastructure is registering attacks. |
1113 | 00:55:54,478 | 00:55:57,019 | The virus is destroying computers." | The virus is destroying computers." |
1114 | 00:55:57,103 | 00:55:59,019 | You know, atm machines were not working. | You know, atm machines were not working. |
1115 | 00:55:59,103 | 00:56:01,978 | Hospitals reported their computers being down. | Hospitals reported their computers being down. |
1116 | 00:56:02,061 | 00:56:05,353 | TV station, grocery stores... | TV station, grocery stores... |
1117 | 00:56:05,436 | 00:56:09,144 | It was devastating. It was spreading like fire. | It was devastating. It was spreading like fire. |
1118 | 00:56:10,561 | 00:56:13,770 | Sanger: Ukraine is Vladimir putin's petri dish. | Sanger: Ukraine is Vladimir putin's petri dish. |
1119 | 00:56:13,853 | 00:56:18,353 | It's where he experiments on every single technique | It's where he experiments on every single technique |
1120 | 00:56:18,436 | 00:56:22,395 | that he ultimately ended up using in the United States. | that he ultimately ended up using in the United States. |
1121 | 00:56:22,478 | 00:56:25,395 | Breaking into emails, and making them public. | Breaking into emails, and making them public. |
1122 | 00:56:25,478 | 00:56:29,228 | Sowing chaos with disinformation. | Sowing chaos with disinformation. |
1123 | 00:56:29,311 | 00:56:32,687 | Shymkiv: Russia was constantly testing different strategies, | Shymkiv: Russia was constantly testing different strategies, |
1124 | 00:56:32,770 | 00:56:35,186 | and different approaches, in Ukraine. | and different approaches, in Ukraine. |
1125 | 00:56:35,269 | 00:56:37,353 | Attacks on the electrical grid, | Attacks on the electrical grid, |
1126 | 00:56:37,436 | 00:56:40,061 | 2015, 2016. | 2015, 2016. |
1127 | 00:56:40,144 | 00:56:43,186 | Attack on the transportation infrastructure. | Attack on the transportation infrastructure. |
1128 | 00:56:43,269 | 00:56:47,395 | Odessa airport, Ukrainian subway in Kiev. | Odessa airport, Ukrainian subway in Kiev. |
1129 | 00:56:47,478 | 00:56:50,353 | You don't see the regular war. | You don't see the regular war. |
1130 | 00:56:50,436 | 00:56:54,311 | But war is taking place, and it's devastating. | But war is taking place, and it's devastating. |
1131 | 00:56:55,311 | 00:56:57,228 | Alperovitch: With its notpetya attack, | Alperovitch: With its notpetya attack, |
1132 | 00:56:57,311 | 00:56:59,228 | what the Russians didn't count on | what the Russians didn't count on |
1133 | 00:56:59,311 | 00:57:02,228 | is that the spreading algorithms that they put in | is that the spreading algorithms that they put in |
1134 | 00:57:02,311 | 00:57:03,853 | were so aggressive that | were so aggressive that |
1135 | 00:57:03,937 | 00:57:06,395 | it wouldn't just contain itself to the network of one company. | it wouldn't just contain itself to the network of one company. |
1136 | 00:57:06,478 | 00:57:09,228 | Newscaster: Any firms with any links to Ukraine | Newscaster: Any firms with any links to Ukraine |
1137 | 00:57:09,311 | 00:57:12,645 | are being contaminated by this contagious virus. | are being contaminated by this contagious virus. |
1138 | 00:57:12,728 | 00:57:16,395 | It would quickly jump out, and compromise contractors, | It would quickly jump out, and compromise contractors, |
1139 | 00:57:16,478 | 00:57:18,395 | other networks that you may be connected with. | other networks that you may be connected with. |
1140 | 00:57:18,478 | 00:57:21,061 | It escapes the box, and it begins to hit the corporations | It escapes the box, and it begins to hit the corporations |
1141 | 00:57:21,144 | 00:57:22,603 | and companies all around the world. | and companies all around the world. |
1142 | 00:57:22,687 | 00:57:24,978 | Zegart: Maersk shipping was one. | Zegart: Maersk shipping was one. |
1143 | 00:57:25,061 | 00:57:26,853 | Fedex was another. | Fedex was another. |
1144 | 00:57:26,937 | 00:57:29,436 | They lost hundreds of millions of dollars of business | They lost hundreds of millions of dollars of business |
1145 | 00:57:29,520 | 00:57:32,186 | just from the loss of business operations | just from the loss of business operations |
1146 | 00:57:32,269 | 00:57:34,311 | and the money they had to pay to remediate | and the money they had to pay to remediate |
1147 | 00:57:34,395 | 00:57:36,687 | the damage to their systems. | the damage to their systems. |
1148 | 00:57:37,687 | 00:57:39,978 | Sanger: There was one other aspect | Sanger: There was one other aspect |
1149 | 00:57:40,061 | 00:57:42,186 | to the notpetya attacks | to the notpetya attacks |
1150 | 00:57:42,269 | 00:57:46,144 | that made this story really complicated. | that made this story really complicated. |
1151 | 00:57:46,228 | 00:57:49,561 | It turned out that a component of the attacks | It turned out that a component of the attacks |
1152 | 00:57:49,645 | 00:57:53,061 | had relied on code that had been stolen | had relied on code that had been stolen |
1153 | 00:57:53,144 | 00:57:56,311 | from inside the NSA. | from inside the NSA. |
1154 | 00:57:57,228 | 00:57:59,144 | In the summer of 2016, | In the summer of 2016, |
1155 | 00:57:59,228 | 00:58:02,812 | a group that called itself theshadowbrokers | a group that called itself theshadowbrokers |
1156 | 00:58:02,895 | 00:58:07,228 | began posting thousands of lines of this code | began posting thousands of lines of this code |
1157 | 00:58:07,311 | 00:58:09,770 | to make it clear to the NSA | to make it clear to the NSA |
1158 | 00:58:09,853 | 00:58:12,353 | that they had the crown jewels. | that they had the crown jewels. |
1159 | 00:58:13,561 | 00:58:16,269 | Before long, the north Koreans | Before long, the north Koreans |
1160 | 00:58:16,353 | 00:58:18,645 | used parts of the shadowbrokers code | used parts of the shadowbrokers code |
1161 | 00:58:18,728 | 00:58:22,687 | when they attacked with a weapon called wannacry. | when they attacked with a weapon called wannacry. |
1162 | 00:58:22,770 | 00:58:25,687 | Newscaster 1: This specific worm that was leaked from the NSA's toolkit | Newscaster 1: This specific worm that was leaked from the NSA's toolkit |
1163 | 00:58:25,770 | 00:58:27,103 | targeted Microsoft windows. | targeted Microsoft windows. |
1164 | 00:58:27,186 | 00:58:29,144 | Newscaster 2: Windows-based computers in the US | Newscaster 2: Windows-based computers in the US |
1165 | 00:58:29,228 | 00:58:32,353 | and across the globe could be at risk. | and across the globe could be at risk. |
1166 | 00:58:35,645 | 00:58:38,395 | Brad Smith: I will always remember on that morning, | Brad Smith: I will always remember on that morning, |
1167 | 00:58:38,478 | 00:58:41,728 | sitting in the meeting of Microsoft's senior leadership team. | sitting in the meeting of Microsoft's senior leadership team. |
1168 | 00:58:41,812 | 00:58:44,353 | And all of a sudden, people are seeing emails | And all of a sudden, people are seeing emails |
1169 | 00:58:44,436 | 00:58:45,978 | pop up on their screen. | pop up on their screen. |
1170 | 00:58:46,061 | 00:58:49,353 | Reports from one customer after another. "What's going on?" | Reports from one customer after another. "What's going on?" |
1171 | 00:58:49,436 | 00:58:53,269 | We're getting details of this massive international cyber attack today. | We're getting details of this massive international cyber attack today. |
1172 | 00:58:53,353 | 00:58:56,812 | Hackers demanding money have paralyzed computers | Hackers demanding money have paralyzed computers |
1173 | 00:58:56,895 | 00:58:59,853 | in at least 99 countries. | in at least 99 countries. |
1174 | 00:58:59,937 | 00:59:01,937 | Smith: You could almost see this worm | Smith: You could almost see this worm |
1175 | 00:59:02,019 | 00:59:03,978 | moving with the time zones | moving with the time zones |
1176 | 00:59:04,061 | 00:59:08,228 | across the Atlantic ocean from Europe to North America. | across the Atlantic ocean from Europe to North America. |
1177 | 00:59:11,019 | 00:59:14,311 | Sanger: It was as if we had lost the blueprints | Sanger: It was as if we had lost the blueprints |
1178 | 00:59:14,395 | 00:59:16,353 | for an American missile. | for an American missile. |
1179 | 00:59:16,436 | 00:59:20,228 | The north Koreans and the Russians had grabbed it, | The north Koreans and the Russians had grabbed it, |
1180 | 00:59:20,311 | 00:59:22,728 | improved upon it, designed a prototype, | improved upon it, designed a prototype, |
1181 | 00:59:22,812 | 00:59:27,478 | and shot it back at American allies and friends. | and shot it back at American allies and friends. |
1182 | 00:59:27,561 | 00:59:31,728 | It attacked 155 countries in one day. | It attacked 155 countries in one day. |
1183 | 00:59:31,812 | 00:59:34,103 | In the history of humanity, | In the history of humanity, |
1184 | 00:59:34,186 | 00:59:37,978 | no weapon has ever been fired by a single country | no weapon has ever been fired by a single country |
1185 | 00:59:38,061 | 00:59:41,978 | in a way that hit so many other nations simultaneously. | in a way that hit so many other nations simultaneously. |
1186 | 00:59:44,561 | 00:59:47,186 | Sanger: The volume of attacks is escalating. | Sanger: The volume of attacks is escalating. |
1187 | 00:59:47,269 | 00:59:50,561 | The sophistication of attacks is escalating. | The sophistication of attacks is escalating. |
1188 | 00:59:50,645 | 00:59:53,853 | And the debate about how to go deal with it | And the debate about how to go deal with it |
1189 | 00:59:53,937 | 00:59:57,019 | is only getting more and more confusing. | is only getting more and more confusing. |
1190 | 01:00:06,478 | 01:00:09,436 | Brandon Scott: It was my first day as council president. | Brandon Scott: It was my first day as council president. |
1191 | 01:00:09,520 | 01:00:11,478 | It was about 12 o'clock in the morning. | It was about 12 o'clock in the morning. |
1192 | 01:00:11,561 | 01:00:14,520 | I'm on my work phone and I try to get into my email, | I'm on my work phone and I try to get into my email, |
1193 | 01:00:14,603 | 01:00:16,186 | and it doesn't work. | and it doesn't work. |
1194 | 01:00:16,269 | 01:00:18,937 | And then I get onto my surface pro, and it doesn't work. | And then I get onto my surface pro, and it doesn't work. |
1195 | 01:00:19,019 | 01:00:21,520 | And so I start to call some other folks that I knew would be up | And so I start to call some other folks that I knew would be up |
1196 | 01:00:21,603 | 01:00:23,687 | and I was told that we had been hacked. | and I was told that we had been hacked. |
1197 | 01:00:24,978 | 01:00:27,603 | We had been hit by a ransomware attack. | We had been hit by a ransomware attack. |
1198 | 01:00:27,687 | 01:00:29,144 | We were advised by-- | We were advised by-- |
1199 | 01:00:29,228 | 01:00:31,687 | uh, the administration but also from the federal government-- | uh, the administration but also from the federal government-- |
1200 | 01:00:31,770 | 01:00:34,144 | that we should not pay that ransom. | that we should not pay that ransom. |
1201 | 01:00:34,228 | 01:00:37,770 | We couldn't communicate with the people that we normally communicate with. | We couldn't communicate with the people that we normally communicate with. |
1202 | 01:00:37,853 | 01:00:40,228 | People couldn't come in and fill out for their permits. | People couldn't come in and fill out for their permits. |
1203 | 01:00:40,311 | 01:00:41,937 | Real estate deals could not be done. | Real estate deals could not be done. |
1204 | 01:00:42,019 | 01:00:43,144 | Bills could not be paid. | Bills could not be paid. |
1205 | 01:00:43,228 | 01:00:44,478 | Parking tickets could not be paid. | Parking tickets could not be paid. |
1206 | 01:00:44,561 | 01:00:45,978 | Fines could not be paid. | Fines could not be paid. |
1207 | 01:00:46,061 | 01:00:48,978 | We're talking about lots and lots of business in the city | We're talking about lots and lots of business in the city |
1208 | 01:00:49,061 | 01:00:50,395 | that could not be done | that could not be done |
1209 | 01:00:50,478 | 01:00:52,478 | because the systems were crippled | because the systems were crippled |
1210 | 01:00:52,561 | 01:00:54,561 | and pushed down to a halt. | and pushed down to a halt. |
1211 | 01:00:54,645 | 01:00:59,061 | I lost, you know, literally 12 years of files. | I lost, you know, literally 12 years of files. |
1212 | 01:00:59,144 | 01:01:01,812 | Interviewer: What was the cost to Baltimore, ultimately? | Interviewer: What was the cost to Baltimore, ultimately? |
1213 | 01:01:01,895 | 01:01:04,019 | Yeah, it was upwards of $15 million, | Yeah, it was upwards of $15 million, |
1214 | 01:01:04,103 | 01:01:08,436 | is what we had to, to pay out and to rebuild, and build better systems. | is what we had to, to pay out and to rebuild, and build better systems. |
1215 | 01:01:08,520 | 01:01:11,478 | Interviewer: And the original ransom was far less than that. | Interviewer: And the original ransom was far less than that. |
1216 | 01:01:11,561 | 01:01:12,978 | Far less than that, but, you know, | Far less than that, but, you know, |
1217 | 01:01:13,061 | 01:01:16,144 | the mayor made a decision based on the advice of, | the mayor made a decision based on the advice of, |
1218 | 01:01:16,228 | 01:01:19,561 | uh, public safety experts to not pay it. | uh, public safety experts to not pay it. |
1219 | 01:01:22,561 | 01:01:26,853 | Sanger: Cites across america have been paralyzed. | Sanger: Cites across america have been paralyzed. |
1220 | 01:01:26,937 | 01:01:29,853 | And some of them, including one small town in Florida, | And some of them, including one small town in Florida, |
1221 | 01:01:29,937 | 01:01:32,103 | decided it was cheaper to pay the ransom | decided it was cheaper to pay the ransom |
1222 | 01:01:32,186 | 01:01:34,770 | than to try to go rebuild the databases. | than to try to go rebuild the databases. |
1223 | 01:01:36,937 | 01:01:38,687 | Scott: Cites and governments around the country, | Scott: Cites and governments around the country, |
1224 | 01:01:38,770 | 01:01:41,436 | businesses around the country, non-profits around the country, | businesses around the country, non-profits around the country, |
1225 | 01:01:41,520 | 01:01:43,186 | school systems around the country, | school systems around the country, |
1226 | 01:01:43,269 | 01:01:46,186 | have to understand that this is the world that we live in now. | have to understand that this is the world that we live in now. |
1227 | 01:01:46,269 | 01:01:48,478 | Right? This is the new normal. | Right? This is the new normal. |
1228 | 01:01:58,436 | 01:02:01,937 | Richard burr: Secretary Nielsen, looking ahead to 2018, | Richard burr: Secretary Nielsen, looking ahead to 2018, |
1229 | 01:02:02,019 | 01:02:06,103 | what is dhs's current estimation | what is dhs's current estimation |
1230 | 01:02:06,186 | 01:02:08,436 | of the threat to our elections, | of the threat to our elections, |
1231 | 01:02:08,520 | 01:02:12,228 | from Russia, or any other hostile actor? | from Russia, or any other hostile actor? |
1232 | 01:02:12,311 | 01:02:13,978 | We think the threat remains high. | We think the threat remains high. |
1233 | 01:02:14,061 | 01:02:15,478 | Uh, we think vigilance is important, | Uh, we think vigilance is important, |
1234 | 01:02:15,561 | 01:02:18,186 | and we think there's a lot that we all need to do, | and we think there's a lot that we all need to do, |
1235 | 01:02:18,269 | 01:02:19,770 | uh, at all levels of government, | uh, at all levels of government, |
1236 | 01:02:19,853 | 01:02:22,311 | uh, before we have the midterm elections. | uh, before we have the midterm elections. |
1237 | 01:02:25,395 | 01:02:27,269 | When it comes to elections, | When it comes to elections, |
1238 | 01:02:27,353 | 01:02:29,561 | the president never, uh, understandably, | the president never, uh, understandably, |
1239 | 01:02:29,645 | 01:02:32,478 | never wanted the results of the elec-- | never wanted the results of the elec-- |
1240 | 01:02:32,561 | 01:02:34,937 | of the election to be questioned. | of the election to be questioned. |
1241 | 01:02:35,645 | 01:02:37,395 | It was very difficult, | It was very difficult, |
1242 | 01:02:37,478 | 01:02:41,353 | but those who need to be focused on the elections, | but those who need to be focused on the elections, |
1243 | 01:02:41,436 | 01:02:43,561 | they know what they need to do. | they know what they need to do. |
1244 | 01:02:43,645 | 01:02:46,353 | The people who need to do the work that needs to be done, | The people who need to do the work that needs to be done, |
1245 | 01:02:46,436 | 01:02:50,311 | have really dug in and, and recognized the, the threat. | have really dug in and, and recognized the, the threat. |
1246 | 01:02:55,561 | 01:02:57,687 | Sanger: When he was running for president, | Sanger: When he was running for president, |
1247 | 01:02:57,770 | 01:03:01,353 | trump had not really thought about cyber. | trump had not really thought about cyber. |
1248 | 01:03:01,436 | 01:03:03,853 | I don't think he had even heard about stuxnet. | I don't think he had even heard about stuxnet. |
1249 | 01:03:03,937 | 01:03:07,186 | He certainly never registered what it was all about. | He certainly never registered what it was all about. |
1250 | 01:03:08,186 | 01:03:11,311 | He said to me at one point, "oh. The cyber. | He said to me at one point, "oh. The cyber. |
1251 | 01:03:11,395 | 01:03:13,687 | The cyber is very powerful." | The cyber is very powerful." |
1252 | 01:03:15,937 | 01:03:19,228 | But candidate trump said he wanted to pull American troops | But candidate trump said he wanted to pull American troops |
1253 | 01:03:19,311 | 01:03:23,228 | out of the middle east, out of South Korea, out of Japan. | out of the middle east, out of South Korea, out of Japan. |
1254 | 01:03:23,311 | 01:03:26,770 | So he saw cyber as this magic bullet. | So he saw cyber as this magic bullet. |
1255 | 01:03:26,853 | 01:03:30,853 | Today I'm convening this meeting to follow through | Today I'm convening this meeting to follow through |
1256 | 01:03:30,937 | 01:03:35,478 | on my promise to secure crucial infrastructure. | on my promise to secure crucial infrastructure. |
1257 | 01:03:35,561 | 01:03:38,353 | And the networks that we've been talking so much about | And the networks that we've been talking so much about |
1258 | 01:03:38,436 | 01:03:41,645 | over the last period of time of the federal government | over the last period of time of the federal government |
1259 | 01:03:41,728 | 01:03:44,895 | against cyber threats. | against cyber threats. |
1260 | 01:03:51,895 | 01:03:54,603 | Sanger: By the time trump became president, | Sanger: By the time trump became president, |
1261 | 01:03:54,687 | 01:03:59,520 | the United States had built up this massive, offensive cyber program. | the United States had built up this massive, offensive cyber program. |
1262 | 01:04:03,353 | 01:04:05,812 | It had gone after North Korea's missiles. | It had gone after North Korea's missiles. |
1263 | 01:04:05,895 | 01:04:07,812 | Newscaster: North Korea has once again attempted to launch | Newscaster: North Korea has once again attempted to launch |
1264 | 01:04:07,895 | 01:04:09,395 | a ballistic missile, and failed. | a ballistic missile, and failed. |
1265 | 01:04:09,478 | 01:04:12,103 | Newscaster 2: They Mark the second and third launch failures. | Newscaster 2: They Mark the second and third launch failures. |
1266 | 01:04:12,186 | 01:04:14,561 | Newscaster 3: Another failure. | Newscaster 3: Another failure. |
1267 | 01:04:14,645 | 01:04:18,853 | Using code to send those missiles spinning into the sea. | Using code to send those missiles spinning into the sea. |
1268 | 01:04:18,937 | 01:04:22,687 | (Exploding) | (Exploding) |
1269 | 01:04:22,770 | 01:04:27,061 | It had gone after the Isis recruitment system. | It had gone after the Isis recruitment system. |
1270 | 01:04:27,144 | 01:04:30,687 | It was called "operation glowing symphony." | It was called "operation glowing symphony." |
1271 | 01:04:30,770 | 01:04:34,603 | And the idea basically was to knock Isis offline. | And the idea basically was to knock Isis offline. |
1272 | 01:04:37,061 | 01:04:40,645 | But one of the key lessons of the Obama administration | But one of the key lessons of the Obama administration |
1273 | 01:04:40,728 | 01:04:44,687 | was that despite developing all these new capabilities, | was that despite developing all these new capabilities, |
1274 | 01:04:44,770 | 01:04:49,228 | it took far too long to get cyber operations approved. | it took far too long to get cyber operations approved. |
1275 | 01:04:50,853 | 01:04:53,311 | Rosenbach: During the time I was in the department of defense, | Rosenbach: During the time I was in the department of defense, |
1276 | 01:04:53,395 | 01:04:55,353 | not even the secretary of defense | not even the secretary of defense |
1277 | 01:04:55,436 | 01:04:57,228 | could approve an offensive cyber operation. | could approve an offensive cyber operation. |
1278 | 01:04:57,311 | 01:04:59,061 | That was only the president of the United States. | That was only the president of the United States. |
1279 | 01:04:59,144 | 01:05:01,687 | President Trump has taken a very different approach, | President Trump has taken a very different approach, |
1280 | 01:05:01,770 | 01:05:05,061 | where he's delegated the approval authority | where he's delegated the approval authority |
1281 | 01:05:05,144 | 01:05:07,186 | to a lot of offensive cyber operations, | to a lot of offensive cyber operations, |
1282 | 01:05:07,269 | 01:05:08,937 | not only to the secretary of defense, | not only to the secretary of defense, |
1283 | 01:05:09,019 | 01:05:11,937 | but to the commander of cyber command. | but to the commander of cyber command. |
1284 | 01:05:12,019 | 01:05:14,311 | Dan Sullivan: What do you think our adversaries think right now? | Dan Sullivan: What do you think our adversaries think right now? |
1285 | 01:05:14,395 | 01:05:17,812 | If you do a cyber attack on america, what's gonna happen to 'em? | If you do a cyber attack on america, what's gonna happen to 'em? |
1286 | 01:05:17,895 | 01:05:20,812 | So, basically, uh, I would say right now, um, | So, basically, uh, I would say right now, um, |
1287 | 01:05:20,895 | 01:05:23,311 | they do not, um, think that much will happen to them. | they do not, um, think that much will happen to them. |
1288 | 01:05:23,395 | 01:05:26,144 | -Sullivan: They don't fear US. -They don't fear US. | -Sullivan: They don't fear US. -They don't fear US. |
1289 | 01:05:27,978 | 01:05:30,770 | Sanger: Once general nakasone took over at the NSA | Sanger: Once general nakasone took over at the NSA |
1290 | 01:05:30,853 | 01:05:32,061 | and cyber command, | and cyber command, |
1291 | 01:05:32,144 | 01:05:34,103 | he put together within the organization | he put together within the organization |
1292 | 01:05:34,186 | 01:05:36,228 | something called the Russia small group, | something called the Russia small group, |
1293 | 01:05:36,311 | 01:05:41,395 | who were determined to take an aggressive stance against the Russians. | who were determined to take an aggressive stance against the Russians. |
1294 | 01:05:43,353 | 01:05:46,978 | For several years, the United States had warned | For several years, the United States had warned |
1295 | 01:05:47,061 | 01:05:51,061 | that Russian hackers were inside the US electric grid. | that Russian hackers were inside the US electric grid. |
1296 | 01:05:51,812 | 01:05:53,436 | In 2018, | In 2018, |
1297 | 01:05:53,520 | 01:05:56,603 | the NSA took American-made code | the NSA took American-made code |
1298 | 01:05:56,687 | 01:06:01,103 | and put it inside the Russian electric grid. | and put it inside the Russian electric grid. |
1299 | 01:06:01,186 | 01:06:03,228 | And they designed some of it | And they designed some of it |
1300 | 01:06:03,311 | 01:06:06,061 | in a way to make sure the Russians saw them. | in a way to make sure the Russians saw them. |
1301 | 01:06:07,019 | 01:06:08,770 | It was supposed to say, | It was supposed to say, |
1302 | 01:06:08,853 | 01:06:11,103 | "we're not gonna do this in a covert way. | "we're not gonna do this in a covert way. |
1303 | 01:06:11,186 | 01:06:13,269 | "We're gonna make you understand | "We're gonna make you understand |
1304 | 01:06:13,353 | 01:06:14,687 | what the price will be." | what the price will be." |
1305 | 01:06:18,937 | 01:06:21,186 | Rosenbach: There were also a series of messages | Rosenbach: There were also a series of messages |
1306 | 01:06:21,269 | 01:06:23,645 | sent to Russian influence operatives | sent to Russian influence operatives |
1307 | 01:06:23,728 | 01:06:25,812 | that said, "we know who you are. | that said, "we know who you are. |
1308 | 01:06:25,895 | 01:06:28,478 | "If you continue to conduct cyber attacks, | "If you continue to conduct cyber attacks, |
1309 | 01:06:28,561 | 01:06:32,228 | "and if you try to target the election in 2018, | "and if you try to target the election in 2018, |
1310 | 01:06:32,311 | 01:06:33,728 | there will be repercussions." | there will be repercussions." |
1311 | 01:06:33,812 | 01:06:35,978 | There were very targeted cyber operations | There were very targeted cyber operations |
1312 | 01:06:36,061 | 01:06:37,895 | to make it clear that we knew who was doing what, | to make it clear that we knew who was doing what, |
1313 | 01:06:37,978 | 01:06:41,269 | and we were gonna degrade their capability to succeed. | and we were gonna degrade their capability to succeed. |
1314 | 01:06:44,478 | 01:06:47,687 | Healey: In 2018, in the lead-up to election day, | Healey: In 2018, in the lead-up to election day, |
1315 | 01:06:47,770 | 01:06:52,186 | cyber command takes down the Russian Internet research agency. | cyber command takes down the Russian Internet research agency. |
1316 | 01:06:52,269 | 01:06:55,770 | They got in there, and really took apart their home network. | They got in there, and really took apart their home network. |
1317 | 01:06:55,853 | 01:06:57,144 | Really disabled it, | Really disabled it, |
1318 | 01:06:57,228 | 01:06:58,937 | so that they wouldn't be able | so that they wouldn't be able |
1319 | 01:06:59,019 | 01:07:01,061 | to conduct their social media campaign. | to conduct their social media campaign. |
1320 | 01:07:03,603 | 01:07:06,436 | Hultquist: This was a very forward-leaning operation. | Hultquist: This was a very forward-leaning operation. |
1321 | 01:07:06,520 | 01:07:09,269 | It looked to be pretty successful. | It looked to be pretty successful. |
1322 | 01:07:09,353 | 01:07:12,978 | Russian actors were somewhat quiet during that period. | Russian actors were somewhat quiet during that period. |
1323 | 01:07:14,186 | 01:07:15,895 | The question is, how long will that last? | The question is, how long will that last? |
1324 | 01:07:15,978 | 01:07:20,269 | Can we defend forward against every, you know, potential actor? | Can we defend forward against every, you know, potential actor? |
1325 | 01:07:22,645 | 01:07:23,937 | (Static) | (Static) |
1326 | 01:07:24,019 | 01:07:25,520 | Reporter: Good morning, Sandra and ed. | Reporter: Good morning, Sandra and ed. |
1327 | 01:07:25,603 | 01:07:27,853 | And now it is up to the Iowa voters. | And now it is up to the Iowa voters. |
1328 | 01:07:27,937 | 01:07:30,895 | Reporter 2: Iowans in more than 1,600 precincts are gathering | Reporter 2: Iowans in more than 1,600 precincts are gathering |
1329 | 01:07:30,978 | 01:07:34,561 | to back the person they want to win the Democratic presidential nomination. | to back the person they want to win the Democratic presidential nomination. |
1330 | 01:07:34,645 | 01:07:36,311 | Pete butteigeig: My purpose here is very simple. | Pete butteigeig: My purpose here is very simple. |
1331 | 01:07:36,395 | 01:07:38,687 | It's to come before you one more time | It's to come before you one more time |
1332 | 01:07:38,770 | 01:07:41,520 | and ask you to caucus for me. | and ask you to caucus for me. |
1333 | 01:07:41,603 | 01:07:44,228 | Chuck Todd: We are still awaiting the first official results | Chuck Todd: We are still awaiting the first official results |
1334 | 01:07:44,311 | 01:07:45,561 | given to US by the party. | given to US by the party. |
1335 | 01:07:45,645 | 01:07:48,311 | Obviously, things are going a bit slow for them. | Obviously, things are going a bit slow for them. |
1336 | 01:07:48,395 | 01:07:51,937 | Sixteen hours since the Iowa caucuses began. | Sixteen hours since the Iowa caucuses began. |
1337 | 01:07:52,019 | 01:07:53,728 | We're still waiting for the results. | We're still waiting for the results. |
1338 | 01:07:53,812 | 01:07:57,061 | The app didn't work. No one knew if it would. | The app didn't work. No one knew if it would. |
1339 | 01:07:57,144 | 01:07:59,478 | This is, so far, not so good. | This is, so far, not so good. |
1340 | 01:08:01,937 | 01:08:03,728 | Iowa was exactly my worst fear. | Iowa was exactly my worst fear. |
1341 | 01:08:03,812 | 01:08:08,353 | The biggest concern was that voters would not be able to trust the system. | The biggest concern was that voters would not be able to trust the system. |
1342 | 01:08:08,436 | 01:08:10,061 | What about the confidence in the vote? | What about the confidence in the vote? |
1343 | 01:08:10,144 | 01:08:11,895 | Especially with, against the backdrop | Especially with, against the backdrop |
1344 | 01:08:11,978 | 01:08:13,687 | of the Russian interference in 2016. | of the Russian interference in 2016. |
1345 | 01:08:13,770 | 01:08:17,144 | What Iowa is demonstrating to adversaries of the United States is | What Iowa is demonstrating to adversaries of the United States is |
1346 | 01:08:17,228 | 01:08:19,269 | all they have to do is create that appearance. | all they have to do is create that appearance. |
1347 | 01:08:19,353 | 01:08:22,103 | And they probably don't even have to create their own disinformation. | And they probably don't even have to create their own disinformation. |
1348 | 01:08:22,186 | 01:08:23,937 | American partisans will do it for them. | American partisans will do it for them. |
1349 | 01:08:24,019 | 01:08:25,895 | News anchor: The president's son was saying it's rigged. | News anchor: The president's son was saying it's rigged. |
1350 | 01:08:25,978 | 01:08:27,228 | The president's campaign manager. | The president's campaign manager. |
1351 | 01:08:27,311 | 01:08:28,603 | Jake tapper: The biden campaign is out there | Jake tapper: The biden campaign is out there |
1352 | 01:08:28,687 | 01:08:30,436 | openly saying they don't trust | openly saying they don't trust |
1353 | 01:08:30,520 | 01:08:31,770 | what the results will be. | what the results will be. |
1354 | 01:08:31,853 | 01:08:35,061 | They've created what's called a perception hack. | They've created what's called a perception hack. |
1355 | 01:08:35,144 | 01:08:38,061 | Our mind immediately goes to the question, | Our mind immediately goes to the question, |
1356 | 01:08:38,144 | 01:08:40,478 | "are the Russians messing with our election?" | "are the Russians messing with our election?" |
1357 | 01:08:40,561 | 01:08:42,853 | It doesn't matter whether they are or they aren't. | It doesn't matter whether they are or they aren't. |
1358 | 01:08:42,937 | 01:08:45,937 | This is one of the confusing aspects of election security. | This is one of the confusing aspects of election security. |
1359 | 01:08:46,019 | 01:08:48,937 | It's not just about trying to hack into computers. | It's not just about trying to hack into computers. |
1360 | 01:08:49,019 | 01:08:51,395 | There's another aspect of election interference | There's another aspect of election interference |
1361 | 01:08:51,478 | 01:08:53,311 | that's about trying to hack into your brain. | that's about trying to hack into your brain. |
1362 | 01:08:53,395 | 01:08:55,561 | They're ultimately trying to get the American people | They're ultimately trying to get the American people |
1363 | 01:08:55,645 | 01:08:58,269 | to lose confidence in the system. | to lose confidence in the system. |
1364 | 01:08:58,353 | 01:09:00,228 | That the system is beyond repair. | That the system is beyond repair. |
1365 | 01:09:00,311 | 01:09:03,478 | That the system is broken, and their vote doesn't matter. | That the system is broken, and their vote doesn't matter. |
1366 | 01:09:03,561 | 01:09:06,978 | US officials have now told, uh, senator Bernie Sanders that Russia | US officials have now told, uh, senator Bernie Sanders that Russia |
1367 | 01:09:07,061 | 01:09:10,770 | is trying to help his presidential campaign. | is trying to help his presidential campaign. |
1368 | 01:09:10,853 | 01:09:12,061 | Reporter: How do you think it came out now, | Reporter: How do you think it came out now, |
1369 | 01:09:12,144 | 01:09:13,478 | if you had the briefing a month ago? | if you had the briefing a month ago? |
1370 | 01:09:13,561 | 01:09:15,978 | Well, I'll let you guess about one day before the, uh, | Well, I'll let you guess about one day before the, uh, |
1371 | 01:09:16,061 | 01:09:18,311 | Nevada caucus. Why do you think it came out? | Nevada caucus. Why do you think it came out? |
1372 | 01:09:18,395 | 01:09:21,144 | 'Cause the "Washington post"? Good friends. | 'Cause the "Washington post"? Good friends. |
1373 | 01:09:21,228 | 01:09:23,853 | Reporter: Joe, what do you say to the Russians? | Reporter: Joe, what do you say to the Russians? |
1374 | 01:09:24,395 | 01:09:25,978 | I'm comin'. | I'm comin'. |
1375 | 01:09:26,061 | 01:09:27,311 | They're continuing to meddle. | They're continuing to meddle. |
1376 | 01:09:27,395 | 01:09:29,978 | They're involved in this race, and in my primary. | They're involved in this race, and in my primary. |
1377 | 01:09:30,061 | 01:09:32,561 | They're involved going after me on Facebook. | They're involved going after me on Facebook. |
1378 | 01:09:32,645 | 01:09:34,269 | They've already been taken down. | They've already been taken down. |
1379 | 01:09:34,353 | 01:09:36,311 | Because putin knows me and I know him, | Because putin knows me and I know him, |
1380 | 01:09:36,395 | 01:09:38,228 | and he doesn't want me to be president. | and he doesn't want me to be president. |
1381 | 01:09:38,311 | 01:09:41,895 | The Russians want everyone in this country to mistrust everything. | The Russians want everyone in this country to mistrust everything. |
1382 | 01:09:41,978 | 01:09:43,436 | Whether or not the Russians are involved, | Whether or not the Russians are involved, |
1383 | 01:09:43,520 | 01:09:45,186 | these next few months are gonna be tense. | these next few months are gonna be tense. |
1384 | 01:09:47,895 | 01:09:49,395 | Newscaster: We do have breaking news. | Newscaster: We do have breaking news. |
1385 | 01:09:49,478 | 01:09:52,728 | The coronavirus outbreak is now a global pandemic. | The coronavirus outbreak is now a global pandemic. |
1386 | 01:09:52,812 | 01:09:54,478 | No country is untouched. | No country is untouched. |
1387 | 01:09:54,561 | 01:09:57,645 | No part of our everyday lives is untouched. | No part of our everyday lives is untouched. |
1388 | 01:09:57,728 | 01:09:59,770 | We will see more cases, | We will see more cases, |
1389 | 01:09:59,853 | 01:10:01,770 | and things will get worse. | and things will get worse. |
1390 | 01:10:03,645 | 01:10:05,353 | Sanger: The coronavirus | Sanger: The coronavirus |
1391 | 01:10:05,436 | 01:10:09,520 | has reordered the competition for world power. | has reordered the competition for world power. |
1392 | 01:10:09,603 | 01:10:11,520 | And so, it's not surprising | And so, it's not surprising |
1393 | 01:10:11,603 | 01:10:13,978 | that it's reordered cyber power, as well. | that it's reordered cyber power, as well. |
1394 | 01:10:14,061 | 01:10:16,395 | Newscaster: Bad information is now spreading online | Newscaster: Bad information is now spreading online |
1395 | 01:10:16,478 | 01:10:18,853 | faster than the coronavirus itself. | faster than the coronavirus itself. |
1396 | 01:10:18,937 | 01:10:20,853 | Cyber experts and public health officials | Cyber experts and public health officials |
1397 | 01:10:20,937 | 01:10:24,103 | warm this so-called info-demic is dangerous, | warm this so-called info-demic is dangerous, |
1398 | 01:10:24,186 | 01:10:26,103 | and needs to be contained. | and needs to be contained. |
1399 | 01:10:27,853 | 01:10:30,311 | Sanger: In the midst of covid-19, | Sanger: In the midst of covid-19, |
1400 | 01:10:30,395 | 01:10:33,561 | disinformation gets super caffeinated. | disinformation gets super caffeinated. |
1401 | 01:10:33,645 | 01:10:35,186 | And we see it play out | And we see it play out |
1402 | 01:10:35,269 | 01:10:38,353 | in Russia's favorite petri dish once again, | in Russia's favorite petri dish once again, |
1403 | 01:10:38,436 | 01:10:40,478 | in Ukraine. | in Ukraine. |
1404 | 01:10:40,561 | 01:10:44,019 | ♪ | ♪ |
1405 | 01:10:48,311 | 01:10:51,061 | Chris Miller: As the coronavirus began spreading across the world, | Chris Miller: As the coronavirus began spreading across the world, |
1406 | 01:10:51,144 | 01:10:53,728 | Ukraine quickly moved to start bringing | Ukraine quickly moved to start bringing |
1407 | 01:10:53,812 | 01:10:56,353 | some of its citizens back from Wuhan, | some of its citizens back from Wuhan, |
1408 | 01:10:56,436 | 01:10:59,895 | to serve out 14 days of self-isolation | to serve out 14 days of self-isolation |
1409 | 01:10:59,978 | 01:11:03,353 | in this tiny little town in central Ukraine. | in this tiny little town in central Ukraine. |
1410 | 01:11:03,436 | 01:11:06,645 | These people were not infected with the virus. | These people were not infected with the virus. |
1411 | 01:11:06,728 | 01:11:11,436 | But people on social media began spreading this misinformation | But people on social media began spreading this misinformation |
1412 | 01:11:11,520 | 01:11:15,561 | that these Ukrainians that are coming home from Wuhan are infected. | that these Ukrainians that are coming home from Wuhan are infected. |
1413 | 01:11:16,895 | 01:11:19,687 | People started using viber, | People started using viber, |
1414 | 01:11:19,770 | 01:11:23,645 | and Instagram and Facebook to warn each other. | and Instagram and Facebook to warn each other. |
1415 | 01:11:23,728 | 01:11:26,812 | Some of the messages went even further in saying | Some of the messages went even further in saying |
1416 | 01:11:26,895 | 01:11:29,520 | we need to go out into the streets and protest. | we need to go out into the streets and protest. |
1417 | 01:11:29,603 | 01:11:33,019 | We need to turn these buses of people around to protect our children. | We need to turn these buses of people around to protect our children. |
1418 | 01:11:33,103 | 01:11:36,937 | Or else we're going to wake up in the morning, and we'll all be dead. | Or else we're going to wake up in the morning, and we'll all be dead. |
1419 | 01:11:37,019 | 01:11:40,603 | -(Crowd yelling) -This disinformation actually fueled | -(Crowd yelling) -This disinformation actually fueled |
1420 | 01:11:40,687 | 01:11:43,103 | a real-life protest in the streets. | a real-life protest in the streets. |
1421 | 01:11:43,186 | 01:11:45,395 | (Rocks pelting buses) | (Rocks pelting buses) |
1422 | 01:11:48,478 | 01:11:51,311 | (Commotion, yelling) | (Commotion, yelling) |
1423 | 01:11:53,478 | 01:11:55,311 | Police came out in response. | Police came out in response. |
1424 | 01:11:55,395 | 01:11:57,061 | Clashes ensued. | Clashes ensued. |
1425 | 01:11:58,311 | 01:12:00,144 | (Siren blaring) | (Siren blaring) |
1426 | 01:12:00,228 | 01:12:03,311 | When something like this happens, in Ukraine especially, | When something like this happens, in Ukraine especially, |
1427 | 01:12:03,395 | 01:12:07,478 | the entity that is always pointed at first is Russia. | the entity that is always pointed at first is Russia. |
1428 | 01:12:07,561 | 01:12:12,061 | There are signs that Russia could be involved. | There are signs that Russia could be involved. |
1429 | 01:12:12,144 | 01:12:14,478 | But there are real people in these groups. | But there are real people in these groups. |
1430 | 01:12:14,561 | 01:12:16,186 | Real people who I interviewed, | Real people who I interviewed, |
1431 | 01:12:16,269 | 01:12:19,311 | who said, "I also shared messages in this group | who said, "I also shared messages in this group |
1432 | 01:12:19,395 | 01:12:20,645 | "to go out and protest, | "to go out and protest, |
1433 | 01:12:20,728 | 01:12:22,478 | to protect myself, to protect my family." | to protect myself, to protect my family." |
1434 | 01:12:22,561 | 01:12:25,061 | And it just spiraled out of control very, very, very quickly. | And it just spiraled out of control very, very, very quickly. |
1435 | 01:12:25,144 | 01:12:26,186 | Within hours. | Within hours. |
1436 | 01:12:28,395 | 01:12:31,311 | Sanger: There's a lesson in what happened in Ukraine. | Sanger: There's a lesson in what happened in Ukraine. |
1437 | 01:12:31,395 | 01:12:34,853 | The Russians are already changing the playbook. | The Russians are already changing the playbook. |
1438 | 01:12:34,937 | 01:12:36,561 | They're targeting people | They're targeting people |
1439 | 01:12:36,645 | 01:12:39,395 | who might be susceptible to the message, | who might be susceptible to the message, |
1440 | 01:12:39,478 | 01:12:41,228 | the conspiracy. | the conspiracy. |
1441 | 01:12:41,311 | 01:12:43,269 | And repeat it themselves. | And repeat it themselves. |
1442 | 01:12:44,269 | 01:12:46,311 | And it's not just the Russians. | And it's not just the Russians. |
1443 | 01:12:46,395 | 01:12:49,436 | The pandemic now becoming even more than a public health crisis. | The pandemic now becoming even more than a public health crisis. |
1444 | 01:12:49,520 | 01:12:51,812 | It is turning into a major diplomatic clash | It is turning into a major diplomatic clash |
1445 | 01:12:51,895 | 01:12:55,395 | as the blame game unfolds on the origins of the virus. | as the blame game unfolds on the origins of the virus. |
1446 | 01:12:55,478 | 01:12:57,853 | I would like to begin | I would like to begin |
1447 | 01:12:57,937 | 01:12:59,853 | by announcing some important developments | by announcing some important developments |
1448 | 01:12:59,937 | 01:13:03,144 | in our war against the Chinese virus. | in our war against the Chinese virus. |
1449 | 01:13:03,228 | 01:13:06,103 | (Speaking foreign language) | (Speaking foreign language) |
1450 | 01:13:09,728 | 01:13:11,937 | The Chinese in 2020 | The Chinese in 2020 |
1451 | 01:13:12,019 | 01:13:14,395 | have used disinformation brilliantly | have used disinformation brilliantly |
1452 | 01:13:14,478 | 01:13:18,895 | as people have been casting blame for covid-19. | as people have been casting blame for covid-19. |
1453 | 01:13:18,978 | 01:13:20,728 | There was a story spread | There was a story spread |
1454 | 01:13:20,812 | 01:13:24,103 | that the virus didn't begin in a wet market in Wuhan. | that the virus didn't begin in a wet market in Wuhan. |
1455 | 01:13:24,186 | 01:13:29,728 | But instead that it began with a US army exercise in China. | But instead that it began with a US army exercise in China. |
1456 | 01:13:29,812 | 01:13:33,144 | There's absolutely no evidence for this at all. | There's absolutely no evidence for this at all. |
1457 | 01:13:33,228 | 01:13:35,019 | But the Chinese saw | But the Chinese saw |
1458 | 01:13:35,103 | 01:13:39,311 | how well the Russians were able to plant this information, | how well the Russians were able to plant this information, |
1459 | 01:13:39,395 | 01:13:42,186 | and watch it take off naturally | and watch it take off naturally |
1460 | 01:13:42,269 | 01:13:45,937 | among conspiracy theorists and others. | among conspiracy theorists and others. |
1461 | 01:13:46,895 | 01:13:50,436 | ♪ | ♪ |
1462 | 01:13:52,144 | 01:13:54,770 | Stamos: I think we've been highly distracted as a country | Stamos: I think we've been highly distracted as a country |
1463 | 01:13:54,853 | 01:13:58,061 | by focusing just on Russia since 2016. | by focusing just on Russia since 2016. |
1464 | 01:13:58,144 | 01:14:01,353 | When the real long-term strategic challenge for US | When the real long-term strategic challenge for US |
1465 | 01:14:01,436 | 01:14:03,561 | is going to be China globally. | is going to be China globally. |
1466 | 01:14:03,645 | 01:14:06,478 | Alperovitch: Russian foreign policy is to take others down, | Alperovitch: Russian foreign policy is to take others down, |
1467 | 01:14:06,561 | 01:14:09,019 | and cause disruption in the system. | and cause disruption in the system. |
1468 | 01:14:09,853 | 01:14:11,436 | China has very different priorities. | China has very different priorities. |
1469 | 01:14:11,520 | 01:14:13,812 | They're trying to work within the system and take over the system, | They're trying to work within the system and take over the system, |
1470 | 01:14:13,895 | 01:14:16,478 | so they're not interested in chaos. It's all about theft. | so they're not interested in chaos. It's all about theft. |
1471 | 01:14:16,561 | 01:14:18,812 | And primarily theft of intellectual property | And primarily theft of intellectual property |
1472 | 01:14:18,895 | 01:14:21,520 | that can be used to further build up the Chinese economy. | that can be used to further build up the Chinese economy. |
1473 | 01:14:25,144 | 01:14:27,603 | There was one time we were brought into a company | There was one time we were brought into a company |
1474 | 01:14:27,687 | 01:14:30,353 | that was in the satellite communications business. | that was in the satellite communications business. |
1475 | 01:14:31,269 | 01:14:32,603 | They had discovered a hack, | They had discovered a hack, |
1476 | 01:14:32,687 | 01:14:34,645 | and, uh, they asked US to analyze it, | and, uh, they asked US to analyze it, |
1477 | 01:14:34,728 | 01:14:37,311 | and ultimately help protect them. | and ultimately help protect them. |
1478 | 01:14:38,019 | 01:14:40,228 | We saw that the email address | We saw that the email address |
1479 | 01:14:40,311 | 01:14:42,978 | that was being used to register a bunch of this infrastructure | that was being used to register a bunch of this infrastructure |
1480 | 01:14:43,061 | 01:14:45,144 | was being reused continuously. | was being reused continuously. |
1481 | 01:14:45,228 | 01:14:47,687 | It was a gmail address. | It was a gmail address. |
1482 | 01:14:47,770 | 01:14:49,978 | And we tracked it to an individual in China. | And we tracked it to an individual in China. |
1483 | 01:14:50,061 | 01:14:52,311 | They had a social persona, | They had a social persona, |
1484 | 01:14:52,395 | 01:14:54,144 | and had a picasa album, | and had a picasa album, |
1485 | 01:14:54,228 | 01:14:58,144 | which at the time was a photo album that was owned by Google. | which at the time was a photo album that was owned by Google. |
1486 | 01:14:58,228 | 01:15:01,144 | It was open, and he had a bunch of pictures of his girlfriend, | It was open, and he had a bunch of pictures of his girlfriend, |
1487 | 01:15:01,228 | 01:15:03,687 | and his family, and himself. | and his family, and himself. |
1488 | 01:15:10,520 | 01:15:13,061 | And he had pictures of his dorm room. | And he had pictures of his dorm room. |
1489 | 01:15:16,061 | 01:15:19,353 | And in the corner of the dorm room we saw a hat. | And in the corner of the dorm room we saw a hat. |
1490 | 01:15:22,478 | 01:15:24,228 | We started doing imagery analysis, | We started doing imagery analysis, |
1491 | 01:15:24,311 | 01:15:27,269 | and we noticed that the hat was pla officer's hat. | and we noticed that the hat was pla officer's hat. |
1492 | 01:15:28,770 | 01:15:30,561 | We thought, "this might be interesting." | We thought, "this might be interesting." |
1493 | 01:15:30,645 | 01:15:32,728 | We might have someone from the Chinese military | We might have someone from the Chinese military |
1494 | 01:15:32,812 | 01:15:35,645 | on our hands here that may be responsible for these attacks. | on our hands here that may be responsible for these attacks. |
1495 | 01:15:38,812 | 01:15:41,269 | We found other pictures that he had posted online | We found other pictures that he had posted online |
1496 | 01:15:41,353 | 01:15:43,853 | that were labeled "office." | that were labeled "office." |
1497 | 01:15:43,937 | 01:15:47,478 | There was a picture of this big white building behind him | There was a picture of this big white building behind him |
1498 | 01:15:47,561 | 01:15:50,520 | that had huge antennae dishes, | that had huge antennae dishes, |
1499 | 01:15:50,603 | 01:15:52,561 | had reflective coating on the windows, | had reflective coating on the windows, |
1500 | 01:15:52,645 | 01:15:55,103 | that would prevent signal interception. | that would prevent signal interception. |
1501 | 01:15:55,186 | 01:15:57,645 | We started doing satellite imagery analysis | We started doing satellite imagery analysis |
1502 | 01:15:57,728 | 01:15:59,520 | to try to locate this building. | to try to locate this building. |
1503 | 01:15:59,603 | 01:16:02,103 | We tracked it down to Shanghai. | We tracked it down to Shanghai. |
1504 | 01:16:02,186 | 01:16:03,853 | To a particular area of Shanghai. | To a particular area of Shanghai. |
1505 | 01:16:03,937 | 01:16:06,269 | We started looking at the imagery. We said, "wait a second. | We started looking at the imagery. We said, "wait a second. |
1506 | 01:16:06,353 | 01:16:09,186 | There's military guard gates all over this building." | There's military guard gates all over this building." |
1507 | 01:16:09,269 | 01:16:11,436 | We got the address of that building, | We got the address of that building, |
1508 | 01:16:11,520 | 01:16:16,061 | and we started looking into Chinese government materials. | and we started looking into Chinese government materials. |
1509 | 01:16:16,144 | 01:16:18,603 | And sure enough, we discovered there was the headquarters | And sure enough, we discovered there was the headquarters |
1510 | 01:16:18,687 | 01:16:21,061 | of the 12th bureau of the third department | of the 12th bureau of the third department |
1511 | 01:16:21,144 | 01:16:24,103 | of the general staff of the people's liberation army, | of the general staff of the people's liberation army, |
1512 | 01:16:24,186 | 01:16:26,144 | giving US pretty high-level confidence | giving US pretty high-level confidence |
1513 | 01:16:26,228 | 01:16:29,311 | that this hack had come from the Chinese military. | that this hack had come from the Chinese military. |
1514 | 01:16:33,853 | 01:16:36,436 | Clapper: This is actually part of a plan. | Clapper: This is actually part of a plan. |
1515 | 01:16:37,478 | 01:16:40,395 | They lay it out in their, their five-year plans | They lay it out in their, their five-year plans |
1516 | 01:16:40,478 | 01:16:42,561 | for the technology they want to acquire. | for the technology they want to acquire. |
1517 | 01:16:42,645 | 01:16:45,603 | If they can generate it indigenously, great. | If they can generate it indigenously, great. |
1518 | 01:16:45,687 | 01:16:46,895 | If they can't, | If they can't, |
1519 | 01:16:46,978 | 01:16:49,687 | because they want to get it fast, they'll steal it. | because they want to get it fast, they'll steal it. |
1520 | 01:16:52,478 | 01:16:54,853 | China alone is responsible for hacks | China alone is responsible for hacks |
1521 | 01:16:54,937 | 01:16:58,603 | to almost 700 public and private targets in the US | to almost 700 public and private targets in the US |
1522 | 01:16:58,687 | 01:17:00,395 | in the last five years. | in the last five years. |
1523 | 01:17:01,687 | 01:17:03,228 | Zegart: One of the reasons why | Zegart: One of the reasons why |
1524 | 01:17:03,311 | 01:17:04,770 | China's most sophisticated airplane | China's most sophisticated airplane |
1525 | 01:17:04,853 | 01:17:07,436 | looks like the f-35 joint strike fighter | looks like the f-35 joint strike fighter |
1526 | 01:17:07,520 | 01:17:09,770 | is because they stole some of the technology | is because they stole some of the technology |
1527 | 01:17:09,853 | 01:17:11,520 | from the f-35 joint strike fighter. | from the f-35 joint strike fighter. |
1528 | 01:17:11,603 | 01:17:14,228 | When you look at pictures of it, you go, "man, that looks familiar." | When you look at pictures of it, you go, "man, that looks familiar." |
1529 | 01:17:15,603 | 01:17:17,103 | And that's just the tip of the iceberg, | And that's just the tip of the iceberg, |
1530 | 01:17:17,186 | 01:17:18,645 | from the Chinese side. | from the Chinese side. |
1531 | 01:17:18,728 | 01:17:21,186 | Newscaster: Google says it and at least 20 other companies | Newscaster: Google says it and at least 20 other companies |
1532 | 01:17:21,269 | 01:17:24,395 | were victims of a targeted cyber attack originating in China. | were victims of a targeted cyber attack originating in China. |
1533 | 01:17:24,478 | 01:17:28,353 | A very sophisticated cyber attack on the health insurer anthem. | A very sophisticated cyber attack on the health insurer anthem. |
1534 | 01:17:28,436 | 01:17:31,436 | Newscaster 2: This intrusion is once again the work of state-sponsored | Newscaster 2: This intrusion is once again the work of state-sponsored |
1535 | 01:17:31,520 | 01:17:34,228 | espionage groups based in China. | espionage groups based in China. |
1536 | 01:17:35,311 | 01:17:36,937 | Sanger: And then the Chinese escalated. | Sanger: And then the Chinese escalated. |
1537 | 01:17:37,019 | 01:17:41,311 | They spent a year inside the office of personnel management, | They spent a year inside the office of personnel management, |
1538 | 01:17:41,395 | 01:17:44,478 | the most boring bureaucracy in america. | the most boring bureaucracy in america. |
1539 | 01:17:44,561 | 01:17:47,019 | Zegart: They stole 22 million files | Zegart: They stole 22 million files |
1540 | 01:17:47,103 | 01:17:50,978 | of highly classified security clearance applications. | of highly classified security clearance applications. |
1541 | 01:17:51,061 | 01:17:52,853 | That is an intelligence nightmare. | That is an intelligence nightmare. |
1542 | 01:17:52,937 | 01:17:56,478 | The Chinese now have all sorts of detailed information | The Chinese now have all sorts of detailed information |
1543 | 01:17:56,561 | 01:17:58,311 | about your family members, | about your family members, |
1544 | 01:17:58,395 | 01:18:00,019 | foreign friends that you may have, | foreign friends that you may have, |
1545 | 01:18:00,103 | 01:18:02,478 | that could be used to actually recruit assets | that could be used to actually recruit assets |
1546 | 01:18:02,561 | 01:18:05,103 | for the Chinese government sometime in the future. | for the Chinese government sometime in the future. |
1547 | 01:18:06,728 | 01:18:08,311 | Sanger: By 2020, | Sanger: By 2020, |
1548 | 01:18:08,395 | 01:18:11,687 | they were back at it in a much more sophisticated way. | they were back at it in a much more sophisticated way. |
1549 | 01:18:11,770 | 01:18:14,520 | News anchor: The FBI and federal cyber security agents | News anchor: The FBI and federal cyber security agents |
1550 | 01:18:14,603 | 01:18:17,853 | are warning that hackers linked to the Chinese government | are warning that hackers linked to the Chinese government |
1551 | 01:18:17,937 | 01:18:22,770 | are trying to steal research on coronavirus vaccines and therapies. | are trying to steal research on coronavirus vaccines and therapies. |
1552 | 01:18:22,853 | 01:18:26,019 | Sanger: The way jet fighter designs might have been | Sanger: The way jet fighter designs might have been |
1553 | 01:18:26,103 | 01:18:27,395 | a decade ago, | a decade ago, |
1554 | 01:18:27,478 | 01:18:31,228 | coronavirus has become the holy grail. | coronavirus has become the holy grail. |
1555 | 01:18:32,895 | 01:18:35,269 | Because the country that wins the race | Because the country that wins the race |
1556 | 01:18:35,353 | 01:18:38,853 | for the vaccine and the treatment of covid-19 | for the vaccine and the treatment of covid-19 |
1557 | 01:18:38,937 | 01:18:42,186 | will become a new kind of power, | will become a new kind of power, |
1558 | 01:18:42,269 | 01:18:46,228 | able to spread that vaccine around the world. | able to spread that vaccine around the world. |
1559 | 01:18:49,103 | 01:18:51,895 | Finally, and perhaps most importantly, | Finally, and perhaps most importantly, |
1560 | 01:18:51,978 | 01:18:56,311 | as China has spread its economic tentacles through the world, | as China has spread its economic tentacles through the world, |
1561 | 01:18:56,395 | 01:18:59,019 | it has recognized that the networks | it has recognized that the networks |
1562 | 01:18:59,103 | 01:19:01,520 | it is selling to everybody else | it is selling to everybody else |
1563 | 01:19:01,603 | 01:19:05,395 | across fiber optic cable and 5g networks | across fiber optic cable and 5g networks |
1564 | 01:19:05,478 | 01:19:08,770 | gives them an element of control | gives them an element of control |
1565 | 01:19:08,853 | 01:19:12,269 | that a few years ago they could scarcely have even imagined. | that a few years ago they could scarcely have even imagined. |
1566 | 01:19:13,478 | 01:19:15,395 | Alperovitch: You could see a future where | Alperovitch: You could see a future where |
1567 | 01:19:15,478 | 01:19:18,103 | every device that you can imagine is on the Internet, | every device that you can imagine is on the Internet, |
1568 | 01:19:18,186 | 01:19:21,144 | and is connected to the 5g cellular network. | and is connected to the 5g cellular network. |
1569 | 01:19:21,228 | 01:19:24,269 | Warner: 5g is like moving from radio to television | Warner: 5g is like moving from radio to television |
1570 | 01:19:24,353 | 01:19:27,103 | in terms of how we use our telecommunication system, | in terms of how we use our telecommunication system, |
1571 | 01:19:27,186 | 01:19:29,687 | and if we're thinking about, you know, driverless cars, | and if we're thinking about, you know, driverless cars, |
1572 | 01:19:29,770 | 01:19:32,687 | or our, our refrigerator that's connected to the Internet, | or our, our refrigerator that's connected to the Internet, |
1573 | 01:19:32,770 | 01:19:34,228 | and all of the possibilities | and all of the possibilities |
1574 | 01:19:34,311 | 01:19:36,019 | that come with a totally interconnected world, | that come with a totally interconnected world, |
1575 | 01:19:36,103 | 01:19:38,186 | that rides on a 5g network. | that rides on a 5g network. |
1576 | 01:19:38,269 | 01:19:40,269 | So who controls that network | So who controls that network |
1577 | 01:19:40,353 | 01:19:43,812 | is extraordinarily important, and I think what we're waking up to | is extraordinarily important, and I think what we're waking up to |
1578 | 01:19:43,895 | 01:19:46,269 | is we're confronting China | is we're confronting China |
1579 | 01:19:46,353 | 01:19:49,228 | that has a national champion in its company huawei | that has a national champion in its company huawei |
1580 | 01:19:49,311 | 01:19:52,687 | that is a long-term security threat. | that is a long-term security threat. |
1581 | 01:19:52,770 | 01:19:57,311 | Hurd: This company huawei is the largest provider of 5g equipment. | Hurd: This company huawei is the largest provider of 5g equipment. |
1582 | 01:19:57,395 | 01:20:00,520 | They're the ones building the antennas that you need. | They're the ones building the antennas that you need. |
1583 | 01:20:00,603 | 01:20:04,478 | They're the ones that are building the systems that moves the data. | They're the ones that are building the systems that moves the data. |
1584 | 01:20:05,853 | 01:20:09,228 | The United States' position on this is that | The United States' position on this is that |
1585 | 01:20:09,311 | 01:20:13,144 | any information that is able to transmit | any information that is able to transmit |
1586 | 01:20:13,228 | 01:20:15,186 | across huawei technology | across huawei technology |
1587 | 01:20:15,269 | 01:20:19,770 | will ultimately be accessible by the Chinese government. | will ultimately be accessible by the Chinese government. |
1588 | 01:20:19,853 | 01:20:21,770 | And what is the Chinese government | And what is the Chinese government |
1589 | 01:20:21,853 | 01:20:24,019 | going to do with that information | going to do with that information |
1590 | 01:20:24,103 | 01:20:25,978 | is the ultimate question. | is the ultimate question. |
1591 | 01:20:26,061 | 01:20:29,561 | ♪ | ♪ |
1592 | 01:20:33,895 | 01:20:36,395 | (Crowd cheering) | (Crowd cheering) |
1593 | 01:20:36,478 | 01:20:37,770 | Thank you. | Thank you. |
1594 | 01:20:40,228 | 01:20:43,103 | So we begin, Oklahoma. We begin. | So we begin, Oklahoma. We begin. |
1595 | 01:20:43,186 | 01:20:45,019 | Thank you, Oklahoma. | Thank you, Oklahoma. |
1596 | 01:20:45,103 | 01:20:49,311 | And thank you to vice president Mike pence. | And thank you to vice president Mike pence. |
1597 | 01:20:49,395 | 01:20:51,895 | We begin. We begin our campaign. | We begin. We begin our campaign. |
1598 | 01:20:51,978 | 01:20:54,687 | Man singing: ♪ happy birthday, Mr. President... ♪ | Man singing: ♪ happy birthday, Mr. President... ♪ |
1599 | 01:20:54,770 | 01:20:55,895 | That's nice. | That's nice. |
1600 | 01:20:55,978 | 01:20:58,144 | (Crowd cheering) | (Crowd cheering) |
1601 | 01:20:59,186 | 01:21:00,728 | Thank you. | Thank you. |
1602 | 01:21:00,812 | 01:21:02,895 | (Crowd cheering) | (Crowd cheering) |
1603 | 01:21:13,520 | 01:21:15,812 | Christopher krebs: I have spent the last year | Christopher krebs: I have spent the last year |
1604 | 01:21:15,895 | 01:21:19,144 | gaming out the 2020 election. | gaming out the 2020 election. |
1605 | 01:21:19,228 | 01:21:20,770 | Trying to get ahead of it. Really trying to think through | Trying to get ahead of it. Really trying to think through |
1606 | 01:21:20,853 | 01:21:22,937 | what, what's next. What's next, what's next. | what, what's next. What's next, what's next. |
1607 | 01:21:24,895 | 01:21:27,186 | My nightmare scenario is ransomware. | My nightmare scenario is ransomware. |
1608 | 01:21:27,269 | 01:21:31,603 | That a ransomware actor would gain access to a voter registration database, | That a ransomware actor would gain access to a voter registration database, |
1609 | 01:21:31,687 | 01:21:35,687 | lock it up, and say, "hey, election official. | lock it up, and say, "hey, election official. |
1610 | 01:21:35,770 | 01:21:37,561 | "I've locked this up. | "I've locked this up. |
1611 | 01:21:37,645 | 01:21:41,645 | I'm not giving it back to you unless you give me $3 million." | I'm not giving it back to you unless you give me $3 million." |
1612 | 01:21:43,395 | 01:21:45,228 | This is what gets me up every morning. | This is what gets me up every morning. |
1613 | 01:21:45,311 | 01:21:46,603 | It's the last thing I think about at night. | It's the last thing I think about at night. |
1614 | 01:21:46,687 | 01:21:47,853 | I wake up in the middle of the night | I wake up in the middle of the night |
1615 | 01:21:47,937 | 01:21:49,228 | and think about it. When I'm walking the dog. | and think about it. When I'm walking the dog. |
1616 | 01:21:49,311 | 01:21:51,687 | Up here, oh, it's a hellscape right now. | Up here, oh, it's a hellscape right now. |
1617 | 01:21:54,978 | 01:21:57,520 | Clinton: When you have a government led by someone | Clinton: When you have a government led by someone |
1618 | 01:21:57,603 | 01:22:00,603 | who appears to be beholden | who appears to be beholden |
1619 | 01:22:00,687 | 01:22:02,144 | to Vladimir putin, | to Vladimir putin, |
1620 | 01:22:02,228 | 01:22:04,311 | you don't have much confidence | you don't have much confidence |
1621 | 01:22:04,395 | 01:22:07,645 | that your own government is going to protect | that your own government is going to protect |
1622 | 01:22:07,728 | 01:22:10,520 | the integrity of our election. | the integrity of our election. |
1623 | 01:22:10,603 | 01:22:13,812 | I'm somebody who thinks that putin should have paid a price. | I'm somebody who thinks that putin should have paid a price. |
1624 | 01:22:14,937 | 01:22:16,937 | I don't know if we're gonna find out | I don't know if we're gonna find out |
1625 | 01:22:17,019 | 01:22:18,770 | exactly what the threat is | exactly what the threat is |
1626 | 01:22:18,853 | 01:22:21,478 | until, once again, it's too late. | until, once again, it's too late. |
1627 | 01:22:24,311 | 01:22:26,770 | Sanger: In 2020, the Russians are back, | Sanger: In 2020, the Russians are back, |
1628 | 01:22:26,853 | 01:22:29,019 | but so are the Chinese. | but so are the Chinese. |
1629 | 01:22:29,812 | 01:22:31,395 | And the Iranians. | And the Iranians. |
1630 | 01:22:31,478 | 01:22:33,728 | And the north Koreans. | And the north Koreans. |
1631 | 01:22:35,269 | 01:22:37,436 | All of these countries are just experimenting | All of these countries are just experimenting |
1632 | 01:22:37,520 | 01:22:40,895 | with things that they learned from watching the Russians. | with things that they learned from watching the Russians. |
1633 | 01:22:40,978 | 01:22:44,645 | They realize that they can do damage to US, | They realize that they can do damage to US, |
1634 | 01:22:44,728 | 01:22:48,395 | by merely opening up the chasms that already exist | by merely opening up the chasms that already exist |
1635 | 01:22:48,478 | 01:22:50,019 | in American society. | in American society. |
1636 | 01:22:50,103 | 01:22:53,228 | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ |
1637 | 01:22:58,311 | 01:23:00,645 | Rosenbach: If it were going to be a nation-state actor | Rosenbach: If it were going to be a nation-state actor |
1638 | 01:23:00,728 | 01:23:03,687 | who's gonna disrupt the elections in 2020, | who's gonna disrupt the elections in 2020, |
1639 | 01:23:03,770 | 01:23:07,561 | I think mostly likely it would be the north Koreans | I think mostly likely it would be the north Koreans |
1640 | 01:23:07,645 | 01:23:09,937 | or the Iranians. | or the Iranians. |
1641 | 01:23:10,019 | 01:23:13,645 | If we were going to look for an Iranian attack, for example, | If we were going to look for an Iranian attack, for example, |
1642 | 01:23:13,728 | 01:23:17,103 | all they would have to do is destroy one thing | all they would have to do is destroy one thing |
1643 | 01:23:17,186 | 01:23:19,269 | in one state or one county, | in one state or one county, |
1644 | 01:23:19,353 | 01:23:22,645 | in conjunction with an information operation that would say, | in conjunction with an information operation that would say, |
1645 | 01:23:22,728 | 01:23:24,978 | "we are the holy warriors of Iran, | "we are the holy warriors of Iran, |
1646 | 01:23:25,061 | 01:23:27,770 | and we successfully locked up this server." | and we successfully locked up this server." |
1647 | 01:23:27,853 | 01:23:30,603 | The press would cover it. There would be all these questions, | The press would cover it. There would be all these questions, |
1648 | 01:23:30,687 | 01:23:32,520 | and america would be wrapped in knots. | and america would be wrapped in knots. |
1649 | 01:23:32,603 | 01:23:35,186 | At the same time, you know, certain political leaders | At the same time, you know, certain political leaders |
1650 | 01:23:35,269 | 01:23:36,937 | might also take advantage of that. | might also take advantage of that. |
1651 | 01:23:41,853 | 01:23:45,186 | One final question. Our intelligence agencies have said | One final question. Our intelligence agencies have said |
1652 | 01:23:45,269 | 01:23:47,978 | that your country is among the countries | that your country is among the countries |
1653 | 01:23:48,061 | 01:23:50,728 | that are attempting to interfere in our election. | that are attempting to interfere in our election. |
1654 | 01:23:50,812 | 01:23:54,186 | We don't interfere in the internal affairs of another country, | We don't interfere in the internal affairs of another country, |
1655 | 01:23:54,269 | 01:23:57,144 | but there is a cyber war going on. | but there is a cyber war going on. |
1656 | 01:23:57,228 | 01:23:59,853 | The United States started that cyber war. | The United States started that cyber war. |
1657 | 01:23:59,937 | 01:24:01,353 | You remember stuxnet. | You remember stuxnet. |
1658 | 01:24:01,436 | 01:24:05,061 | Any war that the United States starts, | Any war that the United States starts, |
1659 | 01:24:05,144 | 01:24:07,561 | it won't be able to finish. | it won't be able to finish. |
1660 | 01:24:07,645 | 01:24:10,978 | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ |
1661 | 01:24:22,395 | 01:24:26,269 | ♪ ♪ | ♪ ♪ |